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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The problem of the thesis. 
The problem of this thesis is to try to define Plato's philosophy 
of education in the early dialogues, its importance, and its relation to 
the later dialogues. Many authorities mention that Plato was one of the 
first great ·educational theorists, but there is an astonishing dearth of 
scholarly treatment on this aspect of his thought in relation to his philoso-
phy as a whole. Volumes have been written on Plato's Ideas, his theory 
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of knowledge, the Good and his political thought, but the only analysis de-
voted to the place of education in the Platonic system, at this writing, is 
Werner Jaeger•s Paideia. This thesis does not presume to fill the need 
for a detailed analysis of Plato's educational theories as they pertain to 
his complete philosophy--it is to be hoped, however, that its structure 
will at least indicate the type of treatment that is needed. Texts that in-
clude Platot s educational ideas and deal with them to any extent usually 
limit the discussion to a description of educational concepts found in the 
Republic; this is understandable, but regrettable because there is a wealth 
of material in the earlier dialogues that helps in the understanding of 
Plato's precepts in the Republic. 
i. Three aspects of education in Plato's dialogues. 
There are at least three important ways in which to think of 
education in connection with Plato's dialogues. First, Plato .is an 
exceptionally fine teacher himself--he cannot be read passively. The 
dialogues delineate fundamental problems as polemics and it is the 
skillful presentation of these controversial issues that stimulates thought 
and makes the dialogues ageless masterpieces of philosophical literature. 
Because the educational method used by Plato is an integral part of his 
philosophy and because of its importance as educational technique, con-
siderable space is devoted to the literary form of the dialogues. 
The second aspect of the dialogues that is important educationally 
consists of the precepts that Plato describes, primarily in the Republic 
and the Laws. Many of these educational dicta are extremely cogent--
for example, Plato's insight into the effect of environment and child 
psychology on training--but on the whole this is the least important and 
most easily dated part of Plato's educational philosophy, even though the 
most often cited; for that reason the practical rules and regulations and 
their application as discussed in the dialogues will not occupy an im-
portant place in this thesis. 
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The third and by far the most important phase of Plato's education-
al thought lies in its relation to the development of Plato's philosophy. 
Plato's theories on education are not afterthoughts to the rest of his 
philosophy; if the educational theories of most other philosophers who 
have noted the importance of education were burned their philosophy would 
hardly suffer. But in Plato's case, his works would be rather barren and 
in many cases meaningless without the frequent references to teachers 
' and teaching. 
In reading the dialogues, Plato's personality; the personality of 
a pragmatic and very realistic artist and thinker who was striving to 
solve the problems of his day, is always evident. His method is not 
fragmentary or superficial, as these individual, informally written dia-
logues might lead one to think, but a unified development of organized 
and profound thought in which every element is reasoned and justified by 
a meaningful whole. Plato did not solve by any means all the problems 
that he raised, but he did bring up most of the questions that are still 
pertinent to philosophical speculation in such a way that they are a dis-
tinct contribution to philosophy because of the relations that he perceived 
to exist between the practical and the theoretical, the individual and the 
state, ethics and education, epistemology and metaphysics, and so on 
through the list of problems that have since become traditional with 
philosophy. His is philosophy in the "grand manner" --Plato tries to 
make use of all experiences in the effort to explain those experiences 
meaningfully in their many rich interpenetrations. 
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The emphasis that has been placed on Plato's Ideas and his realm 
of Forms in themselves is unjustified until it has been shown why and how 
they fit into the living fabric of Plato's thought. Unlike so much of modern 
philosophy, Plato did not develop separate disciplines with an eye to an 
exhaustive technical analysis or in the conviction that one pigeonhole of 
philosophical thought held all the answers. 1 His interest lay in the 
1. Cf. Wild, PTM, 128-129. 
complete life, and his philosophy reflects the unceasing search for the 
justification of that life, as he saw it, and the attempt to organize the 
frame of mind and the social system in which such a life could be realized; 
therefore, to separate from the whole any part of Plato's philosophy is to 
do him an injustice. Since this thesis is concerned with one aspect of 
Plato's writings, a methodological problem immediately becomes evi-
dent: How can Plato's educational theory be discussed without a thorough 
analysis of his philosophy as a whole? 
The first section of the thesis is an attempt to solve one part of 
the methodological problem by presenting an attitude towards his philoso-
phy as a whole through a discussion of form in the dialogues. In order 
to obviate the problem of extracting "education" at the expense of its true 
place in Plato's development, .the most important of the early dialogues 
have been summarized; conclusions and observations pertinent to his edu-
cational theory are interspersed among or added to the summaries. 
This procedure is necessarily a compromise; the summaries are not 
Plato--there is no substitute for the original dialogues--and they have 
perhaps made the exposition too long, but it is hoped that they serve a 
purpose in showing where the educational references have come from and 
the problems from which they arise. 
ii. The educational approach to Plato. 
Before Plato's time there was no organized educational system. 1 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 111. 
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The proper education of a son was the responsibility of the father, and 
consisted of a rather elementary training, by slaves for the most part, 
in music, gymnastics and the proper use of arms. 1 Music, in the Greek 
sense, was the sum total of a folklore training in classic poetry, rhythm, 
harmony and perhaps the actual playing of some sort of musical instru-
ment. It was the "finishing school" of the citizen-warrior; the content 
was the cultural heritage of a proud but rather unsophisticated race; 
its function was not to turn out scholars and pedants but stalwart citizens 
with the pride and ability to defend their city honorably. Until the "golden 
age" of the fifth century the teachers of Hellas were the classic poets, 
but with the intellectual stimulation of this age there was an increased 
demand for cultural education, and a class of teachers, the Sophists, 
arose to meet the need. 
The Sophists represent more closely education as we think of it 
today; that is, they lectured on certain subjects for money, and although 
they have the reputation of having taught for the very practical purpose 
-of preparing their students to defend themselves successfully in a court 
of law, they did discuss and develop theories that had no obvious con-
nection with the workaday world--that is, purely educational and theo-
retical subjects. The Sophists do not represent systematic education, 
however; they were itinerant teachers; a student paid his money and took 
his choice. 
1. Plato, Prot., 325d-326d, Protagoras describes briefly the edu-
cation of a youth of means; see also Laches, 178-184c. 
Why is it that, with no tradition of systematized education behind 
him, 1 we find a highly organized and consciously directed program of 
education forming such an essential part of Plato's philosophy? 2 It 
is Werner Jaeger's thesis in his scholarly work Paideia, that Plato's 
philosophy is the natural development of the Greek cultural tradition 
dedicated to the search for a complete life, i. e. , bios. Jaeger's 
thoroughly documented study presents a theory with which it is hard to 
disagree; the problem here, however, is to determine why Plato in-
corporates into his philosophy the education that he did, and to evaluate 
its importance in his total system. 
The Sophists turned the mind of man from the abstract specu-
lations characteristic of the Milesian and Ionian scientists to the problem 
of man and his place in the universe. Socrates rejected the Sophists' 
relativistic point of view but developed their concern for the problems 
of man. The aesthetic tradition of the full and noble life is here fused 
with the philosophical problem of the nature of the cosmos and the 
central problem now becomes the definition of the good life in relation 
to the totality of reality. 
iii. Is "the good life" an educational problem? 
What problems doesnthe .good life"' raise? First, is it possible 
to strive for the good life? --that is, is the good life the product of 
1. Nettleship, EPR, 5. "What may be called the first system of edu-
cation iS developed [in the RepublicJ . " 
2. Cf. Barker, GPT, 37-40. 
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individual effort or is man merely born to be what he is? Is the reali-
zation of the good life nothing but a happy accident? The whole of Greek 
tradition assumes that honor and acclaim should accrue to the individual 
for exceptionally worthy deeds or noble traits of character. 1 Even 
though the notion of fate plays a very important part in Greek literature 
and thought, man is conceived as to some extent controlling his own 
destiny, and he is blamed or p.mised in accordance with what he is and 
what he does. It follows that only the virtuous can lead the good life, for 
it would be a contradiction in terms to say that a bad man could lead a 
good life. An unscrupulous man might lead a successful or a profitable 
life but not the good life. If success or accomplishment were the cri-
terion, then the good life would be the reward of natural strength or 
craftiness and not the result of the moral effort of the individual. 
Even if we assume that a man may improve through his own in-
itiative, can he be aided in his attempt to become virtuous? Can virtue 
be taught? The nature of virtue must be defined before this question 
can be answered. What is virtue? Plato answers with the Socratic 
paradox that virtue is knowledge. It can certainly be taught, then. Very 
well, what kind of knowledge is virtue? Here we are on the verge of 
the epistemological, metaphysical and eschatological problems that 
furnish the ground for the nature of knowledge and therefore of virtue. 
1. Barker, G PT, 2. "A sense of value of the individual was thus the 
primary condition of the development of political thought in Greece. " 
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But there is another aspect of Plato's thought just as pertinent and more 
directly concerned with the actual living of the good life: the social and 
the ethical. 1 If we assume that the individual has the knowledge neces-
sary to be virtuous, what is his relation to other human beings? Can 
the individual become virtuous if he is separated from society or, if he 
is already virtuous, can he lead the good life apart from a community? 
The Greek organic conception of the individual and society was such that 
a man was thought to realize himself only in a social structure; in fact 
the highest form of self-realization came through society, that is, in 
some form of public service. 2 
If this is so, again we must ask what is the virtuous individual's 
relation to the social organization of which he is a part? He is indebted 
to the state in some respect since he was granted the opportunity to 
become virtuous in that society.3 Then again, the individual has the self-
imposed responsibility of trying to improve the community in which he 
lives because it is an intrinsic part of his life, and it follows that the 
good life could be realized to the fullest only in the best possible environ-
ment. 4 
How is the individual to effect an improvement in the state? 
Obviously, by teaching others to be as virtuous as he is. People are 
1. Wild, PTM, 15-16. 
2. Barker, GPT, 146. "To the Greek it was obvious that a good man 
must be a member of a state, and could only be made good through 
membership of a state." Cf. Nettleship, LRP, 5. 
3. Plato, Rep., 596e; cf . Wild, PTM, 76. 
4. Cf. Wheelwright, CIE, 175; Sabine, HPT, 39. 
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plastic and have an infinite capacity for improvement, but they also have 
the capacity to degenerate because of this plastic nature. It is a moral 
obligation that the man who would improve the people must know why he 
himself is virtuous and why the ends he would have others strive for are 
right. It would be a compound crime if he educated the people on the 
basis of mere opinion and it proved that this opinion were wrong, for 
then he would have made the people worse. 
How is the conscientious person to acquire the strength of his 
convictions, the positive assurance that he will improve the peop~e by 
his education? At this point it is necessary to go back and pick up the 
other thread of Plato's thought, for it now becomes absolutely necessary 
that the nature of knowledge, the metaphysical frame, the ultimate 
principle of all existence be known to the educator of the people so that 
he will know why the improvements he suggests are right. 1 The ex-
amination of his own virtue has led to the ground, the final justification 
of all social action. This knowledge of the Good in turn suggests the 
structure of the state and the nature of the education necessary for its 
perpetuation. 
If the state is the best state possible and if it is founded on the 
complete knowledge of all of reality, then any change in principles will 
1. Cf. Field, POP, 23-27. There is a necessary relationship between 
morals and social organization; the attempt to find a criterion for 
moral judgment leads to the problems of epistemology and meta-
physics. Field's introductory chapter, pages 7-27, is very similar 
to the argument of this thesis. 
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be for the worse. The state seen in this interpretation is not the end to 
which. the individual must subjugate himself and in which the individual is 
lost, contrary to the opinion of so many modern critics who see in Plato · 
the seeds of fascism or communism; it is the necessary medium for the 
realization of the good life for the individual. This becomes clear if the 
argument is carried out and we ask of Plato why the good life is worth-
while; why should the individual strive to be virtuous and why should he 
seek to improve the people? Socrates was executed for trying to do just 
that! The eschatological myths of the Gorgias, the Phaedo, and the 
Republic show the good life as the prerequisite for personal immortality; 1 
whether this view is accepted or not it furnishes proof that Plato cannot 
be lumped together with the more despicable forms of authoritarian rule--
10 
his purpose was not to establish rule of the aristocrat at the expense of 
the common man but to create a society in which the highest and best 
ideals of man could be realized to the benefit of all citizens .2 
iv. The educational importance of the problem of virtue. 
When Socrates asks "Can virtue be taught?" it seems to be a 
fairly simple question, but its compound implications make it a very com-
plex one to answer with any degree of clarity. It is by far the most im-
portant question in the early dialogues, ~nd the one from which the rest 
of Plato's philosophy evolves. Before any answer, let alone a positive one, 
can be given, a decision must be reached as to whether anything at all can 
1. Plato, Gorg., 523a-526d; Phaedo, 107c-114c; Rep., 614b-621b. 
2. Plato's aristocracy is of the mind not of birth or wealth. 
be known:. The epistemological question is of prime importance in de-
veloping a sound synoptic philosophy, but it is hardly the natural order 
of thought that it should occur to us at the beginning of an investigation 
on the nature of the good life. Plato presents the "vulgar" opinions that 
most naturally occur to the thinking person in quest of a rational basis 
for the life worth living, and it may be that these early dialogues are 
autobiographical in the sense that they represent Plato's attempt to de-
fine problems that he had not yet settled in his own mind. 1 The negative 
"conversational dialogues" set the stage, but there is no really positive 
advance in the dialogues until Plato offers an hypothesis on the nature of 
knowledge in the Symposium and the Meno. 
Even if knowledge is possible, can virtue be known? To be able 
to answer this question we must know the nature of virtue--what is 
virtue?- -or rather what must virtue be if it is to be taught? If virtue 
is teachable, it must be some form of knowledge; if knowledge is possi-
ble and if . virtue is ~now ledge, there still remains the problem of whether 
knowledge can be taught. If we assume that knowledge can be taught, 
what other assumptions must also be made?--that is, if education is 
possible and desirable what else must we assume about man and the 
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world in which he lives? Must we not affirm that education is a good thing. 
if we are to seek it and spend time cultivating it? There must be some 
1. Bradley, ES. Bradley uses this methodology in his Ethical Studies 
and the development in the book is amazingly similar to the evo-
lution of Plato's thought in the early dialogues and the Republic. 
purpose in education or we are indeed wasting time searching for learn-
ing, and that purpose must also be good. Now we are faced with the 
problem of what "good" and "purpose" mean and just how they are related 
to education. 
Plato treats this problem obliquely too by showing that things 
such as potential ability or material possessions are not good in them-
selves but depend for their value on proper use; in other words health, 
wealth, intelligence, etc., · are not good if they are misused but they may 
be the source of values if they are used wisely. We still do not know 
what the good is, but Plato assures us that wisdom is necessary to it. 
Wisdom is a virtue, and the man who is truly wise will be temperate, 
just and courageous because these are the names of qualities that reflect 
"right usagen of possessions or character potentials. This is all very 
good, but can this "right usage" be taught?-- that was the problem with 
which we started. Once the dialectic has reached this point, however, 
we are in a much better position to appreciate the importance of the 
question. 
H virtue cannot be taught, there is no such thing as philosophy, 
as Plato defines philosophy. On the answer to the question, then, hangs 
a whole development of thought on the nature of man, his purposes, ends 
and ideals. H virtue cannot be taught, no man can be held responsible 
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for his actions, and right and wrong are reduced to purely physical terms; 
we enter a completely determined universe, at least as far as ethics is 
concerned, where good and purpose and consequently education have no 
meaning; where pleasure and power rule supreme and where there is no 
reason to prefer one set of values or pleasures rather than some other--
the satisfied pig is happier than the unsatisfied Socrates. 
The educational problem of whether virtue can be taught implies 
the individual's search for the good life and happiness (virtue) and that 
the good life is social in character (education). It also contains all the 
root problems essential to Plato's social philosophy and the more techni-
cal thought that grows out of it. Plato's thought is easier to understand 
if the problems that education presents are kept in mind, for there is 
considerable evidence in the dialogues that they shaped a great deal of 
his thinking. 
2. The purpose and method of the thesis. 
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The purpose of the thesis is to try to discover the lasting edu-
cational doct_rines relevant to a way of life. There are many reasons for 
feeling that education today is failing in its primary purpose of preparing 
the student for participation in a full and rich life and furthermore that 
this failure is dangerous to democratic ideals. This is evident if the good 
and full life is defined in Platonic terms; that is, if we think of the good 
life as being realized only by a citizen who is consciously aware of society 
and his place in it and has been prepared to participate meaningfully in 
preserving the ideals of that society. Even though at first glance Plato's 
political structure would seem to be the direct antithesis of democracy, 
I <J 
an analysis of his educational purpose can be extremely useful to a 
democratic form of government. 
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The definition of democracy has evolved since Plato's day; in 
principle, at lea~t, there is no vast difference between representative 
democracy and Plato's educational state. Theoretically, the best man 
possible should represent his constituents, both in a representative demo-
cracy and in Plato's educational state. The qualifications of candidates 
and the methods of selection are different, but the ends are the same. 
It is not enough to criticize Plato's absolute political system because it 
does not agree with some of our present-day ideals; democracy is not 
made safer by deprecating Plato or merely by showing the points of 
difference that make his thought incompatible with democracy. We must 
try to analyze the reasons behind his system. In this way much that is 
applicable to any social organization may be learned to our advantage. 
Plato's educational theory is such that it can be very useful as a 
touchstone for finding the weaknesses of education today. The implicit 
purpose of the thesis, then, is to furnish material for a comparison of 
present-day education with a total system, of thought in which instruction 
and improvement form an integral and integrated part of a way of life 
and society. 
The explicit purpose of the thesis is to gather material from and 
about the early dialogues that is relevant to education. The early dia-
logues are negative; that is, they raise problems and discuss them, but 
,:;-
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leave the reader in confusion. Unless they are considered as a whole, 
there is not much abeut the "little" works that suggests anything of edu-
cational importance, but if they are thought of as an introduction to the 
later works they are essential to an understanding of the "educational 
problem" in Plato's writing, because it is in these "conversational" dia-
logues that we find the questions raised which make the "educational 
problem" significant to Plato's philosophy as a whole-. 
The fact that the early dialogues in this thesis have been oriented 
to the later ones, especially the Republic, makes it imperative that a 
considerable amount of space be given to the idea that the dialogues are 
in some respect an organic whole. The section on unity follows a brief 
chapter of historical background whose function is to indicate some of the 
influences to which Plato was exposed in formulating his thought. For a 
succinct historical introduction, the first two chapters of Sabine's A 
History of Political Theory are highly recommended. 
Of the early dialogues, only the Ion and Cratylus have not been 
included. The Ion, on artistic standards, and the Cratylus, a burlesque 
of etymological derivations, do not add to the development of the argument 
and therefore have been omitted; 1 Jaeger has been followed in consider-
ing the Phaedo and the Phaedrus as later works. There has been no 
attempt to present the works in the exact order in which they were 
written, and the criterion of their logical connection has been how they 
1. The Cratylus, however, does contain some important epistemological 
material and the first suggestions of the Ideas in its concluding pages. 
advance the "educational argument." The educational problem is certain-
ly not the only one in the dialogues, and some other arrangement might 
suit other developments better. 
Unfortunately the Republic cannot be included in the analysis of 
dialogues, but throughout the thesis the structural development of the 
Republic is the frame of reference for the exposition on the early dia-
logues, and while it is hoped that the thesis is intelligible in itself, an 
understanding of the Republic is a distinct aid. Since the Republic is 
Plato's best known work and the one upon which the most scholarship has 
been expended, its absence is perhaps not felt so much as that of the 
Laws. As A. E. Taylor says: 
Plato's services to the theory of education, in par-
ticular have usually been grossly underrated, from 
an inexcusable neglect of the very thorough treatment 
given to it in what he probab\_Y regarded as his most 
important work ~he LawsJ . 
The concluding essay is written with a deep appreciation of what 
has been left undone at the conclusion of the more formal development in 
the chapter on the Gorgias; an attempt has been made to combine the final 
summary of the results of the investigation with an outline of the relation 
of those results to Plato's philosophy as a whole and the importance of 
his "educational problem" to the world in which we live. So broad a 
purpose can be accomplished here only by using generalities that are 
16 
highly tentative but nevertheless necessary in order that some justification 
1. Taylor, PMW, 463. 
be shown for the claim that the early dialogues are vital to Plato's edu-
cational theory and his thought in general. 
3. Sources and limitations of the investigation. 
17 
The main source for this thesis will be the dialogues of Plato which 
precede the Republic. Jaeger's Paideia was instrumental in the selection 
of the Protagoras, Symposium, Meno and the Gorgias for more detailed 
analysis than the other early works, but the order in which they are taken 
up has been changed to follow more closely the argument of the thesis. 
The other early dialogues are discussed at greater length here than they 
are in Paideia since they are not usually given much space .in other works, 
even though there is much that is important in these dialogues. The early 
dialogues give various educational problems more detailed study than does 
the Republic, and thereby set the stage for the systematic development 
found in the Republic. The movement of Plato's thought from the ideal 
state to the second best represented in the Laws would entail a thorough 
examination of the Republic and also a careful study of the dialogues that 
are thought to bridge the gap between his two major works. Obviously so 
large a task is beyond the scope of this thesis; an analysis of the function 
of education in the second best state would presuppose an extensive 
knowledge of the development of Plato's thought; further, the meandering 
nature of the Laws makes the structural analysis of his argument and its 
relation to education a major work in itself. 
The principle secondary source that will be referred to is Werner 
Jaeger's Paideia. His development is very similar to that presented 
here and this thesis owes much to his scholarship- -the chief point of 
difference is not a difference of opinion but of emphasis. Jaeger treats 
Plato's philosophy as the natural culmination of a Greek cultural Ideal. 
Naturally The Republic and The Laws will be the real 
core of our exposition. Throughout, our aim is to take 
the picture of Plato which emerges from these books, 
and set it in its right place in the history of Greek 
thought.... We shall therefore not treat it as the de-
tached system of philosophical concepts, but try to 
show ... the organic function it has within the general 
movement of Greek thought and the development of 
Greek tradition. 1 
The chief concern here is with the degree to which Plato's analysis of 
society, the individual and the good life reveals the necessity for a 
definite purpose in education and how the "educational problem" in turn 
shaped his thought. 
R. C. Lodge's book Plato's Theory of Educ~tion is rich in spe-
cific educational references from the dialogues, but in general Lodge dis-
cusses education in the narrower sense of instruction or training rather 
than from the broader aspect of paideia as used by Jaeger and this thesis. 
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This work is very valuable, however, for its voluminous cross references 
to passages relevant to education. Plato's Theory of Man, by John Wild, 
while not primarily concerned with Plato's educational theories, supports 
the general position of the thesis by pointing out that the social and ethical 
aspects of Plato's thought have not been given their due because of the 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 84. 
modern preoccupation with his theory of knowledge and his metaphysics. 
G. C. Field's work The Philosophy of Plato .is a very readable survey 
of Plato's philosophy which contains many valuable insights; the only 
disadvantage is its lack of documentation. 
George H. Sabine's A History of Political Theory contains four 
chapters that are pertinent to the thesis (chaps. 1-4). The material is 
lucid and accurate and the criticisms are thoughtful, · but this work also 
suffers from a lack of documentation. John Dewey, who will be con-
sidered very briefly in the conclusion, offers a theory of education in 
Democracy and Education and Experience and Education that is not too 
far removed from the interpretation which is placed on Plato in this 
thesis. Volume I of K. R. Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies 
is a bitter· criticism of Plato's political philosophy; it represents well 
the type of attack that is all too frequently made upon Plato's views in 
the name of democratic ideals--the type of attack that misses the spirit 
of Pla~o completely and reads into his ideas· on communal life and his 
abS olute ruler an argument for modern communism and fascism. Some 
of Popper• s criticisms are undoubtedly valid, but their edge is dulled by 
a tremendous bias and frequent misuse of quotations from the dialogues. 
R. L. Nettleship' s beautifully written little volume The Theory 
of Education in Plato's Republic is easily the most brilliant work con-
sulted in the preparation of this thesis. In contrast to Lodge's rather 
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prosaic approach to Plato's theory of education, Nettleship' s creative 
insights leap from every page as he describes simply but profoundly, as 
Plato himself might, the sweeping ideas that lie behind the artful de-
velopment of Plato; s arguments. This book cannot be recommended too 
highly, not for Plato's theory of education alone, but also for the inany 
flashes of intuition which reveal so clearly the true nature of Plato's 
thought and the inexhaustible mine of ideas that the dialogues contain. 
Nettleship' s little masterpiece, however, is limited to the Republic and 
therefore is not really pertinent to the thesis until the Republic is dis-
cussed in the final chapter. This fine little volume would be much more 
u.seful, too, if it were documented. 
These are the principal sources of. the thesis and some of the 
reasons why they have been chosen. The remaining works that have 
been used will appear in footnotes. 
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CHAPTER 'II 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PLATO'S THOUGHT 
1. Greek cultural ideals. 
Plato as the flowering and culmination of Greek culture can only 
be appreciated historically. We can picture him at the crossroads of 
Greek thought, during a climactic period in Hellenic history, building a 
highway and helping himself to paving blocks from smaller arteries now 
and then to construct a six-lane causeway of ethics, religion, meta-
physics, politics, epistemology and education over which thousands upon 
thousands would pass in centuries to come . . All the various mortars of 
Greek philosophy cement the bricks together in an imposing architec-
tural structure that stands as a monument to the versatility of the human 
mind. The quickly moving traffic passes over elements of Parmenides 
and Heraclitus accurately arranged according to Pythagoras and ap-
proaches majestic spans that vault earthly things and soar skyward in 
keeping with the design of Parmenides. The beauty and function of the 
whole can only be seen from high above and in those early days before 
man took wings, divine flight was furnished by mystic insight that proba-
bly originated in Orphic religion. This is the structure, but the in-
tensely human element is furnished by a homely attendant who seems 
to run most of the gas stations along the way to keep the traffic moving 
towards its goal. Some people think the highway was all his idea in the 
21 
first place and that Plato built the road just to give Socrates a chance 
to talk to the customers. 
This highway runs along so smoothly that it takes a bit of look-
ing to notice that it passes confidently over some mean and treacherous 
country and that it took a great amount of engineering and thought to make 
the trip seem a very simple and pleasant excursion. It takes an engi-
neer to appreciate fully all the problems that were involved. 
Some of the problems are purely structural; others are 
functional and historical, but it might be best to go back and see if the 
events leading up to this system in any way elucidate the reasons for 
its construction. 
The ancient Greeks were an amazing race and in many ways a 
very difficult one for the twentieth century to understand. The tre-
mendous versatility and vigor of the .Greek mind produced a culture 
that has never been surpassed in the richness and originality of its 
products. They were ruthless in war, sensitive in art, brilliant in 
theory but often inept in practice, politically minded but unable to es-
tablish a stable society, and hero worshippers who condemned or 
exiled many of their most powerful political and intellectual figures. 
The Greeks seem to have had very little compromise in their souls; it 
is little wonder that moderation came to be considered a cardinal 
virtue among them. Yet underlying these conflicts of the Dionysian 
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and Apollonian strains there runs a strong current of consistency in the 
very tension that was prevalent, and-due in part to that tension--a 
cultural unity. Even though the various city states could not seem to 
get along politically they never lost the feeling of their racial homo-
geneity nor the awareness of their common cultural heritage. It comes 
as a surprise to the modern reader that Thucydides could be exiled 
from Athens for bungling a naval assignment and then feel perfectly free 
to visit his former enemies in order to gather information for his 
famous history of the Peloponnesian War. 1 
One of the dominant factors in Greek life and one of the hardest 
for us to comprehend is the identification of the citizen with his city 
2 state. 
The citizen has rights, but they are not attributes 
of a private personality; they belong to his station. 
He has obligations too, but they are not forced on 
him by the state; they flow from the need to 
realize his own potentialities. The Greek was 
happily free both from the illusion that he had an 
inherent right to do as he pleased and from the 
pretensions that his 3duty was the stern daughter of the voice of God. 
This political view is interpreted by Werner ;J"aeger in his survey of 
Greek culture as only one aspect of a larger organic conception per-
taining to all of their society and culture; the striving for realization 
1. Bury, HG, 430. 
2. Cf. Barker, GPT, 2-3. 
3. Sabine, HPT, 19. 
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of individual potentialities within an organic cultural pattern he calls 
paideia, the Greek for education. 1 But as Jaeger points out, the 
Greek conception of education was much broader than the English word 
implies; it was the sum total of all the aspects in the complete develop-
ment of personality. The closest that English can come to paideia in 
one word is 1'culture. n2 
Education in this sense and the individual's responsibility to the 
state had its roots in the aristocratic, agrarian society of the early 
city state. The -Greek ideal of the noble man or nobility of person 
Jaeger calls aret{. The conception seems to have much in common with 
the medieval ideal of chivalry, in that birth and position exacted certain 
standards of behavior but not necessarily any formal factual education. 
Originally aret{ meant warlike spirit; :this definition and-its origins 
in an agrarian feudal society parallels the medieval ideal of chivalry 
in many respects, which tends to support the hypothesis that aret{, 
like chivalry, was an ideal of tradition that slowly ·evolved and changed 
until it represented the highest virtues of man. The Greek concept of 
virtue or arete' differed from Christian chivalry in that the Greeks 
placed .little emphasis on truth or honesty as prime qualities of the 
noble man. The worth of truth and honesty is characteristically 
1. Jaeger, PAl, I, xiii-xxix. 
2. Jaeger, · PAl, I, xxii. 
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Asiatic, and probably entered Greek thought during the Persian wars. 1 
2. The .cultural revolution of the 5th c-entury. 
The Persian wars shifted the scene of Greek culture from the 
colonies to Athens, since the vital part that Athens played in the victory 
over the Persians made this city state the leader of Bellas. The 
victory and the place as the leading community among the Greek city:-
states produced a national pride, reflected in the magnificent works of 
the Golden Age, and moved the Athenians to imperialistic ambitions. 
Their supremacy on the sea furthered this aim and soon this small Attic 
community became a center of commerce and activity. The expansion 
of trade and commerce in the sixth and fifth cent~ies produced material · 
wealth and an urban class of merchants who demanded an ever in-
creasing share in the government, while the growing cosmopolitan 
atmosphere placed more and more emphasis on factual knowledge. The 
scientific schools of the Greek colonies, which had been more or less 
closed societies, found a public eager for their knowledge; this was 
especially true in Athens. 2 
In the feverish emulation of intellectual forces which 
this greatest period in the world's history brought 
with it, the thought everywhere gained recognition · 
that in every walk of life the man of knowledge is the 
. most capable, the most useful and the most 
successful. 3 · 
1. Brightman, Minutes of Seminar in Value Theory. 
Boston University, Spring, 1948. 
2. Cf. Jaeger, PAI, ll, 7; 123. 
3. Windelband, HP, 67. 
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The rising democratic tendencies gave impetus to this attitude and in 
response to the need for a more complete formal education there arose 
a class of itinerant teachers-the Sophists. The courts and the as-
sembly of Athens held the bulk of political power and were composed of 
hundreds of people, so that rhetoric or oratory became the chief means 
to political success. 1 The man who could continually sway the mob 
could remain in power; therefore the Sophists who became teachers of 
argumentation and rhetoric found many clients. The unsavory reputa-
tion of being able to "make the worse seem the better" was probably 
attached to them because they charged a fee for teaching, thereby 
limiting education to the wealthy. This incurred the distrust of the 
majority of the people. 
Greek philosophical thought, until the time of the Sophis_ts, had 
concerned itself almost wholly with speculations on the nature of the 
universe, in an attempt to discover one principle that would explain the 
origin of the cosmos and the order they observed in the universe. The 
practical application of education to society and its attending social 
influences, however, changed the emphasis from the objective specula-
tion of Nature to a consideration of man himself in society. 
In this way Greek science took an essentially anthro-
pological or subjective direction, studying the inner 
activities of man, his ideation, and volition, and at 
1. Sabine, HPT, 10. 
c 
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')' ? 
the same time lost its purely theoretical character 
and ac<}_uired a preponderantly practical signifi-
cance. · 
Unfortunately this humanistic, rationalistic and practical bent with its 
original confidence in "man as the measure of all things" soon degen-
I 
erated into an all consuming skepticism and relativism that found 
political expression in the Sophists' doctrine of The Law of Nat~e. 2 
Of the Sophist, Antiphon, Sabine says: "He asserted flatly that all law 
is merely conventional and hence contrary to nature. "3 
The economic expansion, wars and general instability of the 
fifth century B. C. resulted in rapid changes in the government and 
destroyed the old personal regard for law that had existed in the early 
city state; the constitution as a legal structure external to the citizen 
took its place. This view is eloquently stated as a ' 'contract theory" 
of government by Glaucon in the Republic. 4 Law and government are 
represented as artificial hobbles placed on the strong and dominant for 
the protection of the many and the weak; but this is not natural. The 
strong and individualistic need not heed these laws to their disad-
5 
vantage-the strong should appeal only to Natural Law. Acceptance 
of this attitude necessarily destroys the organic conception of society, 
but it is easily understood. 
1. Windell~and, HP, 68. 
2. Windelband, HP, 68. 
3. Sabine, HPT, 30. 
4~ Plato, Rep., 357a~362c. 
5. Cf. Plato, Gorg., 482c.-f .. 
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When the bulk of the. citizens demand equality with those who 
feel themselves superior by birth, intelligence, and education, the rules 
of the political game change; instead of feeling a responsibility for the 
less privileged, the aristocracy found itself in competition with the 
common man and deemed any means of success available to all and 
that only .the weak would not tal\.,e advantage of any situation. This 
attitude probably reflects a reaction against external law by the aris-
tocracy who previously were the law by virtue of th~ir actions and 
character; that is, the law was considered as an intrinsic component of 
the free citizen and the nobleman; the hero.,..leader was freely granted 
honor and respect as typifying tbe ideals and law of the state. In return 
it was his resp0nsibility to protect those ideals and the citizens at large. 
3. Socrates. 
It is from this atmosphere that one of the most amazing charac-
ters in history emerges. The historical Socrates is a polemic subject 
for the scholar, but there is a minimum of information about him on 
which there is little or no argument. He was a real person, a contempo-
rary of Plato's, who was condemned to death and executed by the 
Athenian democracy in 399 B.C. He must have had a tremendously 
influential personality if we judge by the works he inspired and by the 
very fact that he was executed. He must have been considered danger-
ous by those in power even though he took no direct part in politics; 
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this could only mean that he exerted a considerable influence among · 
many who were politically active. The exact nature of his philoso-
phy will never be known, and the point at which Socrates leaves and 
' 
Plato enters in the dialogues is impossible to determine, but it 
seems relatively safe to assert that he opposed sophis~ic relativism, 
that he attempted to derive universal concepts through dialectical 
inquiry into definitions and that he probably is the author of his most 
famous statement in the dialogues: "virtue is knowledge." According 
to Aristotle he was mainly concerned with ethics and the definition 
of universals. Aristotle specifically states, however, that Socrates 
did not posit universals apart from particulars. 1 
Socrates might be thought of as returning to the old school · 
of natural philosophers in that he is searching for the underlying 
principle in the universe, but as accepting the newer humanism in that 
he looks to man himself for the answer. 2 The natural philosophers 
lost man in their objective speculations; the Sophists found man but 
no place for him. Socrates attempted to find man's place in the uni-
verse, which necessarily resulted in his trying to establish an aim in 
life-a real value for living which is expressed so dramatically in 
the Apology: "the unexamined li,fe is not worth living. " 3 The ground 
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1. Aristotle, Met., A, 6, 987a32-b10; M, 4, 1076b17-32; M, 9, 1086b2-7. 
2. Cf. Pater, """PAP, 81. "Socrates brought philosophy down·from 
heaven to earth. t• 
3. Plato, A pol., 38b. 
for his way of life probably found expression in his very personality 
and in his doctrines that virtue is "one," that men do evil because of 
ignorance, and that true knowledge is found through the neye of the 
soul. " Jaeger says of him: 
It was Socrates' summons to men to care for their 
souls that really turned the mind of Greece towards 
a new way of life. .From that time onwards, a 
dominant part in philosophy and ethics was played 
by the concept of life, bios--human existence 
regarded not as the mere lapse of time but as a 
clear and comprehe~sible unity, a deliberately 
shaped life-pattern. · 
4. Influences on Plato's thought. 
This, then, H it has been interpreted correctly, is an adum-
bration of the background for Plato's philosophy. 2 The attempt to un-
ravel the tightly knit fabric of Plato's work results in loose ends and 
needless volumes of interpretive material. 3 There is so little that is 
superfluous in Plato that it is much the wiser policy to let his work 
speak for itself. The essence of Plato is unity; to try to extract one 
element (such as education) does an injustice and leaves much that is 
pertinent unsaid. Platonic scholars are probably correct in attributing 
an organic unity to the body of Plato's writings, a theory which does not 
1. Jaeger, PAl, 1,- 46. 
2. Cf. Demos(ed .. ), DOP, xi, for short background of Plato's thought. 
3. Mackay, Rev. (1941}, 15. Mackay criticizes, as inadequate, 
scholarship · that emphasizes Plato's form at the expense of his 
philosophical content and vice versa. See Ch. m, of text, the 
unity of the dialogues. 
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at all deny the existence of development in the dialogues. 1 
All of the great cultural ideals and intellectual theories of 
Greek civilization, with the notable exception of Democritus' atomism, 
find an organized expression in the gigantic intellectual and spiritual 
synthesis of Plato's dialogues. 
His philosophy is a reintegration of the preceding 
stages of Hellenic culture. For Plato takes up 
deliberately and systematically the various prob-
lems of the Pre-Platonic period an1 works them 
out on a higher philosophical level. 
Man has probably speculated on the problems that still confront 
philosophers ever since the animal became rational, but it remained 
for the Greek mind, in Western civilization, to develop systematic 
conside-ration of these polemic issues and thereby "invent" philosophy. 3 
The first systematic attempt to explain anything, of which we have 
record, is found in the Milesian school of natural philosophers ·or 
physicists. Much of their thought had its roots in the great epic poems 
of Homer and Hesiod. 
The early Milesian natural philosophers established cosmologi-
cal speculation. as a science (in the Greek sense .of the word science) 
but did not find a vital place for man in the universe. Heraclitus and 
Parnienides represent the attempt to solve the problem of change and 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 105,_ See pp. 39-44. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, IT, x. Cf. Zeller, POA, IT, 147-148, for the philo-
sophical influences on Plato's thought. 
3. Jaeger, PAl, I, xxi. , 
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I 
identity and an inquiry into the existence or non-existence of a per-
during being. Protagoras' theory of perception and t}le sophistic con-
. . 
cern for man and man's problems alone, produced skepticism and 
relativism while demonstrating man's importance to man. Socrates 
accepted the humanistic attitude of the Sophists but attempted to find 
a standard or universal basis for man's actions on which to establish 
a meaningful way of life. He gave ethics and the · Greek ideal of arete 
a normative basis and in so doing emphasized the importance of defini-
tion or the universal concept. 1 Pythagoras stands to one side in the 
logical intellectua.l development of Greek thought with his number theory 
and religious mysticism. His number theory was not incorporated as 
an essential organic part of Greek thought until Plato gave it prime 
importance in educational training and borrowed the real existence of 
concepts apart from the human mind as the Idea or Form of sense 
objects. 2 
H in addition to these intellectual strains we add the traditional 
Greek cultural ideals ci. · organic society, rule of the best (aristocracy), 
the political nature of the free Greek citizen, the influence of the epic 
poets, music and gymnastics, and the political situation in Plato's 
time, we begin to see the tremendous scope of the problem that Plato 
1. Taylor, Art. (1947)2, gives a good, short account of Socrates' 
life and character. 
2. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 104. According to Aristotle (Met. M and N), 
Plato tried to interpret the Ideas as numbers at one time in his 
development. 
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set for himself when he began to arrange and systematize all of Greek 
thought within the framework of a critical attitude towards the society 
of his time1 in an attempt to rescue a declining culture with a new 
synoptic ideal in which all of these elements would have a function in 
demonstrating a meaningful and purposive way of life. 2 In a great 
tradition of organized thought, Plato represents both a continuation 
and culmination of that tradition. 
The nature of Plato's synthesis is clearer if the historical de-
velopment of the philosophical and cultural problems is kept in mind, 
and it is noted how one by one all these various problems and influences 
find a place in his solution. It is only in this way, for instance, that we 
can appreciate the importance of his repeated criticism of the poets. 3 
Education, as this thesis will attempt to show, is the means by which 
his philosophy takes on meaning. Poetry and Rhetoric were Plato's main 
rivals in education, and since he considered them incompletely or not 
firmly grounded, that is, without a complete understanding of the 
purpose of education, the poets and Sophists are the objects of much 
critical discussion in the dialogues. In the light of modern poetry, it 
is hard to understand the educational importance of the Greek epics for 
Greek society, but until the Sophists expanded the content of learning, 
1. Cf. Nettleship, LRP, 6. Plato is not "merely reflecting on human 
life, but [is] intensely anxious to reform and revolutioni~e it." 
2. Cf. Demos(ed. ), DOP, x. 
3. Plato, Rep~, 39lff.; 606e ff. Laws, 886c; 890a. 
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the poems of Homer and Hesiod and the poet.s who recited and in-
terpreted them w~re the educators of Bellas. 1 Plato's evident attention 
to the form of his dialogues and the poetic beauty of his works probably 
reflects the importance he attached to meeting poetry on its own ground 
to defeat and replace the older educational ideal with his own. Of 
course Plato does not propose that poetry should be abandoned; rather 
he continually stresses its educational importance when used properly 
in his educational structure. 2 
The political chaos in Athens during Plato's youth, the Athenian 
defeat at the hands of Sparta, and Socrates' execution by the Athenian 
democracy are bound to have affected Plato's thinking. Shorey's view-
point on the interpretation of the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues 
seems the most plausible: ' 'The Socrates of Plato is an ideal, too good 
to be true, the mouthpiece of Plato's opinions. " 3 The low place 
assigned to democracy in the Republic and the character of Socrates 
in the dialogues clearly demonstrate two of these influences, but the 
degree to which Sparta was used as a model for the Republic is not 
nearly so evident. It is probable that Plato was impressed with the 
greater military efficiency and stability of the Lacedaemonian city-
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 214~ ' Plato, Prot., 339a; Laws, 810c. Cf. Cornford, 
ROP, 321 ff. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 215. 
3. Shorey, Art. {1926}, 577. 
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state but he was also aware of its many defects. 1 His ideal state 
grows logically from his own premises and incorporate_s the ''myth" 
of Sparta where it does not contradict any other part of his thought. 
It is inconceivable that he built the Republic around an idea of the 
Spartan state. 2 His later work, the Laws, proves that he was not 
interested in absolutism or rule of the aristocracy as ends but only as 
means to the best society. 
Thus in his old age, if not in his youth, Plato is 
at one with the tradition of his people in distrust-
ing everything savoring of absolute and irre-
sponsible power, and in placing the sovere~ty 
of law at the very basis of political theory. 
1. Plato, Laws, 635b-636d. 
2. Cf. Wild, PTM, 10~. 
3. Morrow, Art. (1941), 107. 
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CHAPTER ill 
THE UNITY OF THE DIALOGUES 
1. Is the question of the unity of the dial()gues important? 
Plato's philosophy is contained 1n approximately thirty dia-
logues, some of which are of doubtful origin, but for the most part it 
is fairly certain that the dialogues are Plato's and that they have sur-
vived practically uncorrupted. . To us they represent Plato's philosophy, 
but, as we shall see, Plato denies his literary offspring as philosophi-
cally legitimate. 1 In what sense do these dialogues represent his 
philosophy and how are they related to one another? Even more funda-
mental, are they related at all? 
In a sense, the form of the dialogues creates the problem--are 
these dialectical dramas separate artistic works that use the evolution 
of ideas as the tour de force in each work separately ·or is there a 
consistent philosophy expressed in these artistic masterpieces? Are 
they expressive of an evolution of thought? If the dialogues do form a 
unified body of philosophical thought unique to Plato, what is its basis 
and what is the evidence in the dialogues for that unity? Why is the 
problem of the unity of the dialogues important to the student of Plato's 
theory of education? For one thing, there are certain problems which 
become very important if the relation of the dialogues is asserted but 
1. See pp. 48, 52-54 for Plato's opinions that philosophy cannot be 
written. 
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which would not exist if the dialogues were taken separately. Se condly, 
the unity of Plato's philosophy is a necessary assumption if a central 
problem or subject, such as education, is followed throughout the 
various dialogues. Further, belief in a hasic~ unity allows the expla-
nation of a point which may not be fully developed in one dialogue, by 
means of another work in which the same problem has been discussed 
more fully in a different context. 
Finally, a definite statement on the relation of the various 
dialogues makes explicit that which is implicit in so many treatments, 
especially critical treatments, of Plato's philosophy. Many who quote 
Plato from various works indiscriminately, to prove their own con-
tentions, do not bother to preface their remarks with any statement as 
to their concept of Plato's philosophy as a whole. Plato's range of 
thought and his style are both conducive to proofs, in his own words, 
that he is sinner or saint depending on which you wish to make him; 
that is, as long as the overall picture of his philosophy is ignored. 
Since the argument in this thesis is that education is the fulcrum around 
which Plato's practical, social philosophy and his theoretical thought 
revolve, it is essential that the problem of unity be made explicit, 
although an exhaustive treatment is neither attempted nor intended. 
2. Plato's quest in relation to unity. 
Many of the important doctrines in Plato's dialogues can be 
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found in the thoughts of his predecessors; in fact, Plato often mentions 
his sources informally in the dialogues. 1 Is Plato merely an eclectic, 
then? Hardly, for there is much too much enthusiasm and sincerity 
evident in his philosophical dramas to accuse Plato of having been a 
sterile and uninspired collector of philosophical opinions. There is 
an originality of content and an artistry of form that stands in evidence 
of Plato's having been anything but a second-hand dealer in shopworn 
ideas. 
It is true that Plato borrowed freely and often from earlier Greek 
thinkers, but not indiscriminately; he recognized that there must be 
some truth in any position held honestly by men of sincere and thought-
ful natures. The men who preceded Plato not only furnished much of 
the actual content of Plato's philosophy but also created one of the cen-
tral problems in his work. How could so many divergent theories with 
various claims to truth be brought into line and harmonized? If there 
were some greater principle under which they could all be subsumed and 
arranged in an order of truth, it might be done. Such an attitude would 
furnish a core from which to develop a theoretical philosophy. 
The claim has been made, however, in the argument of this 
thesis, · that Plato was primarily a practical-moral philosopher attempting 
to solve the problems of the individual and society in his own politically 
turbulent times in order to rescue a cultur-e obviously on the wane. Is 
1. The characters in the dialogues, i.e., Cratylus; Protagoras, Gorgias 
and Parmenides, indicate Plato's sources. See pp. 125 ff. 
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it possible that so large a task as an intellectual synthesis of previous 
philosophies could be accomplished while remaining consistent with 
practical morals and politics? If the technical development had 
moral and social problems as its content, it might be accomplished. 
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For instance, if instead of the purely logical argument of "the One and 
the Many" we substitute the problem of temperance, courage and wisdom 
as they are related to virtue, the logical structure remains the same 
but the content is practical and can be compared and correlated ·with 
experience. 
If Plato's range is this wide, what proof can be brought forward 
that a collection of conversations represents any such thing as a social 
philosophy. that fills out a skeleton of consistent theoretical thought? 
Further, what is the evidence which would support the contention that 
education is the instrument, the method and the mortar by which the 
two are cemented into one total architectonic structure? 
3. The arguments forunity. 
The question as to whether or not Plato's dialogues represent 
a consciously worked out system of philosophy has been argued pro 
and con from many different points of view. Some scholars are of 
the opinion that the dialogues are merely artistic reproductions of 
conversations which were actually held by Socrates; some go so far as 
to assert that the so-called "Socratic dialogues" were written by 
Plato while Socrates was still alive.l Still others, such as Ritter and 
Wilamowitz, consider the dialogues to be separate prose-poetry 
dramas not primarily concerned with a consciously develope~ 
philosophy. 2 It does not seem likely, however, that a man who had 
no greater purpose in his writings than the creation of beautiful prose-
poetry would have founded the Academy. 
There is a large body of Platonic scholars who have asserted, 
in opposition to these various theories, that there is a f\mdamental 
unity in the dialogues. 3 In many respects their opinions are similar 
but they do vary in their emphasis and they do cite different aspects 
of the dialogues as being the most conclusive evidence for the coherent 
development of Plato's thought. 4 Schleiermacher was the first to 
suggest that the dialogues contained a premeditated plan systemati-
cally carried out. He based his theory on the logical connection of 
the content of the dialogues, showing that the later works presupposed 
the discussions in the earlier works. It is now widely held that he 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 373, n.5. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 383, n.2. Wilamowitz, PLA, I, cited by 
Jaeger, PAl, II, 126 and n.l, 388. . 
3. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, II, Ch. 2 and notes on the problem of the 
historic Socrates, the order of the dialogues and their unity; 
also, II, Ch. 4 for the organic unity of the dialogues. 
4. Cf. Zeller, ·POA, II, Ch. 3. Zeller has copious notes in 
reference to Platonic scholarship in the 19th century on the 
unity and the order of the dialogues. 
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overstated his case for logical systemization but his brilliant work set 
off an entirely new approach to scholarly research in Platonic philoso-
phy. 1 In reaction to the theory that all of Plato's dialogues had an 
organized pedagogical purpose2 scholars were quick to point out that 
there were internal inconsistencies in the dialogues which would tend to 
disprove Schleiermacher' s position that they represented a logically 
worked out system of unified thought; also, the negative and inconclusive 
"Socratic dialogues" were cited as evidence that Plato, himself, had not 
reached any conclusion on the problems raised by the earlier dialogues. 3 
Paul Shorey reasserted the unity of the dialogues in The Unity 
of Plato's Thought; he gave the theory new life by suggesting that the 
dialogues reflect the development of Plato's thought within a philo-
sophical position that did not change in its broad outlines or funda-
mental tenets. This thesis would explain the internal inconsistencies 
while affirming the over-all unity of the dialogues. 4 Jaeger's opinion 
is very similar to Shorey's; he thinks that there is a consistency in 
the central problem of all the dialogues that could not have been 
1. Cf. Zeller, POA, ll, 99-117. Shorey, WPS, 66, does not believe 
that Schleiermacher intended so dogmatic an assertion and that 
his theory was not overstated but rather misinterpreted. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, m, 183. 
3. Cf. Ch. 5, pp. 104-107 for the educational purpose behind the 
negative ending. 
4. Cf. Shorey, WPS, 65-73, for a later statement on unity which 
reaffirms his earlier conclusions in The Unity of Plato's 
Thought. 
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accidental. "The central problem around which they all move, with 
such awareness . as -to exclude any possibility of chance in their compo-
sition, is the nature of arettf. " 1 Plato, he feels, knew what he was 
doing from the first; this is demonstrated by the logical manner in · 
which the dialogues follow one another, expanding and explaining 
problems that had been mentioned previously without reaching any con-
clusion. 2 Wild, on the other hand, · who characterizes Plato as a practi-
cal moralist, brings Plato's use of the term techne/ forth in evidence 
of the synthetic nature of his philosophy. 3 
The synthetic, practical nature of Plato's approach 
to philosophy is made evident by his employment of 
the term technein a peculiarly wide sense to cover 
both what we call pure science or theory and what 
we call art, craft, or practice. 4 
Raphael Demos represents another attitude; he points out that 
"Plato's philosophy is summed up in the life of reason. . . . For Plato, 
philosophy meant also a way of life. "5 The unity of the dialogues, 
according to Demos, is an expression of a p.ersonal and evolving outlook 
on life as it should be lived. Plato's philosophy is not systematic; it 
avoids any formulation in a rigid pattern. This theory of unity, al-
though it is based on a subjective response rather than internal evidence, 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 89. 
2. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 92-97, 105 for the unity of the dialogues and 
the historical argument. See nn. on 383-3 84 also. 
3. Wild, PTM, 27, 22-34. 
4. Wild, PTM, 45. 
5. ·Demos (ed.) I, DOP, x, viii. 
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would seem in many ways to be the most conclusive since the "spirit" 
of the dialogues would suggest this conclusion and, too, there is no en-
tirely consistent evidence for any other point of view. A vital and grow-
ing personality could and would be concerned with different problems at 
different times, even though its method and attitude might remain 
essentially the same. 1 A great philosopher "may preserve definite 
convictions while experimenting with a variety of formulations for these 
convictions. " 2 
There are then three general types of argument that have been 
asserted for the unity of the dialogues: (1) the logical; (2) the belief in 
a unified purpose in the works; (3) the more subjective aesthetic response 
to the personality of the author. All three are useful in trying to analyze 
Plato's works. When the dialogues are seen in their relation to each 
other, a wealth of pertinent material is revealed. In addition to the value 
of trying to see the thread of the argument as it develops, the scholar-
ship spent on trying to ascertain the order of the dialogues has unearthed 
the complex formal structure of these dialogues which seem so simple 
at first glance. 
The unity of the dialogues is especially important to the argu-
ment of this thesis for two reasons: (1) the assertion here is that Plato 
1. Demos(ed. ), DOP, I, v111. The dialogues have "a method and 
a unity. The unity is that of an intellectual personality that is 
growing." 
2. Demos(ed. ), DOP, I, viii. 
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does have a purpose that appears constantly in the earlier dialogues in 
relation to education-the value of virtue and its .relationship to life 
in society; (2) material from the earlier dialogues will be used because 
they treat certain aspects important to education more fully than they 
are treated in the Republic, and this material will be used to substanti-
ate the argument of the thesis. Such a procedure, of course, assumes 
that there is a consistency of de.velopment sufficient to warrant treating 
these dialogues as a prolegomena to the Republic. 
4. The educational importance of form. 
Any philosopher who feels that he should put his thoughts on 
paper must do so in the hope that his readers will benefit from his 
insights -in this sense all philosophy has an educational purpose. It 
is a rare and happy exception, however, when the form of the writing 
itself supplements the content in furthering the end of enlightening the 
reader. The judicious balance that must be maintained for the dra-
matic form and the poetic allusions to add to rather than detract from 
the intellectual substance demands ·a rare artistic gift and a firm mind; 
in this respect, Plato stands unrivaled in philosophical literature for the 
successful use that he has made of structure and style to delineate ab-
stract problems and stimulate the reader. The form and the content of 
the dialogues cannot be separated; therefore, the contribution that the 
very form of the dialogues makes to Plato's educational purpose must 
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be given consideration. 
In his own time, Plato had two strong competitors in the field of 
education-the schools · of rhetoric and the ancient poets -both of 
which placed a great deal of emphasis on eloquence and style. That, 
plus the fact that, according to tradition, he, himself, at one time as-
pired to be a dramatist, makes it not at all strange that Plato should be 
very conscious of form in his philosophical writings. 1 As important, if 
not more so, ·are his own opinions that education should be pleasant and 
should draw fro.m the student what he already knows in order to show the 
importance and relations of that knowledge to a totally conceived life. 2 
Education should lead gently and mould the soul; it should inspire inter-
est and confidence so that the student will find within himself the enthusi-
asm to pursue difficult problems to a conclusion. The factual content 
of education is not nearly so im~ortant as the attitude towards life and 
the zeal for the truth which real education can foster. The artistic form 
of the dialogues admirably fulfills all of these requirements laid down by 
Plato himself. 3 
5. Plato's analysis of form in the Phaedrus. 
In the Phaedrus, Plato discusses the importance of form to 
1. Hartland-Swarm, Art. (1951}, 3-18. 
2. Cf. Lodge, PTE, 168-170. Lodge states that Plato's dialogues 
follow his own dictates and educational ideals of what literature 
should be. 
3. Cf. Plato, Phaed-r., 264c-271a. 
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aesthetics and pedagogy . . In its broad outlines, the Phaedrus is a 
criticism of rhetoric. Plato's criticism is directed at the rheto-
rician' s purpose of trying to persuade or convince a person or group to 
accept an opinion without any concern for the actual truth of that opinion. 
He -has Socrates show that no orator could be sure of the success of his 
rhetorical arguments unless he actually knew the real nature of the 
distinctions that he used to convert the truth. 1 In other words, the ora-
tor would have to be a philosopher first to be certain of his defense 
against another rhetorician. A true philosopher has no need to pervert 
the truth, but in either case, form is essential to a convinCing argument. 2 
To be successful, an argument should be presented with close 
attention to form. It should begin with a definition of the subject under 
discussion. 3 The topic should then be developed logically and organi-
cally, for "every discourse ought to be a living creature. ''4 The body 
of the discussion should be divided into two general categories: first 
the "comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea .•.. The second 
1. Plato, Phaedr., 269b-c. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, m, 182-183. There is some scholarly dispute as 
to whether the Phaedrus was written before or after. the Republic. 
Jaeger considers the Phaedrus a late work (see nn. 2-6, 330-331). 
-Actually it would seem to make little difference since Plato must 
in fact have been aware of the formal discipline described in the 
Phaedrus before he put it on paper-even his earliest dialogues 
follow the outline in the Phaedrus. 
3. Plato, Phaedr., 263d. 
4. Plato, Phaedr., 264c. 
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principle is that of division into species according to the natural for-
mation." 1 Plato proposes that these principles be adhered to in ad-
dition to the rhetorical principles of documented facts, logical proofs 
and the evaluation of probable future events. 2 Not only do the indi-
vidual dialogues hew to the line of these formal dictates, but the dia-
logues as a whole, especially the earlier dialogues, constitute just 
such a formal program. 
Why is Plato so concerned with form? Because the rhetorician 
or the philosopher who teaches scientifically is moulding the soul, and 
correct form is a prerequisite to scientific teaching. Time and again 
Plato has Socrates warn students that they are putting their souls in 
jeopardy if they seek knowledge without knowing what their education 
should consist of or why they want it. 3 The teacher's "whole effort is 
directed to the soul; for in that he seeks to produce conviction. " 4 Plato 
often satirizes and condemns the Sophists and the teachers of rhetoric 
for this reason--they are not interested in the effects they produce on 
the total personality of their students but only in the successful manipu-
lation of other men's opinions-and Plato is definitely not interested 
in using the conventional opinions of "the people" as a criterion for truth 
or for political organization. 
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1. Plato, Phaedr., 265e. 3. Plato, Prot., 312-314c. especially. 
2. Plato, Phaedr., 266e. 4. Plato, Phaedt:, 271a. 
6. Philosophy as a .form of education. 
Plato states, in the same vein as in Epistle VII, 1 that the written 
word cannot carry the burden of transferring knowledge to the student; 
it is a shoddy substitute for direct discourse, "the living word of 
knowledge. which has a soul and of which the written word is properly 
no more than an image. " 2 The form of a dis.course or of writing is im-
portant if the argument. has a purpose and a justification in relation to 
the truth. The purpos.e is education and the justification is the im-
provement of the "soul. " 
But he who thinks that in the written word there is 
necessarily much which is not serious, and that 
neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, is of 
any great value, if, like the compositions of the 
rapsodes, they are only recited in order to be be-
lieved, and not with any view to criticism or in-
struction; and who thinks that even the best of-
writings are but a reminiscence of what we know, 
and that only in principles of justice and goodness 
and nobility taught and communicated orally for the 
sake of instruction and graven in the soul, which 
is the true way of writing, is there clearness and 
perfection and seriousness, and that such princi-
ples are a man's own and his legitimate offspring; 
- ... and 'Who cares for ~em and no others--this 
is the right sort of man. 
The temptation exists to rest the case here, for his own words 
cannot be improved upon. It is clear, then, that Plato was very much 
aware of the educational importance of form and, in addition to his own 
1. Plato, Ep. VU, 341h-343a; see pp .. 52 ff. 
2. Plato, . Phaedr., 278a; italics mime. 
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statements, the form of the dialogues is the best evidence for that 
awareness-the dialogues are masterpieces of educational literature. 1 
Plato must have felt that philosophical knowledge 
was best approached as a sort of education. His 
dialogues are models of it, and propaganda for it. 
They are educational, not only because of their 
power to excite the reader's sympathy and antici-
pation and to release his own intellect from its 
trammels, but also because, by seeing there-
peated failure of sincere efforts to reach the 
truth, he comes to realize the difficulty of true 
knowledge and to understand the hitherto 
unexa~.ined presuppositions on which his life is 
built. 
A philosopher and teacher who repeatedly reaches the end of a 
dialogue with a negative conclusion must have had a purpose--it could 
not have been mere chance or a literary device alone. What is his 
purpose? Could it be anything but a way to make the reader self-
conscious of his own presuppositions and ignorance? 3 He could not do 
this without his great gift for making mental gymnastics dramatic and 
interesting. Plato has mastered the tight, formal organization of his 
works to such an extent that he is free to capture the emotion of the 
living moment in beautiful language. This in itself is characteristic of 
Plato's thought-freedom is the result of self-discipline. 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 105-106. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 105-106. 
3. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, II, 90. 
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No other writer has approached Plato's skill in 
concealing a rigid and intricate structure of reason-
ing beneath the flowing lines of a conversation in 
which the suggestion of each thought as it arises 
seems to be followed to an unpremeditated con-
clusion. 1 
The intellectual drama is the perfect medium for exploiting his 
own talent, for it allows Plato to go beyond the written word. His dra-
matic presentation in the dialogue form captures the emotional overtones 
of conflicting personalities and ideologies. The stirring personal quali-
ties of Socrates, in particular, which are so vividly and warmly por-
trayed are as important as the philosophical problems; they round out 
the man who is the concrete example and the inspiration of Plato's edu-
cational program. 2 
The beauty of the style, the humor and the drama, the personal 
tone and vivid character portrayal, the conflicting views and the use of 
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the dialogue are all formal methods that help Plato educate the reader by 
eliciting his participation and stimulating his interest. 3 It is amazing how 
he can anticipate where a reader will find the going particularly difficult; 
in almost every instance he will introduce a summary of the argument or 
a myth after an exceptionally abstruse passage. 
His use of the myth is in itself a beautiful' and highly developed 
educational technique. Plato often uses them to summarize an argument 
1. Cornford, PTK, VIU. 
2. Cf. Zeller, POA, II, ·159-160. Zeller shows the importance of 
Socrates as an ideal and as a unifying element in the dialogues. 
3. Cf. Field, POP, lL 
or to present the essence of a doctrine that is beyond expression in any 
other form. His myths and poetic analogies are so simple and so 
skillfully worked out that long after the details of the prose argument 
have been forgotten its essentials are retained through recollection of 
the myth. 1 Of course, the best example of his educational use of 
analogy or the myth is also his most famous-th~ anaiogy of the Cave. 2 
This example is especially pertinent here because it is an analogy of the 
educational process which leads to the knowledge of the Good. Unlike 
so many analogies, Plato's do not obscure or distort the real meaning 
of the problem at hand; they serve a true educational purpose in explain-
ing and simplifying difficult concepts. 3 
Plato's distinctive contribution to philosophy lies in 
these composite images [myth~ which are so 
poignantly portrayed as to incite the mind to the 
further task of formal analysis, and so carefully 
constructed as to lead it from the very beginning 
along the proper lines •... The earlier dialogues _ 
are filled with vivid pictures taken from the life of 
Socrates, and other images, ... constructed with 
great skilJ to prepare the way for dialectical 
analysis. 
1. Cf. Nettleship, LRP, 10. Plato's picturesque method -of presen-
tation often disguises the logical structure of his works. 
Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 151. 
2. Plato, Rep., 514 ff. 
3. Cf. Barker, GPT, 119-120. Barker refers to analogy as a 
method of the dialogues and criticizes some of the comparisons 
made-especially that of the artisan with the statesman. 
4. Wild, PTM, 205. . 
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7. The riddle of the Phaedrus and Epistle Vll. 
If Plato's philosophy is a form of education there would certainly 
seem to be a real philosophical purpose behind the writing of the dia-
logues; but if we take Plato at his word, the Phaedrus and Epistle Vll 
raise an interesting problem, for in these works he states that philoso-
phy cannot be written. If philosophy cannot be written, what do the dia-
logues represent? Plato gives an answer in the Phaedrus. 
Then the philosopher will not seriously incline to 
'write' his thoughts 'in water' with pen and ink, 
sowing words which can neither speak for themselves 
nor teach the truth adequately to others. No, that is 
not likely--in the garden of letters he will sow and 
plant, but only for the sake of recreation and 
amusement; he will write them down as memorials 
to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, 
by himself, or by any other old man who is treading 
the same path, He will rejoice in beholding their 
tender growth;. . . this will be the pastime in which 
his days are spent. 1 
Must we concede the day to those who hold that the dialogues are 
intelleCtual dramas without any overall purpose? Should we take Plato 
seriously? In the above quotation he himself notes growth; does this 
show that the despair of conveying truth through writing is a reflection of 
old age disappointed by the failure of earlier writings to produce the 
desired results? There seems to be some evidence for this supposition, 
if the seventh Epistle is accepted as genuine; for in Epistle Vll the very 
same sentiments are stated and the events mentioned in the letter show 
1. Plato, Phaedr. , 276d. 
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conclusively that this letter was written late in life. If the Phaedrus is 
not a late dialogue and if the earlier works are not a serious attempt to 
write down his philosophy, what do they represent? A fully developed 
theory one way or the other is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but we may note certain broad features of the dialogues and propose a 
tentative hypothesis. 1 
In a sense, Plato's dialogues bear out his contention that his 
philosophy was never written and that real philosophy cannot be written. 
The dialogues are without a doubt real philosophy by modern standards 
if not by Plato's; does this not show that the fault is with us--we have 
lost the "seriousness'' that Plato refers to and in many cases modern 
philosophy has become an intellectual chess match rather than a program 
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for living. When Plato says that he has never written his real philosophy, 
the ambiguity would seem to lie in the defintion of real philosophy. 
The impatience Plato often displayed with quibbling over words, 2 
although he could quibble with the . best, reflects his attitude that real 
philosophy is the deep concern with life as a result of which one seeks 
a theoretically sound orientation, a consistent pattern of beliefs that can 
be lived; it is the enlightened soul with an enthusiasm for truth and an 
affinity for searching out the fundamental problems of life. 3 Real 
philosophy, then, cannot be separated from the desires, conflicts and 
1. Cf. Field, POP, 183-184. 3. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 25 ff. 
2. Cf. Plato, Euthyd., 278c. 
resolutions of the living philosopher, but in actual discourse he can, 
by example, transfer the spark as Socrates transferred it to Plato, and 
light up the soul of his listener. Mere words, regimented as they are 
one after the other cannot trace out the difficult course that is real phi-
losophy and a way of life. 
Plato may never have writt~n his philosophy, but his dialogues 
come as close as is possible to the living word and that transfer of 
inspiration which is "like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark." 1 This is · 
the educational importance of the form of the dialogues taken as a whole. 
The conversational style or ''Socratic method" in the individual dia-
logues is ·another aspect of Plato's educational use of formal devices. 2 
1. Plato, Ep. Vll; 341d. 
2. Cf. Nettleship, LRP, 8-9. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
1. Plato's use of the Socratic method. 
In addition to the pedagogical value of the form of the dialogues 
taken as a whole, the way in which Plato has Socrates conduct the indi-
vidual discussions also serves a very important educational function. 
The method is probably that actually used by Socrates in his conversa-
tions, but Plato makes it his own and an integral part of his intel-
lectual dramas. 1 The method is no small part of the vital movement 
that Plato creates in his works. 
His great literary discovery was that there is 
enormous dramatic charm and excitement in 
the powerful advance of a purely philosophical 
or scientific research, striving towards its · 
goal in a succession of new and starting 
evolutions. 2 
The dialogues do not express things in unalterable form. It is 
·sometimes difficult to decide which character expresses Plato's own 
sentiments, so forcefully does he present what we should think would 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 19-20. See also n. 11, 373; Aristotle is 
thought to have held that the dialogues were a new literary form. 
Pater in Plato and Platonism thinks of Plato as the first philo-
sophical essayist and maintains that the loose organization 
possible in a series of essays is characteristic of Plato's 
personality and times (see 174-196 especially.) Cf. Zeller, 
POA, 123. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 90. 
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be the opposition's argument. Glaucon' s speech for injustice at the 
I 
beginning of Book II of the Republic is a good example; Plato presents 
the case so well that it seems to be a very impractical thing to want to 
be just.1 Opposing views are seldom rejected or ignored; they are 
brought into the spotlig t and attacked obliquely in an attempt to show 
that the position is in co clusi ve or only partially true. The dialogues 
rarely make a frontal a tack; instead they lead off in a different di-
rection, and when a pri ciple is reached the dialectic returns to the 
original proposition an a contradiction immediately becomes evident . 
Seen in this 1 ght, each of the Platonic dialogues 
is an educati n of men away from the false if 
cherished vi ws of the "first blench" back again, 
but on a high r level, to the faith by which they 
act. 2 
The opinion exp essed in Epistle VII that a thing or object of 
knowledge cannot be s ted in an unalterable form would explain the 
choice of the dialogue a a medium to express the attitude, method and 
difficulty of philosophic 1 thought. 3 Plato says that "benevolent dispu-
tation by the use of que tion and answer without jealousy" is the method 
which leads to the intui ive grasp of reality "in a flash" so that the mind 
is "flooded with light. " Plato's own description of the Socratic method 
can be found in several of the dialogues. 5 
1. Cf. Plato, Rep., 3 8b:...362b. 4. Plato, Ep. VII, 344b. 
2. Barker, GPT, 119. 5. Cf. Robinson, PED, 3-10. 
3. Plato, Ep. VII, 341 -343a. 
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2. Plat on the Socratic method. 
In the Apology, ocrat.es justifies the use of his method, the 
elenchus, as having bee commanded by the gods who called him the 
wisest of men despite th fact that, in his own opinion, he had no wisdom 
at all. By examining m n reputed to be wise he learned that he had 
more wisdom than they ecause he was at least. aware of his igno-
rance. 
1 Even the threat of death did not cause him to abandon God' s 
order to fulfill the philo pher' s mission of searching into himself and 
other men. 2 In this rol it was his duty to sting his fellow citizens and 
all men into the concern or and the improvement of their s.ouls. 3 
In the Meno, Soc ates questions a slave about a problem in 
geometry in order to , de onstrate that knowledge is the recall of truth 
already known to the sou . The slave solves the problem solely through 
the guidance of Socrates' questions even though he has had no previous 
training in geometry. T e episode graphically reveals Plato's faith 
in the power of reason to apprehend truth if it is properly incited to 
seek truth and if the birt of the idea is attended by a capable "midwife." 
Reason can apprehend re ations and knowledge without didactic indoctri-
nation if the problem is c early stated and the inconsistent conclusions 
are pointed out; this is ,e sentially the method that Plato employs to 
1. Plato, Apol., 22. 
2. Plato, Apol., 29d. 
3. Plato, Apol. , 29e-30 , 30e,.31a. 
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instruct the reader in the dialogues. 
During the questioning, Socrates turns from the slave and ex-
plains to Meno how important the realization of ignorance is to the 
quest for knowledge. When the slave realizes that he is in error he 
becomes eager to acquire the truth actively instead of submitting 
passively to teaching. 1 The assertion in the Meno is that philosophy 
begins in wonder and that elenchus or the Socratic method of question 
and answer supplies that wonder. 2 "Elenchus is thus a method of teach-
ing.... It does not, however, actually increase knowledge, but only 
prepares the ground for it. "3 
There is no doubt that the passages in the Apology and the Meno 
describe the purpose and method of the question and answer technique 
of Socrates and the dialogues, but in the Sophist Plato explains the 
technique as it relates directly to teaching. In an attempt to define the 
nature of the Sophists, the Stranger analyzes the various characteris-
tics that seem to be common to the Sophists. The Sophists are obvi-
ously some sort of tea~ hers; they try to change men's opinions or purge 
their souls of ignorance since ignoranc~ exists only in the soul. 4 
1. Plato, Meno, 84a-d. 
2. Cf. Robinson, PED, Ch. 2, for a good short analysis of the 
Socratic elenchus. 
3. Robinson, PED, 12. 
4. Plato, Soph., 228d. 
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"Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be . 
rightly said to be the remedy?" 1 When the Stranger goes on to de-
scribe how the soul is purged of ignorance, he is describing the 
Socratic elenchus. 2 How is it that the method of Socrates is attributed 
to the Sophists whom Plato continually criticizes? 
Plato would seem to be pointing out a very important education-
al truth: the method does not ~istinguish "the nobler Sophist~"3 from 
Socrates but the purpose does. In the Sophist, Plato describes the 
Socratic use of question and answer in connection with Sophistry to 
demonstrate how difficult it is to distinguish the true philosopher from 
the fraud, for the Sophist may indeed purge the soul of ignorance-but 
. . . ~ 
it is ignorance of false opinion which he will purge and not ignorance of 
the truth. The passage in the Sophist from 229a to 231c is then actual-
ly a description of the Socratic method: · 
When a person supposes that he knows, and does not 
know; this appears to be the great source of all the 
errors of the intellect. The sort of instruction whieh 
gets rid of this is termed education. Education ad-
mits of further division; one method appears to be 
rougher, and another smoother. There is the time-
honoured mode which our fathers commonly 
practised toward their sons-either of roughly 
1. Plato, Sophu 229a. 
2. Cf. Coriirord, PTK, 177-187 and Wild, PTM, 273-284 for the 
relation of this passage (Sopn, 226-231) in the Sophist to the 
Socratic method. Both feel that it is really a description of the 
Socratic elenchus. 
3. Plato, Soph,, 331b. 
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6o 
reproving their errors, or of gently advising them; 
which varieties. may be correctly included under the 
general term of admonition. But whereas some 
appear to })ave arrived at the conclusion that all 
ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks 
himself wise is willing to learn any of those things 
in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, 
and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives 
much trouble and does little good-accordingly, 
they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit 
in another way. 
They cross-examine a man's word, when he thinks 
that he is saying something and is really saying 
nothing, and easily . mnvict him of inconsistencies 
in his opinions; these they then collect by the dia-
. lectical process, and placing them side by side, 
show that they contradict one another about the 
same things, in relation to the same things, and 
in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry 
with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and 
thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices 
and harsh notions, in a way which . is most amusing 
to the hearer, and produces the most lasting good 
effect on the person who is the subject of the 
operation. For as the physician considers that 
the body will receive no benefit from taking food 
until the internal obstacles have been removed, so 
the purifier of the soul is conscious that his 
patient will receive no benefit from the appli-
cation of knowledge until he is refuted, an_d from 
refutation learns modesty; he must _be purged of 
his prejudices first and made to th[nk that he knows 
only what he knows, and no more. 
It is interesting to note that Plato not only describes the 
Socratic method but shows that its use, in Socrates' mind at least, is 
joined with the conviction that no one does evil intentionally and that 
1. Plato, Sopn, 229a-23lc. This passage has been edited and 
condensed by the author from the Jowett translation. 
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all ignorance is involuntary. The danger of faulty education is also 
indicated by this passage; for, as Plato admits, the elenchus is a 
method common to both the real educator and the Sophist. 
3. Elements of the Socratic method. 
Plato has adequately described the main features of the 
Socratic method and its general purpose, but it would seem worth-
while to note some of the various devices that he uses in actually 
carrying out the method~ Very often in the earlier dialogues Socrates 
treates the argument as if it were independent of the participants; that 
is, as if the logos were working itself out through the discussion. It 
is often Socrates' attitude that the truth evolves from the conver-
sation and that he, as well as everyone else, does not know what the 
truth is when the conversation begins. 
This profession of ignorance is characteristic of Socrates; 1 not 
only is the reader certain that Socrates has his tongue in his cheek, but 
his audience in the dialogues is often unconvinced of his ignorance. 
Plato's use of Socratic irony is an effective dramatic device which he has 
Socrates employ in order to keep the conversation going when an op-
ponent becomes adamant as a result of his poor showing in the dia-
lectic. He also uses the device to introduce the elenchus or the 
questions and answers; many in their pride expound their wisdom and 
1. Plato, Charm., 165b, 175d. 
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make themselves vulnerable after Socrates has sought their help and 
confessed his lack of knowledge. 
In the use of questions and answers, several features that are 
an integral part of the method can be mentioned. First there is the 
evolution of ideas and the movement of thought which is often the only 
concrete accomplishment that can readily be shown in the earlier dia-
logues. Even when the dialogue reaches a negative conclusion there 
is the intimation of an answer; of a higher truth in the light of which 
the dialogue was conducted. The sincerity of the inquiry, even where 
another's ignorance is being exposed, reveals that the discussion is 
not conducted solely for the purpose of refuting some opinion but for 
the very serious purpose of revealing some truth. 1 Often there is a 
real concern shown for the improvement of the person engaged in the 
discussion with Socrates and since the reader is just as much that other 
person as the character in the dialogue we feel that Plato's purpose at 
all times is greater than that stated in the dialogue. 2 
There is a good deal of argument for argument's sake in the 
dialogues; usually this type of argumentation appears in the dialogues 
in contrast to the serious argument carried on by Socrates. 3 Plato is 
demonstrating that he could, if so inclined, engage in all the tricks of 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 64. 
2. Cf. Jaeger~ PAl, ll, 36-37. 
3. Cf. Euthyd., Prot. and Craty. especially. 
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the Sophistic trade, be it the analysis of the classic poets, a play on 
words or a flowery oration on some trite subject. In the Euthydemus 
he proves that a dog is the father of his owner, in the Protagoras he 
shows that poetry can be interpreted at will to agree with the speaker's 
opinions, and in the Phaedrus Socrates delivers a long ornate speech 
on love, which he debunks as soon as he is through. 
The general tone of the inquiries is that of sincere regard for 
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the essentials of the argument and the persons engaged in it. The drama 
and the passion that Plato a.chieves by manipulating both the characters 
and the deepest questions of life is often startling in its power and 
amazingly convincing in its effect. In the last few pages of the Phaedo, 
for instance, Plato has woven the question of immortality into the fabric 
of the personal tragedy of Socrates' death. He adds grandeur to the 
death of Socrates and conviction to his theory of immortality. 
True to almost any argument and to his own dramatic sense, 
Plato shows that Socrates' skill in using the dialectic often incurred the 
wrath of his adversary, at which point he has Socrates become ironical 
or actually humorous in order to restore a genial tone to the discourse. 
Many times Socrates is the butt of the humor himself as when Meno 
declares that Soc.rates is like an electric ray in looks and in his ability 
to numb an opponent. 1 In these different ways, then, Plato supplies the 
1. Plato, Meno_, 75d. 
warp woven into the woof of the dialogue structure to give the complete 
and brilliant tapestry a play of surface color and design. Beneath 
these more obvious manipulations of formal technique, however, lies 
a deeper significance, a practical purpose. 
4. Choice and the Socratic method. 
Whenever we are faced with a problem in which a choice must 
be made for a mode of thought or a form of action we are confronted 
with a practical situation. Plato's dialogues continually force this type 
of choice upon the reader. 1 He does not present us with a didactic 
treatise expounding one point of view exclusively; he delineates the 
argument and, although it is usually clear which side he prefers, it is 
up to the reader to decide whether he has proved his case in the face of 
the very good arguments which he often states for the opposition. It is 
characteristic that Plato is the first to present the difficulties that he 
sees inherent in some of his own doctrines. 
By making the choice the reader's responsibility, Plato is con-
ducting the development of thought in a manner true to life; he does not 
pose as a sage or an oracle to be consulted on the details of living well; 
1. Wild, PI'M, 35. "Whenever we confront such a contrariety, we 
are confronting the sphere of the practical. . . . Plato's dialogues ... 
are constantly presenting us with just such a contrariety. Hence we 
must regard him as primarily a practical rather than as a theo-
retical philosopher. " 
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he only suggests the fundamental principles. By forcing the problem 
upon the reader, Plato is demonstrating a great truth: no man can 
decide for any other what he should do in the face of an actual conflict. 
By bringing to light, however, the primary problems of life, the 
purpose, attitude and the methods to be consulted, Plato is trying to 
establish a frame of reference, a guide to the wisest choices and the 
best life. 
The Socratic method does in truth little more than 
clear the ground ... that one may have a fair chance 
of knowing, or seeing, perhaps: it does but put one 
into a duly receptive attitude towards such possible 
truth, discovery, or revelation, as may one day 
occupy the ground ... ; it does not provide a propo-
sition, nor a system of propositions, but forms a 
temper.1 
The paradox of Plato's style is that he affirms an absolute truth but 
uses a method which least reveals it. This is consistent with his whole 
educational theory that real knowledge is not "taught." You can only 
guide a pe~son to the point where the truth is self-realized. 2 
5. The question and answer technique. 
The wisdom of Plato's oblique method is shown by the fact that 
his works have not grown old. Plato confronts the reader with the 
fundamental principles and problems of life in bold fact and in a way 
true to life. 3 For this reason Plato's works are still the best 
1. Pater, PAP, 188. 
2. Pater, PAP, 188 ff. 
3. Cf. Pater, PAP, 192. 
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introduction to philosophy ever written, even if the reader finally 
rejects the doctrines unique to .Plato, such as the realm of Forms. 1 
The dialogues presuppose nothing but an intelligent reader; they lead 
gently and gradually introduce the more complex theoretical questions 
in an atmosphere that vibrates with the importance of thinking about 
these matters. Plato goads the reader on with the "gadfly" of Socratic 
questions which he uses to arouse the sluggish will. 2 
The dialectic is logic, plus persuasion; helping, 
gently enticing a child out of his natural errors; 
carefully explaining difficulties by the way, as one 
can best do, by question and answer with him. 3 
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The dialectic of the dialogues is best thought of as a mind in conversation . 
with itself--first as it took place in the mind of Plato and then as it 
takes place in the mind of the reader with Plato's guidance. They repre-
sent the self-scrutiny and evaluation of possible solutions that occur to 
the thinking mind in connection with some difficulty. 4 
As Robinson states, Socratic irony and the elenchus, as 
used by Plato in the dialogues, are not without their negative aspects. 5 
Socrates' profession of ignorance is often hypocritical and his satire 
1. Cf. Wild, PTM, 34. 
2. Wild, PTM, 32. Wild suggests that practical doubt, such as that 
aroused by the Socratic method is out of place in a theoretical 
discussion. 
3. Pater, PAP, 182. 
4. Pater, PAP, 183. 
5. Robinson, PED, 7-10. 
bitter. His barbed questions arouse anger in his fellow citizens time 
after time, as he admits in the Apology, 1 and often his opponents are 
embarrassed and ridiculed in public to the delight of the audience. 2 
Nor is Socrates above the use of eristic arguments to set up "straw-
men" which are easily knocked down. 
In genera~ the early dialogues are destructive; that is, they 
attempt to explode popular misconceptions, the accepted definitions 
and attitudes, the conventional and uncriticized pattern of life into 
which men fall; they jar us out of the mental rut of our opinions and 
beliefs but they do not suggest any concrete solution other than the 
worth of thinking about the issues raised--the early dialogues raise 
problems but give no answers. 3 
Should this stand as a criticism of the Socratic elenchus and the 
dialogues? It must be remembered that this procedure follows Plato's 
theory that the search for wisdom begins in admitting ignorance. But 
why is Plato willing to present Socrates in an unfavorable light as a 
hypocrite and antagonist? First, it is held to be a God-given duty to 
"sting" men and show them their false conceit; since no one likes to 
have his ignorance proven, many naturally become angry. Second, 
the hypocrisy and antagonism may have a negative effect on the 
1. Plato, Apol. , 31b. 
2. Plato, Soph., 230c. 
3. Cf. Pater, PAP, 180 ff. Pater refers to the process as the 
"gradual suppression of error." 
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characters in the dialogue but it is a positive educational device from 
the reader's more objective position. The negative approach stimu-
lates the reader and creates the tour de force which carries the dramatic 
and life-like evolution of ideas along, eliciting the reader's participation 
and making the problems his also. 1 The negative aspects of the dia-
logues, to which Robinson objects, are actually positive pedagogical aids 
from the reader's point of view. 
6. Midwife and gadfly. 
The Socratic method is broadly composed of two distinct 
approaches: the. first, e~hortation or encouragement, is used when the 
conversation involves a person who admits his ignorance and who wants 
to learn. 2 As a general rule, Plato places Socrates in conversation 
with an intelligent youth when he uses this approach and Socrates then 
"leads gently" and acts as a "midwife" to the youth's newborn ideas. 
The Theaetetus, Charmides and Lysis are examples of the dialogues 
which use this method throughout, whereas Books I and n of the 
Republic contrast the methods. In Book I, Socrates uses, for the most 
part, the negative and ironic approach of the "gadfly' ' to refute 
Thrasymachus' power theory of government, whereas in Book ll he is 
1. Cf. Lodge, PTE, 190. ''It is al.nnst impossible for an intelligent 
reader not to project himse1f into these problems and participate 
in the discussion. " 
2. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 37-38; 62 ff. for an analysis of exhortation 
and refutation as used in the dialogues. See also Wild, PTM, 74, 
for Plato's method. 
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serious and sympathetic in treating the same subject with Glaucon. 
Socrates is fighting fire with fire in the first Book; in Book ll he is 
educating. 
The "gadfly" technique is that of examination and refutation 
which Socrates uses against opponents who profess to know; he uses 
this procedure with those who claim that they can teach others what 
they know. This second method, then, is usually used when Plato 
portrays a Sophist as Socrates' adversary. Here the task is first to 
refute an objectionable opinion, to "purge" the argument, so that edu-
cation may begin. 
The development in both cases is usually the same; an hypothesis 
is proposed; Socrates then cites particular cases, very often from the 
crafts or professions but always from experience, and asks there-
spondent for his opinion on these analogies from lif-e. 1 The conclusions 
from the particular cases are then compared to the preliminary defi-
nition and shown to be in contradiction or to extend beyond the original 
definition. As Pater describes the method: 
The thought was to be adjusted first to the phenomena, 
to the facts.... To the thought, secondly, to the 
conception, thus articulate, it was necessary to ad-
just the term; the term, or 'definition; i' by !hich it 
might be <;onveyed into the mind of another. 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 89. 
2. Pater, PAP, 178. 
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Only the control which Plato exercised over the form, his artistry in 
making it dramatic, and the freedom of the dialogue could succeed in 
this long and complex process. 1 
When the first definition or hypothesis is shown to be faulty 
another is suggested which seems to compensate for the shortcomings 
of the first, and the procedure is repeated; the dialectic may continue 
to a conclusion of sorts, usually in a myth, or it may be dropped as 
hopelessly confused. The important point for the practical significance 
of the method is that the theoretical inquiry is continually compared to 
life as it is actually lived. There is a constant alternation of abstract 
definition and commonplace analogy in the dialogues or, as Wild calls 
· it, "the upward and downward path"; 2 a constant comparison of the 
essential nature of life that lies behind the facts with those facts; a con-
tinual adjustment and readjustment of theory and practice. 3 This 
point is brought out time and again as Plato compares the practices of 
the doctor, the cook, the trainer, the pilot, etc. , to the subject under 
discussion. 
7. The correlation of opinion and behavior. 
There is a very important purpose behind Plato's use of these 
1. Cf. Pater, PAP, 178 f. 
2. Wild, PTM, 31-32. 
3. Jaeger, PAl, 178, Jaeger characterizes Plato's method: "An 
effort to attain ideals of universal validity, and a lively awareness 
of all the concrete facts of the life in which he is living." 
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commonplace analogies; he is trying to show that man often acts more 
wisely in individual decisions of his everyday life than he does in the 
much more important but much more difficult problems of his life con-
sidered as a whole and, even more important, that his actions are often 
in direct contradiction to what he. thinks he believes. 1 A man may be 
very careful in his selection of a shipbuilder but perfunctory in his 
selection of a states~an or an ethical code. He demands that the shoe-
maker, . the cook, and the pilot know their business but in ethics or 
politics he makes no such demands on himself or his leaders. 2 
This importance of Plato's use of techne', which Wild cites as · 
proof that Plato is a practical thinker first and foremost, becomes 
evident, for if we demand that our technicians have specialized knowledge 
of their crafts, why should we not demand the same of the politician and, 
1. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 7-8. "When we have to do with the mental 
atmosphere we are liable to forget [the truths of every day life_]." 
Lodge, PTE, 231-232 . . Socrates appeals "from their technique, 
their commonplaces, and their. thesis, to their own self, their 
full and complete self; and it is this, the complete self of 
Protagoras, of Gorgias, of Thrasymachus and the rest which 
finally sits in judgment upon the theses at first maintained, and 
either rejects them or accepts amendments which are more 
adequate expressions of the full experience, not oniy of the 
individual participants in the discussion, but of the whole group, 
including the readers of the Dialogues." 
2. Plato, Prot., 319a f. Wild, PTM, 122-123. "Why should 
human history reveal this universal tendency, as evident in our 
own as it was in Plato's day, to follow reason so wholeheartedly 
in the arts and crafts taken one by one, but to deprive her of all 
actual authority in the braid direction of life itself?" 
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more important, why should we not demand the same of ourselves? 
What is more important than to know the. art of living well? And if 
living is an art, a techne~ shouldn't we have knowledge of that art? 1 
The only way we can know the best, as Plato indicates in Ion,2 is to 
know all the possibilities before judging and also the standard by which 
to judge--an impossible task empirically but one which, nevertheless, 
shows that "the unexamined life is not worth living. "3 
Here we have the central problem in Plato's philosophy: What 
knowledge reveals the art of living well? What is its nature? How can 
it be known? Can it be taught? Plato's search for universal definitions 
is an instrument for the plain knowledge of facts; his is the practical 
concern for sufficient definitions of experience in terms of the indi-
vidual and society; ones that would satisfy the above questions. Plato 
refused to accept the moral relativism that resulted from the Sophists' 
individualism and their Law of Nature; he also refused to give up the 
individual values of the person to "statism" or endanger them with an 
epistemological or a metaphysical monism. Because he wanted both 
the individual and a cohesive society, Plato's search is for objects that 
would satisfy the needs of the .individual and guide man towards the 
1. Cf. Cornford (tr. ), ROP, 8. Plato "adopted Socrates' belief that 
there should be an art of living analogous to the craftsman's 
knowledge and consequent ability to achieve a purposed end." 
2. Cf. Plato, Ion, 35lc-352c. 
3. Plato, ApoC 38a. 
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realization of the best possible society. 
Before this objective can be reached, however, Plato has to 
establish the inconsistency between what we think and how we act. True 
philosophy is a way of life and our opinions, if we would be true philoso-
phers, must be based on knowledge so that our beliefs and our actions 
will be of one cloth. 1 The practical significance of the Socratic method 
in all of its aspects, then, is that it underscores again and again the 
need for harmony between thought and action. 2 
Our ideals and ends must be such that we can live with them and · 
maintain our self-respect. To establish this fact as necessary is an 
educational problem; conventional opinions and. prejudices must first be 
removed. The program which will gradually reveal that knowledge 
which is the art of living is also an educational problem. Finally, the 
knowledge which discloses a life consistent with theory carries with it 
an intellectual responsibility; it shows the obligation for accepting the 
task of "teaching" others. 3 
8. Summary of Plato's methods. 
To summarize: the dialogues give evidence of an objective, 
a unity of purpose--to stimulate self-education in becoming a virtuous 
citizen with a thirst for true knowledge. The earlier dialogues, 
1. Cf. Plato, Laches, 193e. 3. Cf. Plato, Rep., 519d f. 
2. Cf.. Wild, PTM, 119. 
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in keeping with Plato's own principles, introduce and define the problems; 
they are protreptic to the constructive dialogues where the definitions 
are applied to the particulars and arranged in a hierarchy of values. 
The Republic is, of course, the central work here. The later works; in 
which technical problems are probed with greater thoroughness, may be 
thought of as the investigation of the proofs for the metaphysical and 
epistemological tenets upon which the Republic was built. Here Plato 
is investigating his own first principles and he runs into some trouble, 
of which he is well aware, not so much with his own conviction and 
knowledge but with their formulation in words that do not have suf-
ficient dimensions for conveying truth. 
The dialogues as a whole have a formal structure consistent with 
Plato's educational method. They have a beginning in definitions, a 
hierarchical development in relation to life and a conclusion that seeks 
to show that the definitions ar.e based on true knowledge of Urs,t princi-
ples. This is his educational method "writ large." Within each dia-
logue there is essentially the same development. Plato uses myths, 
allegories, poetic allusions and dramatic contrasts of personalities and 
ideas to carry the reader along and to inspire the hope of self-
enlightenment. In addition .to these "progressive visual aids," the dia-
logue itself is a formal principle purposely chosen in the attempt to 
capture the "living word" so that the argument can-"defend itself'' and 
thus "kindle the spark that lights up the soul." 
The dialectic of the conversation has been shown to contain two 
primary principles, exhortation and examination, exercised in con-
junction with the various formal devices cited above, i.e., myths, 
allegories, etc. In addition to the formal structure of the argument 
there is the dramatic structure which incorporates humor, Socratic 
irony, the ideal of Socrates and the sense of a living evolution of 
ideas which Plato's artistry imparts to the unfolding problems. The 
emotional overtone of the whole reflects the sincerity of a personal 
search and the concern for basic issues--a sense of real importance 
permeates all the dialogues. 
It is possible to carry the analysis to absurd lengths in claiming 
a premeditated educational purpose for every detail of structure. It is 
hardly reasonable to suppose that we can tell exactly where a conscious 
formal structure serves rather than commands the poetic genius of 
Plato's highly creative mind. The consistency of formal structure and 
Plato' s own statements as to the importance of form in instruction, 
however, belie any theory that the dialogues are the product of artistic 
inspiration alone. We must remember that for Plato the Beautiful is 
the Good; anything that is truly good will be beautiful and its beauty 
lies, for the most part, in its form. 1 Again, we must keep in mind 
that the form is not composed merely of the physical dimensions; the 
1. Cf. Plato, Sym., 210a-212a. 
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physical relations suggest the true content composed of all the possible 
conclusions that could be drawn from particular premises which are 
consistent and harmonious. H we think of the form of the dialogues in 
this light, then the complex involutions and convolutions, so harmoni-
ously resolved, cannot be thought of as anything but consciously planned 
with a purpose, here held to be fundamentally educational--a purpose 
to educate his fellow man with an ideal of higher truth and to show, 
through the dialogues, that that truth, though difficult to obtain, is 
possible to obtain through self-enlightened discipline of the "soul." 
Finally the practical significance of the dialogues and in particu-
lar the Socratic method, lies in the constant exhortation to bring 
opinion into line with action; to make philosophy a way of life in which 
theoretical knowledge furnishes the ground and the support for practi-
cal action; to destroy the unanalyzed conflicts between belief and 
behavior. 
Plato calls us back to first questions and first 
principles. His purpose is to foster the growth 
of the human soul towards the good; and true 
again to the logical order, he does not attempt 
to suggest methods of achieving this end until 
he has subjected the soul to an analysis, so that 
the teacher may know what it is that he is set to 
treat before ,he begins to think how he shall 
treat it.... As always he asks, not necessarily 
for our assent, but for a resolute effort to clear 
our minds of hazy half-truths and windy phrases 
and to think the whole matter out again from the 
beginnint, bringing the means into relation with 
the end. 
1. Leeson (intra.), EPR, vii. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE CONVERSATIONAL DIALOGUES 
1. An introduction to the problem of virtue. 
The early, or conversational dialogues, as they will be re-
ferred to here, are so evidently concerned with virtue in relation to the 
individual and so clearly show the importance of education in that re-
lationship that we must start by considering them briefly. The interrela-
tion of various problems and some of the later developments in the 
dialogues can best be appreciated after examining these protreptic 
works, in which Plato often states briefly but explicitly the difficulties 
that have shaped his thoughts. 
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Charmides, Lysis, and Laches are an introduction to Plato's phi-
losophy; they use the Socratic method in the form of exhortation- -an 
invitation to learning which expresses confidence in our ability to reason 
through problems, although it brings to light at the same time the common 
presuppositions and prejudices of the reader. 1 Th.ese dialogues all deal 
with individual virtues and virtues of the individual. It is an egocentric 
beginning which asks: What is the nature of the virtues to which indi-
viduals aspire? 
The conversa~ional dialogues might be thought of as the attempt 
of an individual to understand himself in relation to those values that 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, n, Ch. 4, and especially 90 ff. 
seem fundamental to personal happiness. It is a psychologically sound 
beginning in the individualistic concern for personal well-being. There 
are frequent suggestions that virtue extends beyond the egocentric re-
gard for one's self but such suggestions are, at this stage, often 
questioned by Socrates as possibly limiting personal happiness. He 
does so, however, without defining "happiness." When happiness is 
defined in the later dialogues, it becomes clear that the issue was 
clouded in these early works in order to make the problem vital to 
the reader. The negative approach allows the reader to "find" the right 
direction as he argues with the many obviously superficial arguments 
presented by Socrates. Even though many of the refutations offered by 
Socrates are shallow, they are never entirely devoid of good sense; 
these cunningly contrived questions gently push us into the "correct" 
solutions, since the answers which would "defeat" Socrates at this stage 
of the development are the ones that Plato will arrive at himself in the 
later works. 
The dialogues start in the right place--with the person as an 
individual. It is in the area of personal moral values that most men 
disagree and are most often guilty of sloppy reasoning--they are the 
basis of disagreement on broader social questions. In the Euthyphro, 
Socrates explains his constant concern with moral problems; if the 
question at hand is one that can be empirically verified, it is senseless 
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to argue about it--let an actual experiment answer the argument. 
But what differences are there which cannot be 
thus decided, and which therefore make us angry 
and set us at enmity with one another?. . . I will 
suggest that enmities arise when the matters of 
difference are the just and the unjus~ good and 
evil, honourable and dishonourable. 
1 
Each virtue is a good consciously sought, and each has attending 
.consequences that are intellectually judged to be good or bad. Everyone 
admits that courage is a good quality to have, that temperance is a good 
personal characteristic and that it is good to be wise. Plato is asking 
in these dialogues: What is the basis of our value judgment that this or 
that is good? H there is justification for thinking some things good and 
others bad, what can be more important to life conceived of as richer 
than mere existence than the discovery of the standards by which right 
choices and actions are governed? In these short dialogues he is pre-
paring the culture for a colony of ideas that may take root and thrive on 
the barren surface that is most men's minds. 
Before the broader problems of the just and the unjust, etc., are 
introduced, however, Plato places in the foreground the virtues that are 
personal, in order to establish the fact that the virtuous individual is the 
frame of reference and "the good life" for the individual. the goal of his 
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philosophy. Plato inherited the problem of the "good life" from Socrates, 
1. · Plato, Euthyph,, 7c. 
2. Plato, Euthyph,, 7d., 
who was concerned with ethical universals and the improvement of the 
individual soul or the total personality. 1 The dialogues, then, begin at 
the beginning with the individual and his active concern for himself in 
the quest for happiness. 2 And again, in keeping with the normal order 
of thought, the first questions which arise are the moral questions 
involved in choosing a way of life. Plato insists that we must first know 
what these various virtues and values are in order to decide on a way 
of life. 
The conversational dialogues all have an educational setting 
either explicitly, as in the Laches and Euthydemus, or implicitly as 
in the Charmides and Lysis. In the Charmides, Socrates, who has 
just returned from battle, establishes the tone that pervades these works. 
He says: "1, in my turn, began to make enquiries about matters at 
home--about the present state of philosophy, and about the youth. I 
asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or beauty or 
both. "3 These informal dialogues show Plato's ~on cern and that of the 
historic Socrates for the youth of Athens and their education. 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, II, Ch. 2 and especially 23 ff; also 87 ff. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 94-96. Jaeger believes that Plato's object in 
these dialogues is to prepare us for his "political" education in the 
later works, especially the Republic. It is true that the virtues 
discussed are the same as the cardinal virtues of the "statesman," 
but nowhere in these works does Plato move beyond individual 
ethics. 
3. Plato, Charm., 153d. 
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2. Charmides and the virtue of temperance. 
Socrates, fresh from the battlefield at Potidaea, is introduced 
to Charmides, an Athenian youth renowned for his beauty and intelli-
gence, on the pretext that he is a doctor who can cure Charmides' 
headaches. 1 Socrates tells him that he will cure his headaches but 
first he must treat his soul, "for the part can never be well unless the 
whole is well. "2 The cure is effected by the use of charms, "and these 
charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul 
and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to 
the head, but to the whole body. "3 Since Plato considered the Socratic 
elenchus to be an educational device, the allegory here is evident; the 
headache that Socrates is referring to is ignorance and the cure is 
instruction. 4 
In order to discover whether or not he will have to use the charms, 
i. e. , elenchus, before giving him the medicine, Socrates asks Charmides 
if he is temperate. When Charmides evades a direct answer, Socrates 
proposes that they inquire into the nature of temperance together and we 
find that Socrates is exercising his "charms" before effecting the cure. 5 
Charmides' first definition that temperance is quietness is 
1. Plato, Charm. , 155b. 
2. Plato, Charm., 156e. 
3. Plato, Charm., 157a-b. 
4. Cf. Plato, Charm. , 176a, Charmides 
realizes that the "charms" are 
instruction. 
5. Plato, Charm., 158e. 
rejected on the grounds that temperance is a good and noble thing and 
that many things that are good are not quiet. 1 The implication is that 
all good and noble things have something in common, i.e., that they 
are in some respect temperate, and that quietness is not inclusive · 
enough. Socrates points out further that "the life which is temperate 
is supposed to be the good. " 2 It is interesting to note that temperance 
is falsely equated with the good life and that much of the inconclusive 
nature of the dialogue results from this implication, for temperance 
cannot satisfy all the conditions of the good life. In this negative fashion, 
Plato makes the point that arete" is a unified attitude towards life and 
that it is good to the extent that it is based on the knowledge of such 
aspects of virtue as temperance. 
i. Critias--"the doing of good actions." 
The definition that temperance is modesty is quickly rejected 
since an inferior man may be temperate even if he has nothing to be 
modest about. 3 The next definition, "temperance is doing our own 
business" brings Critias, its author, into the argument to defend this 
definition. 4 Critias restates the definition to mean that temperance is 
"the doing of good actions. " 5 Socrates immediately asks if this is 
enough; "are temperate men ignorant of their t emperance?"6 In other 
1. Plato, Charm., 159b-c. 4. Plato, Charm., 162d. 
2. Plato, Charm., 160c. 5. Plato, Charm., 163e. 
3. Plato, Charm., 160d. 6. Plato, Charm., 164a. 
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words, consequences are not the only criterion of the temperate man; 
his intentions must be good, too, and to be well grounded, intentions 
must be based on knowledge. 
To be temperate is to act wisely, but a doctor or a craftsman 
does not always know, even if his intentions are the best, that his skill 
will ultimately produce good. 1 Temperance is not based entirely on 
technical knowledge or good intentions; wise action must include self-
knowledge founded on a set of values that may be used to evaluate the 
probable consequences of that action. 
Socrates' questions reveal the necessity for a personal . set of 
values by which to judge an act as good or bad; Critias therefore re-
defines temperance as self-knowledge. Since temperance or wisdom 
(now equated since temperance is self-knowledge) is the knowledge of 
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something, it must be a kind of science; as a science it must be a science 
of something. Socrates asks Critias: "What is that which is not wisdom, 
and of which wisdom is the science?"2 "Wisdom alone," Critias answers, 
"is a science of other sciences, and of itself. "3 
Socrates interprets Critias' statement to mean that wisdom, 
temperance, and self-knowledge mean that a man would "know what he 
knows, and what he does not know. "4 Actually this is Plato's own position 
1. Plato, Charm., 164b f. 3. Plato, Charm., 166c. 
2. Plato, Charm., 166b. 4. Plato, Charm., 167a. 
r/1 
but here it is thrown into doubt by Socrates who asks if it is possible 
to know what is not. The solution of the Eleatic paradoxes that are at 
the bottom of this problem were of great concern to Plato. John Wild 
claims that Plato solved the essential points of these paradoxes in the 
Parmenides, Theaetetus and especially in the Sophist where he shows 
that "false opiniontl consists of things that are truly known but falsely 
conjoined. 1 
ii. Practical doubt of the science of science. 
The question of whether it is possible for the science of science 
to exist is left open to doubt; Socrates shows that in the case of magni-
tudes, numbers or any relations that depend on the senses or the 
emotions the idea of self-relation is incredible. Socrates indicates 
that there may be ''self-related things" but that a "great man" is 
needed to determine this inherent property. 2 It may be that Plato has 
his own theory of Forms in mind at this point, but he adds significantly 
that these inherently self-related things, if they existed, would have to 
satisfy at least one condition. 3 
I am not certain whether there is such a science of 
science at all; and even if there be, I should not 
1. Wild, PTM, 247-272, 284 ff. 
2. Plato, Charm., 169a f. 
3. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 92-93, 96-98, and especially 101. Jaeger 
feels that Plato did have the theory of Forms in mind in these 
early dialogues. 
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acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance, until 
I can also see whet~er such a science would or would 
not do us any good. . 
Here, it would seem, is at least a partial answer to Santayana's 
comment on the Platonic "super sensible ideals" in The Sense of Beauty; 
Santayana admits that such ideal values .may truly exist, but that it does 
us no good to suppose that they do if we can never know them (that is, 
experience them). 2 Plato has anticipated Santayana, since he demands 
that a "science of science" satisfy the very conditions which .Santayana 
feels would have to be an integral part of the Ideas--that "supersensible 
ideals" can be known and that they "do us good. " 
Far from being an airy speculator unconcerned with everyday life, 
Plato is at all points interested in the practical application of a consistent 
set of values to life as it must be lived; he asserts the primacy of practi-
cal, moral philosophy. This view is strengthened if we take Socrates' 
reference to the "science of science" as meaning technical philosophy. 
Socrates refuses to admit that this "sci~nce of science," even if it can 
know what you know and what ·you do not know is the same as "self-
knowledge," which was Critias' last definition of-'temperance.3 The. 
knowledge of knowledge or the science of science would not have any 
practical content; that is, it would be the awareness that you had· some 
1. Plato, Charm. , 169b. 
2. Santayana, .SOB, 89. 
3. Plato, Charm., 170a-b. 
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kind of knowledge but it could not be the knowledge of anything in particu-
lar, therefore it could not be self-knowledge. 1 
Knowledge is of something, and whether or not it is known to 
be true depends upon specific knowledge and verification. It takes a 
doctor to determine if another man knows what he is talking about in 
relation to health and disease. 2 Thus practical experience, technical 
knowledge, and the investigation of the ''facts" of experience are the 
prerequisites to a sound philosophy. These thoughts shape all of Plato's 
philosophy; they foreshadow the theory of Forms and the Philosopher-
King. That in the Charmides these thoughts are associated in Plato's 
mind with the Philosopher-King and the well ordered state is certainly 
indicated. 
·we: should have found out those who knew, and have 
handed the business over to them and trusted in them ••.• 
The house or state which was ordered or administered 
under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of 
which wisdom was the lord, would have been well 
ordered; for truth guiding, and error having been 
eliminated, in all their doings, ~n would have done 
well, and would have been happy. 
No sooner has Socrates made this suggestion than he doubts 
whether using wisdom to order the state would be beneficial since it 
implies the division of labor . and . a controlled society. 4 Are the benefits . 
1. Plato, Charm., 170b. 3. Plato, Charm., 171e-172a. 
2. Plato, Charm., 170c-171c. 4. Plato, Charm. , 172d. 
of an ordered society sufficient compensation for the limitations of 
personal freedom? Will man be happy if he is governed by what is 
best rather than by what he individually thinks is best? 
Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now 
defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; 
then each action will be done according to the arts 
or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot 
etc. when he is .t;lOt. . • Now I quite agree that · 
mankind, thus provided, would live and act accord-
ing to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and pre-
vent ignorance from intruding on us. But whether 
by acting according to knowledge, we shall act 
well and be happy, my dear Critias, --this is a 
point which we have not yet been able to determine. 1 
Critias, who is now probably speaking for Plato, insists that 
happiness would be impossible without knowledge, but, he agrees with 
Socrates, not all kinds of knowledge lead to happiness. 
The life according to knowledge is not that which 
makes men act rightly and be happy, not even if 
knowledge include all the sciences, but one 
science only, that of good and evil. . • . But that 
science is not wisdom or te~erance, but a 
science of human advantage. 
The dialogue ends, apparently having resulted in nothing more 
than a series of contradictions and paradoxes. In spite of the negative 
results, however, S.ocrates assures Charmides ''that the more wise and 
temperate you are, the happier you will be. " 3 
1. Plato, Charm., 173b-c. 
2. Plato, Charm., 174c-d. 
3. Plato, Charm., 176a. 
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3. The me thO<~ of the sma~er dialogues. 
The "conversational dialogues" and that portion of the E~thydemus 
which will be considered follow the method of the Charmides very 
closely. The Charmides was chosen for a more detailed treatment be-
cause of its broader scope--it touches on almost all the problems raised 
in the other works and its method is characteristic of the other "conver-
ational" works. All the little dialogues portray Socrates in discussions 
with youths of Athens or in discussions about them, as in the Laches. 
The style is light and moves quickly, without halting to investigate in a 
profound manner any of the many bypaths suggested by the argument. 
In these dialogues, Socrates does not refute the opinions of 
others so much as he confuses the subject under consideration.. A defi-
nition of virtue is prop()sed, usually by a youth, and Socrates then cites 
some case not covered by the definition; another is offered and Socrates 
again shows an exception or a contradiction. Much of the uncertainty 
arises from the ambiguous usage and association of undefined terms 
such as good, happiness, knowledge, etc., with the as yet undefined 
"virtue" under discussion. That there is a definite purpose behind these 
"red herrings" is certainly indicated by the systematic way in which 
Plato goes about clarifying these terms, as they apply to virtue, in the 
late!" dialogues. 
In all these dialogues Plato has Socrates engaged in conversation 
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with persons reputed to have the virtue around which the argument re-
volves. This device serves to emphasize the dichotomy between be-
havior and belief that exists in many persons who have not critically 
examined the principles which govern their lives. These unanalyzed 
contradictions are the source of Socrates' epigrammatic statement that 
"evil is ignorance"; 1 it is also the sourc~ of Plato's efforts to show 
that personal values must rest upon knowledge. 
The characters in the dialogues who are virtuous but who cannot 
describe their virtue emphasize how difficult it really is to define virtue. 
Charmides is a temperate youth who cannot tell what temperance is; 
Lysis and Menexenus are the best of friends but the definition of friend-
ship escapes them; Laches and Nicias .are battle-tested generals but they 
cannot agree on any descr.iption of courage. 2 
4. Personal virtue and knowledge. 
The chain of thought that weaves its way through these conversa-
tional dialogues from personal virtue to knowledge may be stated simply 
and succinctly. The Euthydemus, from 278e through 283a, contains 
most of the essential points of the argument in the same order as they 
. are stated in the brief summary below. 
1. Cf. Plato, Prot., 345b, 353 ff.; Euthyd., 28le; Meno, 77 f. 
2. Cf. Plato, LYSis, 212b; Charm., 158b-c; Laches, 193e. 
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i. Virtue and personal happiness: In all these dialogues, 
virtue is asked to satisfy at least one condition; virtue must not in-
fringe on personal happiness since it is supposed to be good, and it 
should contribute to happiness. 
ii. Happiness and good fortune depend on virtue: Personal 
happiness and good-fortune depend, in some respect, on virtue; the 
references to this point ate often less obvious in the Charmides, Lysis 
and Laches than those to pt. i., but there is no doubt that in Plato's 
mind, virtue is a more concrete term and that it is only in terms of 
virtue that happiness has any meaning. 
iii. Can virtue be acquired? If virtue is not only consistent 
with but necessary to happiness, can virtue be acquired? --that is, can 
virtue be learned? --or are virtue and happiness accidents of personality 
and birth? 
iv. How can virtue be learned? If virtue can be acquired, can 
it be taught? If it can be taught, who should teach it? --what are the 
necessary qualifications of the teacher? 
v. What ~re the ends of education? If virtue can be taught we 
must know the ends sought to be sure that we are learning the right thing,. . 
To know the end is to be able to define it; thus the purpose of all these 
dialogues, on the surface at least, is the definition of virtue. 
vi. Virtue depends on some kind of knowledge: Virtue, whatever 
it is, depends on some kind of knowledge which includes but goes beyond 
the technical knowledge of matters of fact. The indication is that this 
knowledge is some form of moral judgment. 
I 
i. Virtue and personal happiness. 
Socrates relates his experience with the brothers Euthydemus and 
Dionysodorus, two Sophists who used to teach fighting in armor but who 
:now are prepared to teach virtue. 1 Their facile display of refuting any 
statement fails . to impress Socrates; he does not believe that they can 
seriously mean that the sophistic arguments used to trip ClEHnias, no 
1. Plato, Euthyd. , 273d. . 
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matter what he says, are the "teaching of virtuen which will make a 
1 
man good whether he wants to be or not. 
For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that 
ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he 
would only be able to play with men, tripping 
them up and oversetting them with distinctions 
of words. 2 · 
Socrates takes over the argument and directs the questions to 
show how he thinks the discourse should proceed to investigate wisdom 
and virtue. ''What human being is there who does not desire happiness ?"3 
And then characteristically, as when any virtue is discussed for the 
first time, Socrates asks if it should be considered a good and noble 
thing. 4 In what sense the virtues are ''good things" is left for the reader 
to decide, and since the individual is the focal point in these writings, 
it is easiest to think of this "good" as subjectively profitable or 
5 
valuable--as good for me. 
It has already been noted (seep. 87) that in the Charmides Plato 
seems hesitant to suggest the rule of the wisest and the division of labor 
since these things might be inimical to individual happiness. 6 The basic 
assumptions of the Republic are questioned in the spirit of the indi-
vidual who assumes the existence of a social structure from which he 
benefits but who does not realize that social obligations necessarily 
1. Plato, Euthyd., 277d f; 274 e .. 4. Cf. Plato, Charm., 159c. 
2. Plato, Euthyd., 278b. 5. Cf. Plato, Charm., 160b; 160c. 
3. Plato, Euthyd., 278e; 6. Cf. Plato, Charm., 171c-173c. 
cf. Charm., l73e; p. 86 f. 
limit his own definition of freedom. The emphasis on pe-rsonal happi-
·ness in these dialogues would make it se.em that happiness is the end 
for which virtue exists. In a sense this is so; psychologically it is so 
as we begin_ our study of virtue. Happiness is completely subjective, 
and since virtue is. being investigated in these introductory dialogues 
from an egocentric viewpoint, what is more natural than to confuse 
happiness with ideals? 
Happiness, however, is not an object of knowledge; it has no 
specific content; it may be the attending psychological quality of any 
realized value. One of the tests of virtue is that it contributes to 
personal happiness. While Plato plainly states this thesis over and 
over again, he plays a variation on the theme more subtly; it is all the 
more powerful since the repeated conjunction of virtue and happiness 
gradually becomes an insistent nhappiness depends on virtue." The 
proposition that "all happy men are virtuous," which might have seemed 
violently objectio~able at first, appears perfectly normal by the time we 
reach the Euthydemus. 
ii. Happiness and goo_d-fortune _depend on virtue. 
Socrates shows that happiness is realized through specific values; 
"shall we not be happy if we have many good things. " 1 He lists the 
things people usually think of as essential to happiness--health, wealth, 
1. Plato, Euthyd., 279a. 
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appearance, power, etc.; to these he adds temperance, justice, courage, 
and wisdom. Mere possession of "good things," however, does not make 
a man happy. "A man who would be happy must not only have good 
things, but he must also use them. " 1 
The proper use of his "goods'' depends on knowledge of that 
possession, for "what do possessions profit a man, if he have neither 
good sense nor wisdom ?"2 It turns out, then, that possessions are not 
good in themselves;3 it takes intelligent action to realize the potential 
value of anything. 4 The conclusion, then, is that ."wisdom only can make 
a man happy and fortunate. n5 
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It is now evident that this direction was indicated in the introductory 
section of the Lysis. Lysis' parents want him to be happy, but they do 
not, on that account, allow him to do as he pleases; in fact, his actions 
are very much controlled. 6 His own slave tells him what to do; this is 
because he does not have the experience or knowledge to govern all his 
1. Plato, Euthyd. , 280d. 
2. Plato, Euthyd., 281b. 
3. Plato, Euthyd., 281a-282. 
4. Dewey and Childs, TEF, 288. It is interesting to note that Dewey, 
_who is generally critical of Plato, is in agreement with him at this 
point. "It is the business of a philosophy of education .•• to trans-
form a preference which is blind ..• into an intelligent choice--one 
made, that is, with consciousness of what is aimed at, the reasons 
why it is preferred, and the fitness of the means used." 
5. Plato, Euthyd., 282c. 
6. Plato, Lysis, · 207e f. 
actions himself. 1 Socrates' objection in the Cha:rmides that the limi- · 
tations imposed by the rule of reason might not be c.onsistent with 
personal happiness are partly answered by this observation in the Lysis. 
Happiness does not lie in doing anything that you want to do; but in doing 
what you have sufficient knowledge to do with understanding. "In things 
which we know everyone will trust us. " 2 
iii. Canvirtue be acquired? 
The various ways in which virtue and happiness are allied in the 
"little" dialogues naturally .suggest the thought expressed by Socrates 
in the Euthydemus: "If only wisdom can be taught, and doe~ not come to 
man spontaneously. " 3 All men want to be happy, and if happiness is the 
quality psychologically concomitant with virtue, they will certainly be 
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interested in whether virtue can be learned. Ostensibly, this is the subject 
of the whole dialogue; the br.others have claim.ed to be able to teach virtue 
and Socrates is waiting for this great event to take place. 4 The problem, 
however, is not answered in the Euthydemus. The other "conversational" 
dialogues do not question that virtue can be taught; they proceed, confi-
dent that .virtue can be acquir·ed--if only it can be defined. 5 Not one 
results in a definition. The cumulative effect of one negati:ve result 
1. Plato, Lysis, 208c. 
2. Plato, Lysis, 210b. 
3. Plato, Euthyd., 282b. 
4. Plato, Euthyd., 273e. 
5. Cf. Plato, Lysis, 210d; 
Laches, 179e-180b; 
Laches, 186b. 
after another is to throw a shadow across the possibility of acquiring 
virtue; especially since the persons in the dialogues who fail with Socra-
tes exemplify the virtue they seek to define. Plato is building up the 
importance of the issue of teaching virtue which points ahead to the 
Protagoras, by using the negative endings. 
iv. How can virtue be learned? 
It might seem foolish to ask how virtue can be learned when it 
has not yet been decided that virtue can be. taught at all, but Plato does 
tell, very generally, how virtue should be taught if it can be taught. If 
it does not "spring up spontaneously," virtue is too valuable a personal 
asset to leave to chance acquisition; the youth must be properly edu-
cated. 1 Proper education is a very difficult and a very important thing; 
therefore, the advice of experts should be followed and not necessarily 
the opinion of the majority. 2 These experts should be proven teachers 
who have knowledge, experience -and good training; if you wish to see 
youngsters well educated, seek out the best teachers. 3 The good teacher 
improves the soul of his students through some sort of knowledge, which 
we now suspect to be knowledg.e of m_oral principles. 4 The type of 
teacher Socrates describes in the Laches is the same as that exemplified 
1. Cf. Plato, Laches, 178 f. Lysimachus and Melesias criticize 
their famous fathers, Aristides and -Thucydides, for educating 
them poorly; they blame their undistinguished record on their 
lack of proper training. 
2. Plato, Laches, 184e. 4. Plato, Laches, 185e. 
3. Plato, Laches, 185; cf. 201a~;b. 
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by Socrates himself in the Charmides and Lysis. 1 The very opposite 
of the good teacher is portrayed in the Euthydemus by means of a vicious 
satire on Sophistic methods of teaching. The whole dialogue is a criti-
cism of false teachers; from the beginning, where it is asked if virtue 
can be taught, to the bitterly critical end, Plato contrasts the serious 
purpose of Socrates with the mental "hocus-pocus" of the Sophists. 
The "inversion" of education and the good teacher is skillfully 
outlined by Socrates in his "tribute" to the artistry of the Sophists. 2 
Their "magnanimous disregard of any opinion" (they will refute anything), 
their "public-spirited denial of all differences, whether good or evil, 
white or black, or any other" is "praised" by Socrates. 3 He comments 
that their "education" is quickly learned: "I observed that Ct esippus 
learned to imitate you in no time. " 4 He warns them that they had better 
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not give any more "public entertainments," or they will lose money because 
their easily learned commodity will no longer be scarce. 5 If we reverse 
these characteristics we have a general description of the good teacher 
who alone is able to answer the question as to how virtue can be learned. 
1. Cf. Plato, Laches, 185 ff.. 
2. Plato, Euthyd., 303b ff. See Wild, PTM, for use of term 
"inversri:on." 
3. Plato, Euthyd, 303d. 
4. Plato, Euthyd~, 303e. The italics are the author's. 
5. Plato, Euthyd, 304a-b. 
v. What are the ends of education? 
A good teacher is essential -for good education, but additional 
information is needed in order to determine what the teacher should 
teach. "Would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the 
art of which we want to .find the masters?" 1 Socrates explains that when 
a person "considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of 
the end and not of the means. n2 Teachers and education are but a means 
to some other end which differs with any given subject. At first it 
seemed that happiness was the end sought in learning virtue (see 
point i. ~but it developed that happiness is realized through knowledge 
and virtue. The Euthydemus draws these threads together by pr9posing 
that "gpod things" make us happy if we have sufficient knowledge or 
power of judgment to ~se them to the best possible advantage. 3 As the . 
dialectic moves forward, happiness takes on a deeper significance, a 
moral cast; which at every step is more closely associated with "the 
good .. " It retains, however, the ambivalent trait of seeming to be a 
nebulous end, psychologically speaking, dependent on both virtue and 
material goods. 
97 
Plato is preparing us, in these little dialogues, to accept edu-
cation in its highest form as "improvement of · the soul. " 4 The immediate 
1. Plato, Laches, 185b. 3. Plato, Euthyd., 280b-282a. 
2. Plato, Laches, 185d. 4. Cf. Plato, Laches, 185e. 
ends of education, therefore, are those "virtues" which will improve 
the soul. The phrasing here is awkward because we do not yet know 
that Plato thinks of virtue as one whole composed of various aspects 
such as wisdom, courage and temperance or that in his psychology 
Plato compares the tripartite soul to these three ''virtues." We have 
seen, however, that the correct use of a "possession," such as the 
potentiality for being virtuous, involves knowledge of it. 1 
H we know what temperance, wisdom, or courage is, we should 
be able to define it; this is the positive meaning of Socrates' single-
minded pursuit of definition in these dialogues. "What is that common 
quality, which is the same in all these cases ?" 2 The objectivity of 
universal ethical definitions is necessary if virtue is to be taught. 3 
Charmides comments, when the dialogue ends without having reached a 
conclusion: "How can I know whether I have a thing, of which even you 
and Critias are, as you say, unable to ·discover the nature? --(not that 
I believe you)!' 4 In a negative fashion, typical of these works, this 
statement says that to know is to be able to define; the parenthetical 
remark is a significant hint that the inconclusive ending must not be 
1. Plato, Euthyd., 28lb. 
2. Plato, Laches, 191e; cf. 192b. 
3. Cf. Plato, Lysis, 219d-220b, where Plato differentiates intrinsic 
values from instrumental values; the "ends" or intrinsic values 
are those with some sort of objectivity. 
4. Plato, Charm. , 176b. 
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taken too seriously. To Plato, the more comprehensive importance 
of seeking accurate definitions lies in the search for obje'ctive truth. 
"For is not the discovering of things as they truly are, a good common 
to all mankind?" 1 If there is no objectivity in value judgments there is 
no basis for improvement through education, or for education itself. 
vi. Virtue depends on some kind of knowledge. 
Throughout the smaller dialogues, knowledge ·has been related 
to the various "virtues" discussed, but just what this knowledge consists 
of or what it knows is never made quite clear. We are told that it is 
the knowledge of "-good and evil"2 but good and evil are not defined other 
than in the cryptic statement that "wisdom is the only good and ignorcn!e 
the only evil. " 3 We are left with no real understanding of what Plato 
means by knowledge after reading these works. He has given enough 
examples, however, of the distinctions that can be made between differ-
ent "types"4 of knowledge, to give an idea of the direction his thought is 
taking. 
The identification of temperance and wisdom in the Charmides 
~ . 
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led to the examination of the "science of science. '1 This "pure knowledge" 
1. Plato, Charm., 166d. 
2. Plato, Charm., 173d and especially 174c-d; Laches, 194 and 196. 
3. Plato, Charm., 281e: 
4. - There is no real evidence in these dialogues that knowledge is thought 
of as a hierarchy; there is some evidence in the Euthydemus but not 
en~ugh. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 92 ff. Relation of the "little" dialogues 
to later works. Jaeger believes that Plato had the Theory of Forms 
in mind when the "little"works were written. 
was critized as not being knowledge of anything in particular. 1 The 
knowledge of particular things or even the "science" of some field or 
subject, such as medicine, is not that type of knowledge which will insure 
our happiness. 2 All that the science of medicine can reasonably insure 
is better health; it cannot guarantee that better health will make an 
individual a better or happier person. 3 Knowledge should be sought, 
however, for "if you discard knowledge, you will hardly find the crown 
of happiness in anything else. " 4 
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The Lysis begins with a short discussion of happiness and personal 
freedom. 5 Lysis is limited in his actions and choices because, as 
Socrates points out, he lacks experience and knowledge. Immediately 
after assuring Lysis that many of the values in life depend on knowledge 
and experience, 6 Socrates turns to Lysis' best friend and says: "You 
have experience, tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or 
the beloved the friend; or may either be the friend?" 7 Menexenus has 
a friend and he has experienced friendship, but he is at a loss to define 
love, which is assumed to be the essence of friendship. 
The difference between experience as a form of knowing and the 
experience of an emotion seems to be the only way of explaining why 
1. Plato, Charm., 169c ff. 4. Plato, Charm. , 173d. 
2. Cf. p. 85 f.; Plato, Charm., 174c. 5. Plato, Lysis, 207e f. 
3. Cf. Plato, Laches, l 95c. 6. Plato, Lysis, 21 0b. 
Cf. p. 87. 7. Plato, Lysis, 212b. 
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Plato used the introduction that he did; he definitely shows its separa-
tion from the rest of the dialogues by having Lysis called from the 
scene and by starting. the inquiry into friendship as soon as Lysis 
leaves. 1 A passage in the Lysis, which is almost identical with one in 
the Symposium, states that love does not depend~ knowledge but rather 
on the desire for knowledge. 2 Since this is part of Plato's explanation 
of love in the Symposium, it is reasonable to suppose that the intro-
duction was used as a contrast in showing the unique position enjoyed by 
love as the motivating force which incites the potentially virtuous person 
to seek that knowledge which will make him truly virtuous. 
In the Laches, at the very beginning of the argument, courage is 
conceded to be a part of virtue. Later in the dialogue, Nicias defines 
courage as "the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in 
war, or in anything. "4 The nature of that knowledge is not revealed in 
the Laches, and Socrates is quick to point out that this definition implies 
the knowledge of good and evil in the past, present and future, which 
would make courage equivalent to the whole of virtue. 5 In a negative way, 
Plato is telling us the definition of virtue itself. 6 
1. Note similar development of love in the Symposium. 
2. Plato, Lysis, 218b~ cf. Symposium 203e-204a. 
3. Plato, Laches, 190c. 
4. Plato, Laches, 195a; this is very similar to Plato's definition in 
the Protagoras. Cf. p.l4o :t: of text. 
5. Plato, LacTies, 198a-199a. 
6. Both the relation of a part of virtue to the whole and its connection 
with knowledge anticipate the Protagoras. 
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The Charmides and Laches end with the conclusion that temper-
ance and courage respectively are somehow related to the knowledge of 
good and evil; the Lysis shows that freedom of choice and responsibility 
are interdependent and that they depend on knowledge. As these little 
dialogues move separately in the same direction, it becomes evident 
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that much of the confusion in these dialogues stems from the failure to 
distinguish"judgment" from "knowledge." Plato's distinctions between 
the "types" of knowledge lead to the realization that moral judgment is 
equivalent to wisdom or true knowledge and that virtue and moral judgment 
are one and the same. In this way Plato is preparing the way for the 
Protagoras where virtue is considered to be knowledge. 
This line of reasoning is better shown in the Euthydemus' more 
positive development than in the other conversational dialogues. In 
character with the negative endings of these works, the .Euthydemus 
does not solve the problem with which it starts--" can virtue be taught''?--
but the dialectic has moved beyond the association of parts of virtue 
with knowledge. Virtue is no longer erroneously attached to temperate 
acts or courageous deeds; it is shown to consist of rational judgment 
in relation to a total scheme of living well. A truly virtuous man will 
act courageously when courage is demanded or temperately when temper-
ance will accomplish the greatest good. 
The man of knowledge is better off than one without it; knowledge 
is good and virtue is good. The proper use of good things depends on 
true knowledge or wisdom. 
Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, 
as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a right 
use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, 
and good-fortune in the use of them, is given by 
knowledge, --the inference is that everybody ought 
by all means to try and make himself as wise as he 
can.1 
This sort of fuzzy alliance between undefined virtue and undefined 
knowledge, hinging on their mutual goodness, exists in all these smaller 
works, but as we finally associate the temperate man, the courageous 
man, the friend and the teacher we begin to see that not only is the wise 
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man more likely to be virtuous , he is the only one who can be truly virtu-
ous. That there are individuals who are vLrtuous without knowing the 
grounds for their virtue is amply demonstrated throughout these dia-
logues. These persons, however, 'are not truly virtuous; they may 
easily lose their virtue, since it is not based on rational conviction, 
and furthermore they cannot teach it to others. 
The virtuous man who is ignorant of the rationale for that virtue 
might be thought of as virtuous in absence of evil whereas if he knew, he 
would be virtuous in spite of evil. For instance, a dolt might be trusted 
with both goods and money because he does not have the wits to value 
either. He is honest because he does not have the brains to be dishonest. 
An intelligent person, however, who values both goods and money, and 
1. Plato, Euthyd. , 282a. 
resists the temptation to steal or cheat because of his -convictions must 
be thought of as morally honest; he has chosen that action which is con-
sistent with his own values. In this sense, then,he "possesses" 
honesty to the extent that he can justify his actions to himself. The 
greater his knowledge, the more he possesses honesty; that is, the: 
greater is the number of different circumstances in which he can act 
with conviction. 
5. The negative endings and education. 
It may seem farfetched to suggest that the negative endings of . 
the smaller dialogues should aid Plato's development of the idea that 
virtue can be taught, but they do serve that purpose whether Plato in-
tended them to or not. These little dialogues show how difficult it is to 
define ethical universals; in fact, they cause us to doubt whether virtue 
can be defined at all. If virtue can be "possessed'-' by ·individuals but 
cannot be known objectively, that is, defined in some sense, then virtue 
certainly cannot be taught. In retrospect, we can see that this is one of 
the implications of the smaller dialogues; in the Euthydemus, the problem 
of teaching virtue is stated as such, but this dialogue also ends negatively. 
The Charmides, Laches and Lysis cast doubt upon particular aspects of · 
the virtuous life as intelligible; the Euthydemus does the same thing to 
virtue as a whole. 
If virtue cannot be defined, if courage, temperance, and wisdom 
remain unrelated characteristics of individuals that cannot be acquired, 
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then, certainly, virtue cannot be taught and the association of education 
and virtue is foolish. Experience shows, however, that some people do 
"learn virtue" and it is Plato's purpose to make education in virtue as 
scientific as possible. It is his aim to analyze the fundamental princi-
ples that govern virtue in order to reduce the element of chance, in 
learning or teaching virtue, by means of a systematic education which 
would insure everyone the opportunity to realize fully their potential for 
virtuous living. Thus, if some people do acquire virtue, it is because 
something is known; if it is known we should be able to define it and if we 
can define it, in some way, it can be taught. The negative dialogues 
indicate the direction that the investigation must take; they also show how 
the investigation centers around knowledge as the link between the indi-
vidual and virtue. 
The conversational dialogues are inconclusive for several reasons: 
first, virtue is considered as a personal attribute of benefit to the indi-
vidual, but the social responsibility of the virtuous citizen is not 
mentioned. The good life is too n~rrowly conceived in these dialogues. 
In the second place, the "parts" of virtue are seen to depend on knowledge, 
but since they are considered separately the fact that it is knowledge of 
moral judgment which apprehends "parts" of virtue in relation to life as 
a whole escapes notice. 
So the negative result of the dialogue is inextricably 
connected with the synoptic character of the dialectic 
enquiry . . . . Starting with enquiries into the nature 
of all the special virtues, [Plato] shows that any 
attempt to define one of them inevitably ends in 
tracing it and all the others back to virtue in1it-
self, from which alone it can be understood. 
Virtue itself is discussed by Socrates in the Euthydemus, 2 but 
virtue is not defined, so that even though judgment is shown to be the 
prime factor in personal well-being, the problem remains unsettled be-
cause it is not shown what that knowledge must differentiate between or 
in relation to what it is to judge. All the suggested definitions in these 
little works have valid aspects because they are based on experience, 
but the "scattered particulars" must be gathered in order for them to 
make sense. 
The Charmides, Lysis, Laches and Euthydemus have shown that 
virtue, since it is good, must make us happy; furthermore,.they have indi-
cated that to be truly happy is to be virtuous~ Other than that, the posi-
tive contribution of these dialogues lies in the problems that they raise; 
we have seen the problems evolve from very lifelike investigations into 
the nature of the special virtues. They give us the reasons for Plato's 
concern in later works with the relation of the special virtues to virtue 
itself, his differentiation of kinds of knowledge, his preoccupation with 
the grounds for moral judgment, and his persistent attention to education. 
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The fountainhead of wisdom is the awareness of ignorance; the Socratic 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 103-104. 
2. Plato, Euthyd., 278e-283b. 
method, the elenchus, is based on this principle. In the conversational 
dialogues, Socrates is practicing his method, not only on Charmides, 
Lysis and Cleinias but also on us, the readers. By forcing us to think, 
Plato is showing that we often do not know what we thought we knew about 
such things as temperance, courage, and wisdom--the negative endings 
are essential to his purpose. 
When we observe in reading them that not one of the 
little dialogues concludes -with the expected results, 
but all turn into a question mark at the end, we feel 
a philosophical excitement which has a profound 
educational influence. 1 · 
This is the educational method of the dialogues at work. 
The problem of education is intrinsically connected with social 
obligation; how does the virtuous individual or rather the citizen stand 
in relation to the state? What can be expected from the state in the way 
of guidance? What can the state expect from him as regards service or 
duty? These problems are not considered in the "little" dialogues. As 
an introduction to these questions, let us turn to the Euthyphro, Apology 
and the Crito to observe what happens to the virtuous citizen, Socrates, 
as he goes about his business in the state. 
1. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 105-106. 
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CHAPTER VI 
VIRTUE AND SOCIETY 
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The virtues tbat have been discussed in the conversational dialogues 
may all be thought of from the purely egocentric point of view; courage, 
wisdom, temperance, and even friendship do not necessarily need to be 
considered in a social context. In these early works, Plato baa avoided 
the question of bow these virtues are connected with the life of tb~ indi-
vidual ln his community; they haYe been abstracted, as 1t were, from 
the living context of the 1nd1vtdualin society ln order to be considered 
ln themselves. Much of the confusion 1n the converaational works stems 
from thls fact, as ls lnd1cated by their negative endings. 
The Euthyphro, ApoloR, and the Crlto extend the drama beyond 
the narrow conftnea of the lndivldual, and present Socrates on a wlder 
stage as the virtuous individual faced with life ln society. In the earlier 
-
dialogues Socrates was seen trying to help others define virtue; in the 
"Socratic dialogues" we never lose sight of virtue, but deflnttlon is not 
the primary function of these works. In them we see virtue in action, 
as personified by Socrates. Courage in the faee of death, wisdom ln 
his advice to the people, and temperance towards his unjuat Judges are 
all exhibited ln their turn by Socrates 1n these poignant dramas, which 
accurately etch the character of the man who la Plato' a educational 
prototype. 
1. Euthyphro. 
The Euthyphro seems, at first, no different from the conver-
sational dialogues. When Socrates asks Euthyphro to "explain the 
general idea which makes all pious things to be piousu we can be for-
given if this seems to us to be an old story; 1 here is Socrates up to his 
now familiar trick of inquiring into the nature of virtue. Unlike the 
conversational dialogues, however, the Euthyphro is not negative in 
ending alone; 1t is negative throughout. The only positive statement in 
the dialogue links piety to justice as a part, but this thought is Immedi-
ately lost and never returned to for development. Unlike the previous 
dialogues, the Euthyphro never associates piety with knowledge; in the 
light of the earlier writings, this is a distinct departure. The only 
purpose of the dialogue would seem to be the criticism of the convention-
al ideas of piety expressed by Euthyphro. 
The ready admission on the part of Euthyphro that piety is a part 
of justice may seem strang• to the modern reader, but it furnishes an 
insight into the trial of Socrates on the criminal charge of impiety. 
Whlle the Greeks were extremely tolerant of religious cults they also 
demanded obedience, in act at least, to the laws of the state governing 
religion • . Socrates was accused of violating the laws of the state, and 1t 
is the judicial character of religion in Athens that elicits the immediate 
1. Plato, Euthyph., 6e. 
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acquiescence on the part of Euthypbro to the Idea that piety is a part 
of justice. Piety, then, cannot be thought of as a strictly individual 
virtue, since to be pious meant. to conform to a certain social pattern. 
Of course, this is the opinion of the Athenians, and Euthypbro, as a 
super .. typleal Athenian, cannot suspect what Socrates means by piety 
or Justice. We can think of the Euthyphro as keynoting the transition 
from virtue• of the individual to the virtuous individual ln society. 
In the dialogue, Socrates meets Euthyphro and in the course of · 
conversation tells him that he is golng to be accused by Meletus of .cor- . 
ruptlng the youth of Athens. 1 Socrates remarks, ironically, that Meletus 
is the only statesman to begin in the right place by cultivating virtue in 
the youth--Socrates has not forgotten the prime tssue of the conversation-
ai dialogues. 2 Buthyphro, a soothsayer, will also be· involved in liti-
gation; he has come to the Porch of King Archon to press charges against 
his father for murder. 3 His father chained a servant who had slain 
another servant in a drunken rage and the killer subsequently died from 
lack of attention. 4 Euthyphro hae no qualms about his proceeding because 
his father committed an impious act, and 1n matters relating to piety he 
bas exact knowleye. 5 
As we would suspect, Soc:ratea shows a great interest; the 
1. Plato, Euthyph. , 2e. 
2. Plato, EUtnyph., 2e. 
3. Plato, Euthypli.; 3b-c . . 
4. Plato, Euthyph., 3d-4a. 
5. Plato, Euthyph. , 5a. 
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profession of exact knowledge on any subject is enough to arouse the 
"gad-flY'' 1n Socrates at any time, and here ls an expert on tbe aubject 
for which he him&elf is about to be tried. t•Tell me, n he says, ''what 
ls the nature of thla idea [of pte~ , and then I shall have a standard .•• 
by which I may measure actions." 1 Piety, Euthyphro replies, ta what 
is dear to the gods. 2 
Euthypbro agrees with Socrates that arguments are not usually 
about empirical facta which can be verified, but about ethical standards--
the just, good and evil, the honorable, etc. 3 The stories of the gods, 
which Euthyphro . specializes in, tell of disagreements between tbe gods. 
It follows that theae disagreements would also be over moral lssues; 
therefore, the aame things are loved and hated by the gods, and the same 
things., then, might be considered pious by some goda and tmptous by 
others. 4 How can Buthypbro know 1f bla father committed a pious or 
an Impious act 111 letting a murderer c:Ue? If we now think of Socrates 
accused of eorrupUng the youth, we see Plato's criUclam of any such 
idea of piety being used to judge Socrates. We alao see 1rhy Socrates, 
who has a much more refined idea of piety, 5 would not 1J&e the stories 
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of gods, which formed the basta of the religious laws, 1n hla own defense; 
he could not do so and maintain his Integrity. 6 
1. Plato, Eutbyph., 6e. 
2. Plato, Eutbyph,, 6e. 
3. Plato, Euffiyp}t,, 7d-f. 
4. Plato, Euthyph~, 9a-b. 
5. Cf. Plato; apol. , 35e. 
6. Cf. Plato,~, 521d-522e, 
for Plato's expJ.inatlon of 
$<)crates' defense. 
f! 2--
Euthyphro' s succeeding deflnitlons are no better understood by 
him; the more acute logical analysis demonstrated by Socrates, in the 
later part of the dialogue, shows how profoundly he has considered the 
nature of piety, which makes his trial for impiety that much more ironl· 
cal. In each case, u Euthyphro remarks, his arguments get up and 
move away from him under fire of Socrates' questions--as far as he 
was concerned they would "never have stirred. " 1 
The dialogue seems to be taking a more positive direction when 
Socrates says, ''I will myaeU endeavor to show you how you might in-
struct me in the nature of piety.... Ia not that which is plo~ necessari-
ly juat?"2 But Plato portrays Euthypbro as resorting to verbiage and 
obviowdy becoming impatient of having his ''exact knowledge" dialnte-
grate and sift through his fingers. 3 Socrates shows Euthyphro that 
prayers ud sacrlflces, as he understands them, are foolish. Be 
comments, rather aarcutlcally, that Euthyphro must really know what 
piety is to take the part of a murderer against his own father and that he 
should therefore tell Socrates what it is. Euthyphro decides that he is 
in a hurry and must leave; thus Socrates is left to face his trial wltbout 
Euthypbro' a "expert" help. 
Plato makes tt obvious that Euthypbro does not understand the 
1. Plato, Euthyp'h., 11d. 
2. Plato, lutbyph., 11-. .• 
3. Plato, Eutbyph., 14b. 
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true nature of law or piety; his equivocation stands in contrast to 
Socrates' real piety and reasoned concern for the law and justice in the 
Apology and the Crlto. Socrates' behavior is consistent with his be-
liefs--in these dialogues he epitomizes the ideal of harmony between 
theory and practice. 
2. Apology. 
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The Apology, as its title would suggest, is not so much Socrates' 
defense against the accusations brought against him as a justification of 
his way of life and his philosophy, since the two are synonymous in his 
case. When Socrates describes what he feels is his god-given duty, 
there can be no doubt that he conceived the m1salon of the philosopher 
to be that of an educator of the people and the state. The fact that this 
way of life has resulted in his trial on the charges of impiety shows 
that even so lofty a vocation could not be pursued with impunity; society 
cannot be ignored by a man who would teach, even if hta method be the 
negative type used by Socrates. Socrates was aware of the pressure 
that can be brought to bear by society, and he explains that he shunned 
political life because a man who acted on conviction could not long endure 
in pol1tics. 1 The Apology reveals many of the problems which face the 
1. Plato, Apol., 31e; cf. 37d where Socrates refused exile because 
he felt iliithe would probably also be driven out of other countries 
for teaching. Cf. 32a: "Be who will fight for the right, if he 
would live even for a brief space, must have a private station and 
not a public one. " 
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man of principle when his mission is not understood by a society with 
different standards from his own; it poses the problem: How is the 
iconoclast or the saint related to the society in which he must live? 
As the ApolOfY begins, Socrates is addressing the court and 
asking them to be patient with him, since he will present hls case in 
hls own way, depending on the eloquence of truth rather than the elo-
quence of a prepared oration such as is usually heard ln the courts. 1 
He explains that he is in court because of two seta of enemies; those that 
he has made in the put and those who al'e his opponents in the trial. 2 
The enemies that he made in the past became angry because he pursued 
the mission that he felt the Delphic Oracle had imposed on him when the 
~rophetess declared that no man was Viiser than $>crates. 3 Convinced 
of his own ignorance, he examined the politicians, the poeta and Ute 
artisans in turn and finally became convinced that he could not refute 
the oracle. 4 These men professed knowledge which they did not have; 
at least Socrates was aware of his ignorance and this gave him a slight 
advantage in wisdom. 
And so I go about the world, obedient to the god, and 
search and make inquiry into the wisdom of any one, 
whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; 
and 1f he ls not wise, then in vlftdlcatlon of the oracle 
I show him that he .lB not wlse. 
1. Plato, Apol., 17b. 
2. Plato, Apol., 18e f. 
3. Plato, Apol. , 21a. 
4. Plato, Apol., 22a. 
5. Plato, Apol., 23b. 
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In this way Socrates made many enemies among the most powerful 
groups in the state: no one likes to have his ignorance exposed, es-
pecially 1n the presence of others. These, then, have old grievances 
to settle. 
The accusations of his present enemies are easily disposed of 
when Socrates engages Meletus in the elenchus. 1 In refuting the charge 
that he intentionally corrupted the youth, Socrates states a preamble 
for the philosopher-educator's purpose in society--stated negatively. 
The good do their neighbours good, and the evil do 
them evil. . . . If a man with whom I have to live is 
corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by 
him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too--
so you say, although neither I nor any2other human ls ever likely to be convinced by you. 
It would follow that the "good man" would improve his neighbor; that 
is, do him 11good." Thus we have the educational function of the "good 
man" or the philosopher. When we add this little line of reasoning to 
the examination of men's opinions, it becomes evident that Socrates, 
as he says himself, is the "gad-fly" of the state for its· own good and, 
3 it might be added, in order to have good neighbors himself. 
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Socrates refuses to abandon his philosophical mission of searching 
into himself and other men even 1n the face of death, for that would be a 
known evil and he will never avoid a possible good, such as death, to 
1. Plato, Apol., 24c·28. 
2. Plato, Apol., 25e. 
3. Plato, Apol., 30a f. 
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embrace a certain evll. 1 Socrates feels that his role as a teacher of 
the people is justified and he does not Intend to give it up. 
For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old 
and young allke, not to take thought for your persona 
or your properties, but first and chiefly to care 
about the greatest Improvement of the soul. I tell 
you that Virtue 11 not given by money, but that 
from virtue comes money and e1ery other good of 
man, public u weU u private. . · 
When the verdict 1a returned, Socrates Ia neither surprised nor 
really unhappy and he w1ll not give 1Q ao much as to plead for a mild 
. punishment. "I wlU not say of myaelf that I deserve any evU, or pro-
pose any penalty. Why should 1?"3 Be wm not allow the shadow of a 
' 
doubt to pua over the conviction that bla way of Ufe waa right and 
honorable; a way of lUe yhlch be aummart.es aa follows: 
Refiectlng that I was really too honest a JU.D to be 
a politician and Uve, I did not go where I could do 
no good to you or to myaelf; but where I could do 
the greateet good privately to every one of you, 
thither I went, and sought to pereuade every man 
among you that he must look to himself, ud seek 
virtue and wisdom before he looks to his prl vate 
interests, and look to the state before he loOks to 
the lntereats of the state; and tbat tbl• ·~d be the 
order wblch he observes in all hla actions. · 
Wben Socrates receives the penalty of death, he tells the court 
that they cannot &Told censure by kllllng men; the easiest and beat way 
1. Plato, tpo~. , 28e ... l9b. 
2. Plato, ~·, 31a-b. 
3. Plato, ~· , 37b. 
4. Plato, Apol. , 36c. 
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to avoid the crlUclam of others ls to improve themselves. 1 As for tbelr 
penalty, death holds no fears for hlm; in the past his "lDner voice" baa 
always warned him when hia conduct wu leading him lnto evll, and be 
bas not beard lt at any tlme durlDg the trlal; therefore, he feels that 
death must be a good thing. 2 Be advlaes bla judges to ,.be of good cheer 
concerning death" for no really evil tblng can happen to a good man tn 
life or 1n death. 3 
• I. Crlto. 
Bow far we have moved from the realm of the egocentric ls 
empbaalaed 1n the Crlto where the discussion revolves around the lndi-
-
vidual' a regard for the law. Bow doea the lndlYidual atand as regards 
the law 1f be bas been unjustly convicted of a crime? Socrates certalnly 
bas been unjustly condemned to death for impiety. Slaould be, as Crlto 
suggests, makesood hla escape, lf not for hia OWD sake, tben for the 
sake of bls family and frlenct. ? The law In the Athenian democracy, 
since there was no Judicial ayatem u we thlnk of it todaYJ very concrete-
ly represented the opinion of the people; therefore, tbts queatlon means: 
Bow is tbe vlrtuoua man to act ln relation to the formulated ·optn1on of 
his 1oelety? Be cannot compromise and remain faithful to bla own values 
and purpose, but oelther can be fulflU tbat mlsalon 1n oppoaltlon to the 
1. Plato, ~. , 89d. 
2. Plato, ~. , 40a f. 
3. Plato, ~·, 41c. 
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opinion of the citizens as a whole. Socrates' uncompromlatng spirit, 
which refuaed to condescend to the people 1n court, his refusal to vio-
late the laws of Athens by appealing to the mob' a emotions or to vindi-
cate himself by meana of aophtsUc lilterpretaUona of the religious 
myths, have condeDUled him more than the chargea brought against 
him. 
After belnl sentenced to death,. Socrates awaits the arrival of 
the ship from Delos which is the signal for his execution. He awakes 
one morning to find Crito already ln bla cell; the ship ls to arrtve very 
sborUy and Crlto has come once ap.ln to try to convince Socrates that 
he should accept the ald of his friends, and escape.. Crito's arguments 
seem quite plaualble in the light of Socrates' unjust convlctton. Socrates 
agrees to nee lf they can prove that their preYlous conclusions about 
justice and the law were in any way wrong. 
Bas the argument which wu once, good now proved to 
be talk for tbe sake of talking--mere childish 
nonseue? That l8 •bat I want to consider with 
your help, cruo .. -whether, under my present circum· 
stances, the argyment appears to be ln any way 
different or not. · 
Throughout the Ae?lOI)', and especially in tbta puaage, two 
points mentioned previously are very evident: 1. action• muat agree 
with beilef; 2. philosophy, for Socrates and for PlalP; is a way of 
We. Socrates lnalsta that any action suggested by Crlto muat be 
1. Plato, Crlto, 46d. 
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consistent with the values and principles that have governed his life. 
"Not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued.... And a good life 
. ls equivalent to a just and honourable one. "1 The fact that he is now 
in jail condemned to die does not change those principles; nor does 
the fact that he was unjustly accued warrant returning evil for evU, 
should escape prove to be an evil. 
Socrates then acts as the Laws of Athens which have come to 
interrogate him and Crlto. 2· The Laws say that the state could not 
exist If anyone who felt like it could disregard the law whenever he 
considered himself unjustly accused. 3 Further, the Laws point out 
. that Socrates has moral obligations to tbe state which he summarizes 
for them. 
For, having brought you into the world, and 
nurtured and educated you, and given you and 
every other citlsen a share in ey-ery good which 
we had to give, we further proclaim to any 
Athenian by the liberty which we allow him, that 
if he does not like us wben he has become of age 
and has seen the ways of the city, and made our 
acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and 
take his goods with him. • • • But be who has ex-
perience of the manner in which we order justice 
and adminlster the state, and stUl remains; haa 
entered into an implied contract that he will do 
as we command him. And he who disobeys us la, 
as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, ~cause in 
disobeying us he ts disobeying his parents; secondly, 
. because we are the author• of his education; 
1. Plato, Crito, 48c. 
2·. Plato, Crlto, 50b-54d. 
3. Plato, Cilto, 50b. 
-
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thirdly, because he has made an agreement with 
us that he will duly obey our commands; and he 
neither obeys them nor convinces us that our 
commands are unjust; and we do not rudely 
impose them, but give him the alternaUve of 
obeying or convinciDf us; --that is what we offer, 
and he does neither. 
Socrates baa demonstrated his satisfaction with Athens and 
the Athenian law by remaining in the city constantly and raising his 
family there. If he had been primarily interested 1n preventing his 
execuUon, he could have proposed exile as bls punishment, but be had 
claimed that death was more desirable; would it be manly to change bls 
mind now, just because death was approaching? 2 By accepting death, 
Socrates is keeping faith with his life, and dies innocently wronged; 
but if be escapes be negates his life and does wrong for which many 
innocent people might suffer. 3 It would mean breaking his agreement 
with the state, destroying faith in the law, jeopardizing his friends and 
casting shame on his famuy ...... all for a short period of mere existence. 
If he revoked his aentence of his own accord by escaping, he would in 
effect renounce virtue, law, and justice; since they make life worth 
living, that which would remain to him would be mere existence. In 
accepting death he is the only one to suffer and 1n thus accepting death 
his life is justified--besides, death may be a good. 
1. Plato, Crito, 51c-52a. 
2. Plato, Crito, 52c. 
3. Plato, Crito, 53b ff. 
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4. Law and justice. 
The contrast between law and justice begtna ln the Eutbyphro. 
This may not seem evident at flr8t, but as baa been pointed out, piety 
is part of the laws of the Athenian state. Piety la never associated with 
knowledge, in the Euthypbro, in the way in which each of the virtues 
discussed 1n the little works was, and there are no leading questions on 
the part of Socrates that augge•t a aertea of seemtugly plausible con-
clusions, as there are ln the early writings--the Euthyphro ta d.e-
atructlve throughout. Wbat purpose does the Euthyphro serve, then? 
That it is meant as an introduction to the Apology ls evident both by the 
references to Socrates' impending trial and the subject of the dialogue. 
But why should Plato want to introduce the Apology with a completely 
negative discussion of piety, even lf impiety ls the chuge brought 
against Socrates? 
Euthyphro is a soothsayer, an expert on matters pertaining to 
piety, but he cannot maintain a consistent llne of reasoning when de-
fending his definitions of piety. He ll not an orc:ltnary clttsen, auch as 
those who wW judge Socrates; he ls the type of person who forma the 
opinions of the people. In bla self ... rlghteous conviction he never doubted 
hta knowledge and, as far aa he was concerned, he never would have ex-
cept for Socrates. If Euthyphro cannot aatlafaetorily define piety, how 
can the people? The Athenian idea of piety ls shown to be baaed on 
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mythological stories and the opinion of uninformed people; and since 
there was no system of jurisprudence in Greece, .the opinion of the 
people in the Athenian democracy was the law. For this reason, rheto-
ric and sophistic argumentation were extremely important to the poli-
tician in that society. Socrates' refusal to use " all the tricks of the 
trade" in his defense, makes the contrast between law and justice, in 
these three dialogues, that much more ironic. 
Plato, then, by exploding the opinions of piety based on my-
thology and all the other common definitions expressed by Euthyphro, 
is showing that the court had no valid basis for judging the only really 
pious person in their mtdst. In the Euthyphro, piety was admitted to be 
a part of justice, and yet ln the Apology we see the perversion of justice 
in the name of law. 
All the dialogues discussed so far have revolved around virtue; 
they have suggested that personal happiness depends on virtue, but 
we do not know exactly what that virtue is. In the Af9logy we see it ex-
emplified in every word and action of Socrates. The previous error of 
limiting the consideration of virtue to the lndividu,alls shown in its 
falsity; with no uncertainty, Plato shows that the man of virtue is a 
teacher and a philosopher whose every act is rooted in the very fibre of 
the whole man and whose philosophy is a profound conviction--a way of 
life--the primary function of which is the improvement of himself and 
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his fellow citizens. But what of the personal happiness that was sup-
posed to be the concomitant of virtue? In the Apol911, Socrates' virtue 
leads to tragic consequences but, and this 1a the fundamental criticism 
implled by Plato, lt is not the fault of virtue but of the law as it · existed 
in Plato' • time; how can justice be obtalDed if law is subject to such 
vagaries as the whims of an untnformed mob? 
We have seen that the problem of virtue lay at the bottom of the 
improvement of the lndlvldual for hla own sake, .and now the problem has 
taken on a broader social significance, for Socrates' unjuat conviction 
stands as a ertttclsm of law on the part of that virtue wht.ch he personi-
fies. If a "man should want good neighbor a, " 18 be justified in using 
Socrat~a' metbnd of trying to improve men ln spite of themselves? Here 
we find one of the ·basle problema that underlie Plato'·• theory of edu-
cation. Virtue 18 a personal attribute and the good society depends on 
virtuous men as individuals, but how shall ''most men" be improved if 
they do not care to be improved and if "moat men" govern the law? 
"Most men'' became angry with . Socrates when be tried to educate them, 
and since they controlled the law be waa condemned to death. 
The confUct between law and justice bad become acute in Plato's 
time; the chaotic Umea in which different forms of government aucceeded 
one another in rap~d fashion wer«! crystalllzed in the Sophtsta' theories 
of Natural Law and the relativity of eth:ical principles. The old 
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aristocratic idea of the essential unity of the citizen with bis state and 
its laws had broken down; lndlvidual ethics replaced aret8, and law, 
external to the citizen, replaced justice. The whole movement of an 
age seemed to be caught up and symbolized in one tragic Incident when 
Socrates calmly took the cup and drained off the last bitter drop of 
hemlock. Plato's task was to invert the order ao that Socrates would 
be the rule rather than the exception, and law and juatlce would once 
more be united. If thls is kept ln mind, Plato's theoretical, social revo-
lution through the educational state in the Republic wlll seem much more 
cogent. 
Plato is not crltlcizing law, as such, ln the Apology, but law 
based on uninformed opinlon. Be goes out of bls way to mate this clear 
in the Crito, where-the principle of the law is reaffirmed in the moat 
-
dramatic form possible. Socrates refused to save hla Ufe, in order to 
preserve the principle of the law. The Crlto furnishes an Immortal 
picture of conviction and behaVior harmoniously resolved in the virtu-
ous citizen. In these dialogues we are given a concrete eample of the 
virtues that were considered theoretically ln the conversational dl a-
logues. We have seen that virtue can be fully realized only in a social 
context and that the truly virtuous man is a phUosopber with an edu-
cational mission, but we still do not know what virtue la, whether lt can 
be acquired, or on what tt ls baaed. In the Pro!qoras these problems 
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are brought together and we find the first really positive step towards 
bringing virtue, the individual, and society together in a balanc~ 
relationship. 
5. Sophistic education vs. Socratic education. 
The Prot&foras is the first dialogue to investigate constructively 
the basts for those convictions and moral principles discussed separately 
tn the conversational dialogues and exemplified by Socrates 1n the 
Apology an.d the Crlto. The drama depicts the conflict between sophistic 
education, personified by Protagoru, and that of Socrates. 1 Socrates 
does not dlaagree with what Protagoras has to say so much as he 
questions his right to say it. This is· emphasised by the fact that 
Socrates and Protagoras change places 1n the course of the argument so 
that Socrates; in the end, is defending Protagoras' original premise 
that virtue can be taught. 
Protagoraa ts a venerable old man when the youthful Socrates 
engage~ htm ln conversation and proceeds to badger him without mercy 
or respect for his age and reputation. 2 His kind reception of Socrates is 
repaid by a resoundlng defeat in the dialectic of the argument; Socrates 
does not even allow him the sop of retalning the upper hand ln the analy-
sis of poetry. Regardless of this treatment, the old master graciously 
acknowledges the power that Socrates has in conducting an argument. 
1. Cf. Iaeger, PAl, n, 108. 
2. Cf. Iaeger, PAl, n, 108. 
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Socrates does not attempt to refute Protagoras' soclologlcal arguments 
for educatlon .. -he lures him into his own province of the ethical standards 
ln order to demonstrate that the Sophists had no right to profess the 
teacblng of political aretl 1 The structure of the dialogue ta •uch that 
Protagoraa' views are presented in a favorable light even though 1t ta 
obvious that his definition of virtue is· illuaderatood by him and dUfer-
ent from that of Plato and Soerates. That Protagoraa ts treated klndly 
is understandable, for much that he has to say, whether actually 
Protagoraa' ideas or not, Ia incorporated into Plato's own thought; but 
Plato i8 showing that "right oplnion" is not aufflclent- ... the teacher of 
virtue must know why hls opinion is right. The prlnctples that 
Protagoras presents are almost without exception used by Plato in the 
Republic as necessary to the Ideal state. This la another lnstance of 
Plato's method of introducing his own opinlou tn a negative light so that 
the reader will be famlllar with them and rel.llze their Importance more 
fully when they are reintroduced at tbe proper time. 
1. Liberal education and the 80\ll. 
Socrates, who tells the story of his discourse wlth Protagoraa, 
ta awakened by Bippocratea one morning; Hippocrates bu beard the news 
of Protagoru' presence in Athena and wanta Socrates to. introduce him 
to the great Sophta.t immediately so that he can study wt.th hlm, no matter 
1. Cf. laeger, PAl, U, 114 ... 115. 
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what the cost may be. Socrates agrees; but flrst, alnce lt is early, be 
testa Hippocrates' resolution by "examining" him. 1 Be points out that 
learning from a Sophist is not lUte learning a trade or a profession; if 
1t were, Hippocrates' object ln studying with Protagoras would be that 
of becoming a Sophist himself. 2 To a youth of a noble and wealthy 
family this was Indeed an embarrassing inference, slnce sophistry was 
not highly regarded u a profession~ Blppocrate.a, who baa a polltlcal 
career ln mind, wants a llberal education, that ts, culture or J!idela, 
3 to further his ambition. 
Edueauon of this sort, Socrates says, differs from training in 
the trades or the professions tn one very important respect--it is en-
tirely training for the soul; that ls, .it moulds the personality to a greater 
extent than any other type of educattoil. If tbla ts the Jdnd of instruction 
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which Blppocratea wlU receive from Protagoraa "m,uat not be make him 
eloquent tn tbat which he understands ?"4 Th1a ts the problem from which 
the rest of the dialogue evolves. What does the Sophist know and what 
-
does be teach his students? Rlppocrates does not .know, but he was 
perfeeUy wllllng to risk his soul 1rithout ever questionlng bla own purpose 
or the quallftcatlona _of his teacher. 
Are you aware of the danger which you are incurring? 
The soults 1n question, but no sooner does this 
foreigner appear, than you iDatanUy commit your 
1. Plato, Prot., 311b. 
2. Plato, Prot., 312b f. 
3. Cf. laeger, PAl, D, 109. 
4. Plato, Prot., 312c. 
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soul to his keeping. You call him a Sophist, but 
are manlfesUy ignorant of what a Sophist ts; .and 
yet you y• going to commit yourseu. to h18 
keeping. 
Socrates' warning at the beglmllng of the dialogue must be kept 
m mind, not only because 1t underscore• the· oonttast between hill own 
form of education, u stated 1n the Aec!19fl, 2 and . that of the Sophists, 
but also because here Plato shows expltcttly that education ls first and 
foremost a matter pertaining to the individual. The fact that the tndl .. 
vidual "soul" 18 the basts of society and the end of education ls empha-
sized here ln plain terms. 3 The effect of education on the total person-
ality, wblch is so fundamental to Plato's moral and political thought in 
the Republic, baa been suggested-In scattered phrases throughout all the 
previous dialogues, but 1n the Protagoras the whole argument emerges 
from the conviction that, 
You cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry 
them away in another vessel; when you have patd 
for them you must receive them into the soul and 
go your wy, etther greatly harmed or greatly 
benefited. 
1. Plato, Prot.·, 313a-c, condensed by the author. 
2. Cf. laeiir. PAl, U, 107 .. 
3. -The "soul'' or character of the total personallty 18 the mo•t 
tndlvtduallzed aspect of a person .. -tbat which sets hlm apart and · 
dlsUngutshea him from other men~ It ls alao that wbtch draws 
· men together and makes them interdependent because of special-
ized talents and abilities pecllllar to tndlvidlials. Plato' a 
emphasis on the soW., then, indicates to what extent education 
ls for the individual. 
4. Plato, Prot., 314b. 
-
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The harm that false education can do forms the baaia of Plato's attack 
on the Sopbiata. They do not understaad that the end of education is 
the moral improvement of an 1od1v1dual' s character, and that all the 
good or profit of education stems from that moral improvement. In the 
Pro~raa, Plato is not streasing hia grievance agalut the Sophists 
for what they teach; he questions their right to teach at all. Be asks 
for their purpose and demands that they show to what extent this pUl"pose 
can be realized through education. 
11. Can virtue be t&!Jht? 
Socrates approaches Protagoras at the home of Calllu, where 
Protagoru and many of the most famous Sophists of the day are lodged, 
and immediately asks him what lt ls that he will teach U Hippocrates 
should become one of his st\ldenta. Socrates blterprets Protagoru' 
flowery answer to mean that be teaches the art of polltlca, and promises 
to make men good citlsens; to this, Protagoraa agrees empbatleally. 1 
Socrates, who says that he doubts if thla art can be taught, cites the case 
of the builder and tbe ahlpwrlght; in matters concernlng butldlng or ships, 
these experts are consulted, but in the affairs of the state there are no 
experts (aa Protagoraa professes to be). In matters pertaining to poll-
tics everyone demands a aay no matter what his profession may be. 
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Here Plato la plantlag tbe aeeda that grow into the ldea of the Pblloaopher-
Klng ln the Republic by suggesting, again negatively, tbat experts are 
1. Plato, Prot., 319a. 
-
needed 1n the art of politics. Socrates ralaes another objection: if 
political virtue or wisdom could be taught, virtuous men would 
certaJ.nly teaeh their sona, but very often the sou of famous fathers 
are undisttngulshed citlzena. 1 
Protagoraa explains, by means of an elaborate myth typieal of 
Sophistic oration, that all men rightly have polltleal opinions because 
all men are by nature P?lltieal animals. 2 Socrates doea not take ex-
ception to the idea that all men are political animals, and 1t may be 
assumed that Plato ia ualng Protagoraa here to express an idea charac-
teriatic of Greek thought in general and lmpllclt in his own philosophy, 
especially in the Republic. That all men are aocial animals does not 
mean, however, that all men should or ean be statesmen; all men are 
consumers, too, but tbat does not mean that they should all be farmers. 
Protagoraa then tries to show that virtue can be taught; for proof , 
Protagoru appeals to empirical fact. The belief that virtue can be 
taught la tmpUclt 1n the very structure of society, and the behavior of 
peoples. 
They do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, 
or to grow spontaneously, but to be a thing which may 
be taught.. . . No one would instruct, no one would 
rebuke, or be angry 1rlth thoa' calamiUea they suppose 
to be due to nature or chance. 
1. Plato, Prot. , 320a-b. 
2. Plato, JiiO[. , 323&. · 
3. Plato, Prot., 32Sd f. 
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ID actual practice, however, men are punished for impiety and in-
justice which "may be described generally as the very opposite of 
political virtue." 1 Protagoras userts that me.n are morally responsi-
ble for the choices and actions which are generally held to be governed 
by the character of the individual, and that injustice and impiety are 
the results of poor training and poor choices. Punishment, lf 1t is 
sensible, ts used to prevent future wrong, which bnpUes that mankind 
feels that 'Virtue can be taught. 2 
Plato, of course, agrees with these observations; lt ls the very 
type of reu.ontng which leads to his own educational theories, but be 
does not agree that social beha'rior ls a sufficient ground for asserting 
that individuals or society can be Improved by means of education. The 
argument would be circular and would result 1n the conclualon, typical 
of relativistic theories, that what is, is right. In other words, lf social 
behavior ls the source and etandard for education, the result is con-
formity and not Improvement. Education then would be merely ac-
quaintance with a soetal environment--a far cry frorn the improvement 
of the "soul" which waa Socrates' goal and the ground for Plato's edu-
cational revolution of society. The basic eontradlctlon in a relativillt'.s 
profession of being capable of teaching virtue to others la at the bottom 
1. Plato, Prot •. , 324a. 
2. Plato, Pro£. , 324b. 
·-
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of Plato's criticism of the Sophists in the Pro5oras. 
Socrates' objection that virtuous men could not teach their own 
sons virtue is next considered by Protagoras. He aeks Socrates, "Is 
there or is there not some one quality of which all the cltl•ens must 
be partakers, U there is to be a city at all ?"2 If there is, and it 
should turn out that justice, temperance and hollness are a unifhtd 
quality called manly virtue, and 1f "this is the quality of which all men 
must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or 
doing anything else," then it would be strange indeed if virtuous men 
3 had their sons trained ln all sorts of other things and omitted virtue. 
Protagoras gives a brief synopsis of the type of education that a youth 
received in Greece before Plato and Isocrates founded their schools, in 
order to demonstrate that from the cradle youngsters were trained in 
virtue. "Education and admonition commence in the first years of 
childhood, and last to the very end of life."" The first explicit statement 
/ 
of the connection between "political wisdom," the separate "virtues" 
and virtue itself comes from the camp of the enemy I How typical of 
Plato that the point towards which all the previous dialogues were in-
exorably moving should be expressed first by the opposition. In this 
1. Cf. Plato, Theat. , 171a. Plato mentions this very contradiction 
ln reference to Protagoras. See 161-165; 178-183 for criticism 
of the Sophists in general. 
2. Plato, Prot. , 824e. 
8. Plato, PrO£. , 825a. 
4. Plato, Prot. , 325d. 
-
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way he can "examine" the idea thoroughly without .boring the reader and 
in the same dramatic evolution of thought show that Protagoras did not 
know what he was talking about. 
Protagoras goes on to say that reading, writing, the works of 
the great poets, music and gymnastlcs ... -the core of Greek edu~ation-­
are all directed towards making a youth virtuous.. When he bas become 
of age, his fellow citizens continue his education,. as do the laws of the 
state, for the very existence of the state "lmpllea that vh·tue is not any 
man's private possession. " 1 Protagoras has the conventional opinion 
of the virtuous man in mind; when he states tbat ·mU8lc, gymnastics, 
etc. , are training in virtue he means that the man educated in this 
manner will be completely acceptable in society, thus making his road 
to political success euler. Plato, too, believes that these forms of 
training have a profound influence on the formation of character; and 
this is the very point ..... unless the purpose of education is clearly under-
stood and its enda clearly defined, 1t may do more harm than good. 
Protagoru has, however, brought the def1Dltlon .of virtue around to 
include the pol1Ueal nature of man--the virtuous man l.s a citizen. 
It is not the nature of virtue nor the Umltatlons of virtuous indi-
viduals which cause. tbeir sons to .turn out badly; 1t is the fault of the 
sons. Protagoras draws an analogy between the flute-player and the 
1. Plato, Prot. , 327a. 
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virtuous father. 
Do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good 
flute-players would be more likely to be good 
than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would 
not their sons grow up to be distinguished or 
undistinguished according to 1thelr own natural capacities as flute-players? 
Political wisdom and virtue have been used interchangeably throughout 
thi.s section of the dialogue by both Protagoras and SocJ:ates; the analo-
gy of the flute-player is lncoulstent with Pr'otagoru' myth about the 
gift of the "ar of politics" whlcb is shared by all men. The gift of 
political wisdom would have to be qualified to mean that all men are 
social animals but that natural virtue or political ability differs with 
each tndlvldual. This ls exactly the position taken by Plato in the 
Republic. " Individual differences" is a necessary usumptlon in the 
Republlc and it leads to the selection of the rulers of the s tate by edu-
cational ellmlnatlon. 
Regardless of the worth of what Protagoras has said, he has not 
explained what the nature of virtue ls, that gives hlm the right to claim 
that he can teach virtue to others. Before any further advance can be 
made, virtue Itself must be investigated; therefore, Socrates returns 
to Protagoras' statement that manly virtue was comprised of justice, 
temperance, and piety, without commenting at all on the rest of 
Protagoras' speech. 2 
1. Plato, Prot., 327c. 
2. Plato, Prot. , 325a. 
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111. Is virtue one? 
Socrates asks If justice, temperance and holiness--and he adds 
wisdom and courage--are separate parts related io a 1Vhole as the 
separate parts of the face are related to t~e whole face, or If they are 
parts of a homogeneous whole related ln the same way as the parts of 
one piece of gold. Protagoraa repies that they are separate things 
although closely related; a man does not necessarily have to have all 
the virtues ln order to have some of them. A just man is not necessari-
ly a brave man. 1 
Socrates proceeds to show that justice must certalnly be con-
sidered holy and holiness just, and that folly is the opposite of both 
temperance and wisdom. Protagoras had already admitted that every-
thing has only one opposite; therefore, wisdom and temperance must be 
very nearly the same. Though the logic may be questionable, Protagoras 
sees the point and refuses to continue answering Socrates' questlon_s with 
brief replles. · The company in turn refuees to let the argument end, and 
SOcrates in order to appease Protagoras agrees to allow Protagoras 
to conduct the argument. 
Protagoras proposes that they seek the definition of virtue by the 
analysis of poetry, where he feels that be will be on safe ground. "I am 
of opinion, Socrates, n he said, "that skill in poetry is the principal part 
1. Plato, Prot. , 329d. 
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· of education. "1 The succeeding section is unimportant to the argument 
of the dialogue but its introduction is significant in the light of Plato's 
criticism of the poets and the Sophistic mode of education. Plato de-
liberately ehows Socrates thinking that Protagoras' interpretation of 
Slmonides' poem ls correct and then setting out diabolically to prove 
that the opposite tnteJ;'pretatlon i.e more reasonable. Plato shows by 
this method that the. iDterpretation of poetry as the Sophists uaed it was 
an intellectual gam~ ln which the end was rather the dlaplay of a facile 
wlt than the search for truth. When he has sufficiently demonstrated 
through Socrates that he could vie with the Sophists on their own ground, 
Plato calls us back to the argument wlth an opinion of Socrates' on 
poetry which is the antithesis of Protagoras' • 
The talk about the poets seems to me like a common-
place entertainment to which a vulgar company have 
recourse; ...• because they are not able to converse 
or amuae one another, while they are drinking, with 
the sound of their own voices and conversation. 2 
Socrates reviews the argument about the unity of virtue and asks 
Protagoru lf he still thinks virtues are separate essences. 3 Protagoras 
answers that four of them are similar in some respects but that courage 
is "very different" from the others. Socrates shows that those who have 
knowledge are more confident about what they do than they were when 
they were ignorant. Protagoraa agrees, but he wlll not' admit that courage 
1. Plato, Prot., 339a. 
2. Plato, Prot., 347c. 
3. Plato, ~· , 350a-c. 
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is therefore wisdom; "the courageous are confident, but not all the 
confident are courageous. " 1 Courage is a natural attribute and not a 
function of knowledge; although knowledge wlll help the man who is 
naturally courageous it cannot make him courageous lf he is by nature 
a weakling. Thls seems a point well taken; in fact, it ls another aspect 
of the individual differences inherent in man previously referred to as 
necessary to Plato's development in the Republlc. 2 If knowledge and 
training could make a man courageous, Plato's elaborate process of 
weeding candidates educationally ln order to locate the most courageous 
citizens for the Auxiliary or Soldier-Guardians would not be necessary. 
Because Protagoras is partially right, however, does not mean that he 
is entirely right. Protagoras is thinking prbnarUy of physical courage, 
whereas moral courage is as important, lf not more important, in 
Plato's deflnltlon of virtue. Socrates takes what seems to be an entirely 
different tack ln order to bring out this point. 
lv. Pleasure and pain. 
Socrates brlngs up the relation between good-evll .and pleasure-
pain. Is pleasure a good ln itself? 3 Be asks Protagoras if, like the 
majority of mankind, he would agree that "a man may bave knowledge, 
and yet that knowledge which is ln him may be overmastered" by 
various emotions or passions. 4 Protagoras ls a bit of an intellectual 
1. Plato, Prot., 351a. 
2. Seep. Dr. 
3. Plato, Prot., 351e. 
4. Plato, Prot. , 352c. 
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snob, and since he professes to be able to teach virtue, he cannot agree 
with the "many." "Wisdom and knowledge, n he says, "are the highest 
of human things." 1 Socrates proceeds to car.-y on both parts of the argu-
ment in order to "instruct" the many who believe that choosing evil 
knowingly is the .-esult of being overcome by pleasure. 
Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is 
a good; and even pleasure you deem an evil, when 
lt· robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or 
causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, how-
ever, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some 
other end or standard, you will be able to show us 
that standard. But you have none to show. 2 
The evil in pleasure Uee in the consequences, not in the pleasure 
itself. Therefore, ttbeing overcome by pleasure" means that the evil o.-
painful consequences were not known at the time of the choice. A 
present evll or pain with an attending pleasant consequence, such as 
bitter medicine, is to be preferred to a present pleasure which eventu-
ally results in pain or evil. No man chooses pain knowingly unless a 
pleasure greater than the pain ls his reward. Therefore, since in 
common opinion pain is equated to evil, no man chooses evil in spite 
of knowledge; men. are overcome by pleasure because of their Igno-
rance. 3 Thus Socrates shows that the common-sense definitions of 
pleasure-pain, good-evil, and error in judgment are at odds with one 
another. The very simplest of hedonistic theories must have a standard 
1. Plato, Prot., 352c. 
2. Plato, 'PrOt., .354c. 
3. Plato, Prot., 357d. 
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of some kind 1n addition to pleasure itaelf. 
It 1a absurd to assert that a man does evll knowingly because he 
18 overpowered by a plea8Ul"e, if that pleaaure eventually results in pain 
greater than the original pleasure. 1 If happlneas depended on choosing 
that course of action which promised the greatest amount of present and 
future pleasure, then the nut of meaaure'" which determined the choice 
would be fundamental to happiness and the good lUe. 
But the art of measurement would do away wlth the 
effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would 
fain teach the soul at lut to lfld reat 1n the truth, 
and would thus save our life. 
"Being overcome by pleasure," then, is due to lack of knowledge in 
general and lack of moral judgment in particular. 3 Socrates has dis-
patched the opinion of ttmost of the world" and now returns to Protagoras. 
The virtues of temperance, holiness, wisdom and justice, it has 
already been admltted, are very similar and are good. If the argument 
above were followed they would also, therefore, be pleasant, and a man 
would choose these values unless be were ignorant. The direction of the 
argument is clearly lndlcatedJfor lf Plato can show that the coward is 
cowardly because of ignorance, then all five "virtues" wm have a 
common opposite; Protagoraa bas conceded that all things have only one 
1. Plato, Prot. , 355a. 
2. Plato; PrOt. , 356d. 
3. Plato, Pi'ot., 357d, 
139 
mutually exclusive opposite. 1 It would follow that all the vb"tues would 
be one in some sense. 
All the Sophists, including Protagoras, agree that ."belng over-
come by pleasure" is due to ignorance and that "the pleasant is the good, 
and the paiDful evil. "2 They are agreeing with the ''many," however, 
and not with Socrates, who has never said that he believes that pleasure 
is the good. 3 The company also agrees that "this inferiority of a man 
to himself ~n allowing himself to be overcome] is merely ignorance as 
the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom. "4 They are also in 
accord on the idea · that fear is the expectation of evil and since no man 
chooses evil or pain unless in ignorance, the coward is wise for avoiding 
danger and the courageous man is ignorant for choosing to face pain. 5 
Courage is good, though, so this conclusion is intolerable, even though 
it follows from the argument. 
If facing danger is honorable, and to be honorable is good, and 
th~ good is pleasant, then the coward who refuses to face danger does so 
because he is ignorant. There seem to be anUn~ous proofs which 
show that the man of valor who has a normal fear of battle is ignorant 
because he chooses to face an anticipated evil, and the coward ls 
1. Cf. Plato, Rep!, 439b, for a statement of the law of contradiction. 
2. Plato, Prot., 58a. . 
3. Cf. Gorg:-;- 497-498. "The good is not the same as the pleasant, or 
the eVllthe same as the painful." (497d) 
4. Plato, Prot., 358c. 5. · Plato, Prot., 359e f. 
- -
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ignorant because he refuses to seek honor which is good and therefore 
pleasant. Plato is contrasting two kinds of courage--moral and physi-
cal. The distinction is made more clearly in Laches where, as we 
might suspect, the idea is introduced by Ntciaa, not by Socrates. 
In Laches, Niciaa defined courage as "the knowledge of the 
grounds of hope and fear. "1 Socrates observes that such a definition 
"cannot allow that any wlld beast is courageous. "2 Niclas answers: 
I do not call animals or any other things which have 
no fears of dangers, because they are ignorant of 
them, courageous, but only fearless and senseless 
. . . . There is a difference, to my way of thinking, 
between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion 
that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by 
very few3 .. --my courageous actions are wise actions. 
It would seem that an understanding of this discussion of courage in the 
Laches is presupposed in Protagoras. 
To seek danger without reason or fear would be foolhardy and 
not courageous, but lf a man realizes the danger and faces it because 
or some higher value he is, in Plato's sense, really courageous. A 
man who avoids his duty is a coward, and he is a coward because he 
does not know of any values greater than mere existence; he is 
morally ignorant. A really brave man must understand and be able to 
justify his courageous actions--he must have moral conviction--or be 
1. Plato, Laches, 196d. 
2. Plato, Laches, 196e. 
3. Plato, Laches, 197a-b. 
141 
is not much better than a beast. It is his own "soul" that Sits 1n 
judgment first and foremost on his actions and then the opinions of his 
-
fellow men. There is no greater punishment for a human being than to 
stand convicted before his mlnd' s eye of being less than a man. 
"Thoughtful courage," as Nlcias puts it, is na quality possessed by 
very few. '* 
Plato has finally brought courage home, and although the dia-
logue seems to end without a conclusion there is little doubt that 
Socrates has summed up the argument in the following statementt 
Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; 
there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue 
cannot be taught, contradieUng yourself now by your 
attempt to prove that allthlngs are knowledge, in-
cluding justice, and temperance, and courage,--
which tends to show that virtue can certainly be 
taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, 
u Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly 
virtue cannot be taught; but 1f virtue is entirely 
knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then l 
cannot but suppose that virtue ls capable of being 
taught.l 
In the course of the argument, Socrates and Pro.tagoraa have changed 
places-.. a clever, dramatic device which allows Plato to criticize and 
utilize Protagoras' theories at one and the same time. 
6. Virtue, the individual and society. 
The "conversational" dlalogues in their investigation of the vari-
ous aspects of virtue suggested that happiness was a concomitant of 
1. Plato, Prot., 361a-b. 
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moral judgment or knowledge. The separate aspects of virtue were 
considered as such, and did not take into account the association of the 
virtuous man with other men in society or the interrelationship of the 
"virtues" themselves. 
The Socratic dialogues, in a sense, are the converse of the 
conversational works. The "virtues" are seen as one harmoniously re-
solved whole in the character of Socrates; the definition of virtue is not 
the purpose ln the drama that depicts Socrates' trial and death; Socrates, 
by his actions, !!. that definition. This is no theoretical or abstract 
discussion, but living evidence that the virtues discussed in the conver ... 
sational dlalogues have been self-consciously realized at .least once--in 
the life, thought and actions of Socrates. The virtues of the conver-
sational dialogues are infused with blood and brought alive in a social 
environment in order to present the virtuous man in the round. Socrates 
ls faced with a problem in the Apol~ that only his profound personal 
conviction and moral courage could have overco&ne--the way in which 
he faced both this problem and his death has made him immortal. 
Socrates' treatment by the Athenians, when compared with the 
benefits that were supposed to accrue to the man of virtue as indicated 
in the conversational works, does not seem consistent at all. If 
Socrates exemplifies the virtuous man, ln what way has his virtue 
brought him happiness? Socrates denied himself or was denied by others 
most of the values that the Greeks felt were necessary to happiness, and 
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for his trouble he was put to death I How can these facts be squared 
with the claims of the conversational dialogues? Either Socrates was 
wrong about virtue making a man happy or the ordinary conception of 
happiness is not what Socrates had in mind in the earlier works. 
Socrll.tes' declaration that his god-given mission was to ad-
monish his fellow citizens to the "care of their souls" and his own 
calm acceptance of the penalty of death in justification of his way of 
life are proof that it is not the conventional idea of happiness that 
-
virtue assures. His philosophy, his virtue, was a way of life, a moral 
conviction, that made him a seU-contained man, a happy man because 
his actions were the realization of the values he held to be the highest 
and the best. · Socrates• happiness is the spiritual happiness of a man 
who can see h1s life as a purposive whole; a life constantly subjected 
to self-criticism; constantly evaluated in reference to the highest of 
values; the life worth living t 
When the promise of personal happiness realized through virtue 
is contrasted to Socrates' trial and death, the tragic irony of the. one 
virtuous man in a corrupt society being condemned for impiety brings 
into sharp focus the immensity of the educational goal which he tried 
and failed to materialize. Socrates' failure to educate the people and 
his conviction ·emphasize the conflict between law and justice which 
Plato felt destroyed the citizens' regard for the best interests of the 
state and thereby their own interest. All of society would have to be 
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"inverted" to accommodate the virtuous individual and to insure that 
the values that Socrates stood for would be the Law and would jUdge 
rather than be judged by unfounded opinion and caprice. 
U happiness and the good llfe depend on virtue and 1f the 
realization of virtue depends on an educational revolution of society, 
what is virtue and can it be taught? There is no sense in proposing an 
educational inversion of values, using Socrates as a model, unless virtue 
is something that can somehow be known and taught. These are the 
problems considered in the Protagoras. 
The Protagoras begins with the affirmation that paldela or 
cultural education moulds the "soul." Through Protagoras, the notion 
is established that man is by nature a political animal and that society 
is based on the assumption that virtue can be taught; be also is the first 
to assert that the virtuous man is a citizen. Protagoras tries to justify 
his assertion that virtue can be taught by a sociological analysis of 
conditions as they exist. "Plato himself always felt that the sophistic 
system of education was directly derived from actual political con-
ditions." 1 Protagoras means by virtue that educational background 
and training in the conventional modes of behavior and thinking which 
will prepare a man to n get along'' best in the accepted patterns of his 
society as lt is. 
1. laeger, PAl, I, 311. 
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Plato ls willing to accept Protagoras' analysis as evidence but 
' ' -
not as the explanation of virtue or as a rationale of its being teachable; 
nor is he satisfied with the purpose that is implicit in Protagoras' 
description of virtue as a conforming to the mores when necessary and 
using them for personal gain when possible. Socrates' virtue is 
critical of existing conditions and alma at improvement, not conformity .1 
Socrates' virtue includes all of Protagoras' argumeQt and goes beyond 
it. This is brought out when Socrates ignores all of Protagoras' magnifi-
cent speech except for one statement in which Protagoras referred to 
a "quallty'1 necessary to the existence of the state--manly virtue--and 
stated that justice, holiness and temperance were parts~~ this quality. 
Socrates, at this point, is interested ln virtue itself and not in a de-
scription of its effects on society or society's effects on lt. 
In seeking a definition of virtue, Socrates shows that no one part 
of virtue can stand alone; at least, not as he conceives the parts. What 
seems llke a digression on the relationship between good and evil, and 
pleasure and pain, turna out to be a proof that any aspect of true virtue 
depends on the ability to make good judgments; judgment of choice can 
be validly made only in reference to knowledge. When Protagoras as-
sents to the idea that an "art of measure" is needed lf pleasure is 
1. The Socrates of the "Socratic dialogues" stands in contrast to the 
Philosopher-King of the Republic as an iconoclast, but Socrates 
is in an imperfect society whereas the Philosopher-King theo-
retically is in a perfect society. 
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equated to the good and pain to evil, Socrates has shown that even the 
standard which "most people" use in making choices depends on 
knowledge; a more refined standard would be certain to depend on 
knowledge of some sort. 
Having reached tbls conclusion, Socrates is then ready tore .. 
turn to the problem of whether or not courage depends on knowledge. 
The dlstlnctlon that he makes between moral courage and physical 
courage discloses the kind of knowledge and the type of judgment which 
is virtue to Socrates; moral courage depends on moral judgment, which 
in turn depends on knowledge of true values--the values which differ-
entiate the courage of the beast from the courage of Socrates, 
If virtue ls a combination of political sagacity and individual 
character, and If 1t is knowledge whleh reveals the proper use of these 
qualities, then surely virtue can be taught, in some degree, even 
though individual differences must be taken into account, By the time 
this conclusion is reached ln the Pro!&Joras, we find tbat much Ught 
bas been shed on many of the questions left unamnrered ln_ the "conver-
sational dialogues." Of the six points mentioned in Chapter V (see 
pp. 90-104) the first two on the relation between virtue and personal 
happiness were answered sufficiently for the state of development 
reached in the early dialogues. The Socratic dialogues have added a 
great deal to the development of points 111-:v.i and have presented evi-
dence which would seem to contradict the conclusions that have 
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already been reached in points i and 11. A restatement of points 
ill-vi in the light of the new material would seem to be in order. 
111. Can virtue be acquired? This question has been answered 
in the affirmative by the Prot5oras. 
tv. How can virtue be learned? Who should teach lt? These 
questions have not been answered expllcltly, but Socrates bas shown 
in the Apology, by describing the elencbus, that virtue is rooted in 
" the criticized llfe"; the awareness of ignoranceJ the castigation of 
false pride and false knowledge and ln care of the "soul.'' Socrates, 
in telling what be thought to be his mission ln life, has depleted the 
teacher of virtue as a man of moral fibre, living his philosophy, im-
proving his neighbor and himself with no thought for financial gain or 
personal fame, but guided by the highest values in search of the best 
life for himself and his society. These values, we know from the 
Crito, are. principles arrived at rationally by Socrates; he does not 
allow b1s personal circumstances to change those principles which are 
the best that he knows. The Ap>logy and the Crito answer, ''Who shall 
teach," better than, f'Bow can virtue be learned," by showing us the 
example of Socrates. 
v. What are the ends of education? . The AfC?loq and the intro-
duction to the Protagoraa give us the answer that the end of education 
is the "moulding of the soul" ln the ways of virtue. A rather cryptic 
answer at best, but this answer can be enlarged because more is now 
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known of the nature of virtue. The virtuous man is a citizen--
courageous, wise, temperate, just and pious; the virtuous man par 
excellen~e is also a philosopher, teacher, and a man dedicated to 
self-improvement and the improvement of others. The moral teacher 
of the Apology and the virtuous citizen of the Protagoras have not been 
associated yet, but both are necessary components of the Philosopher-
King of the Republic. 
In either case, however, the virtuous man is guided by 
knowledge of moral prlneiples 1n his value Judgments rather than by 
caprice, pleasure, or expediency; Socrates does not allow his im-
prisonment or impending death to influence his evaluation of the prlnci-
ple of law or of his obllgatlou to the state. Tbe end of education, then, 
is that knowledge which "moulds the soul" and reveals the standard, in 
relation to which "the art of measure" or judgment is applied to life so 
that the best possible choice can be made wlth conviction 1n any given 
instance. 
vi. Virtue depends on some klnd of knowledge: The Protagoras 
not only affirms this suggestion of the conversational dialogues, but also 
asserts that virtue is knowledge--the kind of knowledge which makes a 
man just, wise, temperate, pious and courageous. other than this there 
is no real indication, in the dialogues discussed so far, as to what kind 
. of knowledge virtue is. The prologue to the Protagoras reiterates that 
the knowledge of the professions and trades is not the kind of knowledge 
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that leads to virtue. 
The Socratic dialogues and the PrO!qoru have answered some 
of the problema raised by the converaatloaal works and ln ~ dolDg have 
raised other queattou: 
· 1. Wbat la the relatlon of the virtues to Vlrtue ltseU? Virtue 
Ia knowledge; aD Die upecli Ol ili'&e depend on 60ilidie and moral 
Judgment, but they mu.at be dlfferentlated 1n some way or tbere would 
be no nnd for apeaklng of justice and wisdom and temperance, etc. 
Bow can they be cUfferenUated and remain one? · 
2. What kind of JmowlUf• ls virtue? Virtue ls Jmowledge, but 
the converaaBoliill dlilogues, IOCritlc Cilalogues and the Pr~oru 
give only negative clues .. to what ldnd of kllowlecfle it is. · . 
3. t.lt J!!!•ible to know?_ Virtue may be Jmowledce, but unless 
we lmow •bit ll meant by iiiOiledge there 11 no -urance that the 
nature of real Jmowledle la 1uch that it can be taught to others. In the 
Pr;toraa lt ia uaumed that anythlug •hleh la knowledge can be taught 
6\lt e lleno ralaea a question •hlch la logically 1f not paycbologically 
prior: Can inyth1ng be knoWn? In other wordll, "knowledge" u uaed 
1n the aborter dtalogues Ia recoptsed ,-an undefined term--what 
exactly do we mean by real knowlqe. The answer to tbls question 
in many •ays determines the· answer to tbe problem of whether virtue 
C&ll be taught. 
· 4. How caa virtue be learned? The Apol!!IJ aDd the Pr~oras 
have abed the vague WUmtiiitlon Of diWD on t1ila queauon, but w~he 
deflDltlon of virtue and the auppoaltlon that it can be taught, tbla 
problem becomes more specific and more important. 
5. What are the enda of edocatton? As with point s, thla 
queatlon hu bien answered very generilly ln the Socratle dlaloguea and 
the Pras;na; the end of education la the lmprOYement of tbe ''soul." 
T-his iealilons the argumeat forward a great deal and ralaea lt to a 
higher level, but it aJAo leaves the queatlon uD&Dawered u long u we 
nelther know what la meant by the "aoul" or what advaDtap there ·liJ in 
an "Improved" aoul over the common, garden vartety. The problema of 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, U, 124. 
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the conversatioual dialogues have not been solved--they bave only moved 
upstairs. 
6. Law va • . lutlce: Socrates' unjust convlctlon brings out 
the dichotomy tbii bid grown up 1n Athe18 between law aad juaUce 
(personUted by Socrates). This apllt ls at the bottom of Plato'• 
efforts to "Invert" society. 
8. If all mea ~e ~tl~ aabnala aad Ylrtue ts ~ledge and 
therefore wac6ilile, why ~a "expert." lathe art of politics be 
needed? Protagoru said that lncllvldual differences accouated for the 
fact that vlrtuou mea could ao£ teach theli aona to · bt virtuous. If ex-
perts are aeeded becaQe all men do not have the same aptitude for 
poliUca, bow shall these experts be located aad what "aptitudes'' mll8t 
they have? 
1. Ia hamne•• d'tr.ndent oa virtue? The Ufe that Socrates 
led, u be de.cr s It fii · e lf21~, aad bis death are bardly the 
kind of argument. which would conVce moat people that the vlrtuoua 
life 1a a happy OD8. The conversational dialogues lDalated tbat virtue 
· be cODcluc1ve to personal happlneas and llltlmated tbat bapplneas depended 
on vlrtu.e; happiness, however, wu never defined In them. The only 
possible way 1D wblch they could be recoacUtd with tbe loeratic dta-
logues would be through a conception of happiness which c:Uffers from the 
ordinary one. 
10. What Ia the erlterlon of "the good lUt?" The dtacus1on 
of pleasure ana Piln 1D Die ~oru reveils thit, even jf pleasure 1.8 
uaoel~ed with tht "good," eart (if measure" ls the ultimate criterion 
in. chooalng between possible pleasures and that dblvalues are choaen 
wtlfully only through ignorance on the part of the person cbooalDg who 
believes at the time of the eholce that the cllsvalue Ia good. Ia the "art 
of measure'' the same· aa kllOWledge?-·and If lt la, what Ia it the 
knowltcll• of? Plato cannot drop the idea ol. the "art of m-ure'' once 
he bas rat•ed the question of w~ the c:rlterion of goodneaa t. and what 
it contributes to true bapplneaa. 
1. Cf. Iaeger, PAl, U, 124-125. 
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In the Sf!!!poalum, Meno, and Gorglu many of these problems 
are taken up again, on a higher level, explaining, searcbiDg, raising 
new problems and pr epariDg the reader for the syntbeala that is found 
ln the Republle. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DIALOGUES INTRODUCTORY TO THE REPUBLIC 
PART ONE: THE SYMPOSIUM AND MENO 
The discussion of Love in the Symposium represents a return to 
the egocentricity of the conversational dialogues at a much higher level; 
there are many similarities between the Symposium and the conversation-
al works, especially the Lysis. The dialectic has returned to the indi-
vidual and the desires of the individual, but the "self" under considera-
tion is much more polished from the buffeting that · it has received in the 
conversational and Socratic dialogues. The Symposium brings us back 
to the consideration of individual happiness and its relation to the values 
of the "good life, " which in the Apology seemed to be in conflict. 
The Symposium depicts a private party given by Agathon for his 
friends. Plato has exercised great care in assembling the guests; each 
person in the dialogue represents a typical aspect of Greek culture--
each actor on the stage symbolizes an attitude towards life and each in 
his turn expresses some aspect of experience, characteristic of his 
attitude, as the essence of Eros or Love. 1 
The theme of Eros is fundamental to Plato's philosophy. 2 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 176 f. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 174. This entire section follows Jaeger's brilliant 
chapter (Ch. 8) in Paideia--especially in the significance of Eros to 
Plato's philosophy as a whole and the interpretation of the speeches 
that precede Socrates' and their relation to the myth of Diotima. 
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His teaching about friendship is the nucleus of a 
theory of politics which treats the state primarily 
as an educational force. . . Friendship is the 
fundamental form of .all society, in so far as society 
is not only a natural but a mofal and spiritual 
association of human beings. 
The scene itself, a symposium of friends, is also symbolic. Plato uses 
the contrasting speeches to demonstrate the superiority of philosophy 
over poetry and the other narrower conceptions presented by their 
"symbolic" champions;2 it also shows the educational potentiality of 
the symposium, especially the symposium as Plato thought of it. 3 
1 . The introductory speeches. 
Phaedrus, the first speaker, calls Eros the oldest of the gods 
and, as a true pupil of the Sophists, quotes the classic poets to prove 
his point. His main contention is that Love excites men to noble am-
bitions and aretE{, on which the existence of friendship and the state de-
pend. 4 The dialogue begins by assigning an exalted moral purpose to 
Eros. Pausanias criticizes Phaedrus for being so general, and proceeds 
to describe more specifically the nature of Love which, as he sees it, 
is primarily erotic. 
Pausanias asserts that the ideal ground for erotic relationships 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 174. 
2. "Cf. Jaeger, PAl, . II, 176. 
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3. Jaeger, PAl, II, 176. "Plato was the founder of the new philosophical 
form of the symposium." 
4. Plato, Sym., 178d f. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, II, 180. 
cannot be understood unless it is realized that there are two kinds of · 
Eros--the vulgar and the divine. 1 The common form of love is indis ... 
criminate lust, while divine love is an educational force which seeks 
to develop the personality of the beloved. 2 Pausanias is speaking of 
homosexual love; it may seem strange that any edifying aspects could 
be reasonably proposed for such love, but among some Greeks, es-
pecially in Sparta, it was felt that homosexual love was an idealized 
form of education. 3 Pausanias cannot distinguish between his two types 
of love by referring to the nature of that love, but only by referring to 
the attitude of the lover. 4 He has difficulty in bringing the erotic side 
of love into line with the values of ''divine'' love, in contrast to Diotima' s 
resolution of the erotic and educational powers of Eros; that is, the values 
that make divine love divine are values independent of the erotic force of 
love. 
Eryximachus, who is a physician, presents a more naturalistic 
opinion--he agrees that there are two kinds of love, but adds that love 
is not limited to the attractions of human beings. 5 Love is a principle 
that operates in all things, including the divine. In an analogy to his 
profession, Eryximachus likens the noble form of love to the desire "of 
the healthy, '"' and the ignoble form to the desire "of the diseased. "6 Eros 
is the proper balance or harmony of opposites in nature; thus, health is 
1. Plato, Sym. , 180d. 4. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 181. 
2. Jaeger, PAI, IT, 180. 5. Plato, Sym., 186a. 
3. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 180 ff. 6. Plato; Sym., 186b. 
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a harmonious blending of opposites, and sickness a disturbance of that 
balance. 1 By means of Eryximachus' speech Plato shows "that Eros 
can be subjected to a scale of values. " 2 
The medical conception of the bodily physis re-
sembles Plato's conception of the spiritual and 
ethical physis in this--it implies a standard3 a norm to which the physis ought to conform. 
Aristophanes, the comedian, spins a fantastic myth when his 
turn comes to speak. As with all these speeches, Aristophanes' contri-
bution is characteristic of the "type'' in subject and treatmenL His 
effort is therefore brilliant, dramatic and humorous, but his story also 
has. a profound meaning based on penetrating insight. Aristophanes tells 
of a heroic age when mankind was composed of spherical beings with 
two heads, four arms, four legs and such sh'ength and cunning that Zeus 
split them in two for fear they would overthrow the gods.4 In their 
original "complete" state ther.e were three kinds of mortals: the male, 
the female and the neuter, which was half male and half female. Ever 
since he was divided, man has sought for his "other half. " 5 Physical 
attachment is the :least of this attraction. 
For the intense yearning which each of them has 
towards the other does not appear to be the desire 
of lover's intercourse, but of something else which 
the soul of either .evidently desires and cannot tell, 
and of which sJte has only a dark and doubtful 
presentiment. 
1. Plato, Sym., 186e. 4. Plato, Sym. , 189d ff. 
2. Jaeger, PAI, IT, 183. 5. Plato, Sym., 192d ff. 
3. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 183. 6. Plato, Sym., 192d. 
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Aristophanes' myth explains the dual nature of love much better 
than Pausanias' disquisition by associating both the erotic and the as-
piring effects of Love with ''man's metaphysical yearning after the 
wholeness which is forever impossible to the individual nature. nl 
Love is a part of the process of self-perfection or self-completion which 
is a felt need of all men. "This symbolism draws Eros right into the 
process of educating and building up the personality. " 2 Aristophanes 
combines the psychological analysis of Pausanias with the theoretical 
generalization of Eryximachus in his extravagant farce to present an 
idea of Love which includes all the forms of love that exist between 
human beings. 
Agathon' s eulogy of Eros does not have the psychological in-
cisiveness of Aristophanes' uproarious tale or the theoretical structure 
of Eryximachu~' analysis--his contribution is poetic. Without saying 
anything in particular, Agathon pays tribute to all the fine qualities of 
this most noble of gods, Eros. The beauty and fervor of his speech 
describe more aptly than its content the power that Love has to inspire 
men to noble sentiments and creative deeds. This beautifully poetic 
laudation is the perfect backdrop for Socrates' speech which follows; 
the contrast brings out how Socrates was "infinitely superior to him both 
in the strength of his passions and in the depth of his knowledge of love. " 3 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 184. 3. Jaeger, PAl, II, 186. 
2. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 184. 
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2. Socrates and the myth of Diotima. 
In commenting on Agathon' s speech, Socrates says: "I think 
you were right, my dear Agathon, in proposing to speak of the nature of 
Love first and afterwards of his works. " 1 In the short dialectical 
passage which follows he shows that he does not agree with Agathon, 
however, as to what the nature of love is. The way in wbich Socrates 
approaches the problem of love is typical of him, and represents Plato's 
educational attitude very well; he is looking for an explanation of love--
not merely the description or analysis of the manifestations of love. In 
the speeches that precede Socrates', various aspects of experience have 
been set forth as the essence of Love; Socrates' task is to show that the 
nature of love, as he conceives of it, is such that it can explain various 
experiences which are associated with it. 
Phaedrus has proposed that Love is the oldest of gods, since 
Love is the principle which brings social order out of chaos; in other 
words, the essence of Eros is the social harmony that it brings into 
being by inspiring noble ambitions in men for the sake of their beloveds. 
Pausanias stresses the erotic force of Love which may be good as an 
educational force or bad as lust. Eryximachus feels that Love is a 
natural force existing throughout nature as the harmony of an object with 
what is proper or natural to it, and that Love is the mean between 
1. Plato, Sym., 199d. 
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extremes.! Love as a "measure" of a thing's harmony is subject. to 
degrees depending on how well ''adapted" a thing is to its environment. 
Aristophanes adds the profound psychological insight that love is the 
longing for self-realization, for "wholeness," which reflects the meta-
physical search for self-perfection. Agathon, by the sensuous passion 
of his eulogy to Love, demonstrates the creative power of love--which 
is not erotic--although he _goes not contribute any positive view through 
the speech itself. 
All the speakers, except Aristophanes, have referred to Love 
as a god, and Agathon has been the most extravagant of all in his praise 
of Eros: therefore, Socrates turns to him and asks: "Is Love of 
' 
something or of nothing?"2 Agathon replies that it is of something and 
Socrates proceeds to demonstrate that Love cannot be a god. "Love 
of something" expresses the desire for something which is not possessed;. 
love cannot be a god because it expresses want and is not perfect in it-
self as a god should be. 3 Socrates introduces the myth of Diotima to 
explain what the nature of love is. 
i. The lesser mysteries of Diotima. 
Plato is a master of presenting things in the most effective way 
possible; it is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the myth of Diotima 
1. Cf. Popper, OSE, 61 ff. , for a critical analysis of ''spiritual 
naturalism. " 
2. Plato, Sym., 199e. 
3. Plato, Sym., 200a. 
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is purposely presented the way it is, not only to preserve the cheerful 
atmosphere of the dialogue, 1 but also to show Socrates learning the 
true nature of love from the wise priestess Diotima; in this subtle 
fashion Plato indicates that the "mysteries" of love can be learned. 
It was Diotima, .Socrates says, who told him that love cannot be 
good because it is incomplete. It is not evil either, but rather a spirit 
that ranges between the mortal and immortal world forming a contact 
for man with the eternal--''the wisdom which understands this is 
spiritual. " 2 Love, then, since it is a conscious desire for something 
.. 
which we do not have, is an awareness of incompleteness or ignorance, 
which, as Socrates says in the Apology, 3 is at least some degree of 
real wisdom. 
No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for 
he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise 
seek after wisdom. Neither do the ignorant seek 
after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, 
that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless 
satisfied with himself: he has no desire for that of 
which he feels no want. . . . For wisdom is a most 
beautiful thing, and Love is of the beautiful; and 
therefore Love is also a philosopher or lover of 
·wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean 
between the wise and the ignorant. 4 
This ingenious explanation of man's curiosity proposes that love is the 
1. Jaeger, PAl, n, 187. The myth of Diotima allows Socrates to use 
the dialogue form without destroying the good feeling of the gathering~ 
160 
2. Plato, Sym., 202a-203a. As Prof. Brightman points out, this passage 
shows well Jowett's attempted use of the New Testament style in his 
translation. Cf. Lodge, . PTE, 239, n. 1s:--
3. Plato, Apol., 21d. See p. 114. 
4. Plato, Sym. , 204a-b. 
motivating force in man's desire to know. 
Goodness and beauty do not lie in love; they are the objects of 
love, which desires to possess goodness and beauty. 1 "And what does 
he gain who possesses the good?" , Diotima asks, and Socrates answers, 
"Happiness. " 2 All men desire happiness through everlasting possession 
of the good, 3 but most men do not know that this desire is love, because 
"one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole";4 
that is, erotic attraction is the part which is usually called love. 
For you may say generally that all desire of good 
and happiness is only the great and subtle power of 
love; but they who are drawn towards him by any 
other path, whether the path of money-making or 
gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers--
the name of the whole is appropriated to those 
whose affection takes one form only--they alone 
are said to love, or to be lovers. 5 
The spirit of love arises through man's desire to create and 
propagate so that he may attain immortality, for if "love is of the ever-
lasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immor-
tality together with good: Wherefore love is of immortality. " 6 Men are 
willing to run great risks and even to die for their children or the honor 
of their name in order to preserve their identity among men for all time. 
"I am persuaded," commented Diotima, "that all men do all things, and 
the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame 
1. Plato, Sym., 204d-e. 4. Plato, Sym., 205a. 
2. Plato, Sym., 204e. 5. Plato, Sym., 206a. 
3. Plato, Sym., 206a. 6. Plato, Sym., 205b. 
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· of immortal virtue. " 1 
Not all men, however, seek immortality through heroic deeds 
or children: 
But souls which are pregnant- -for there certainly 
are men who are more creative in their souls than 
in their bodies--conceive that which is proper for 
the soul to conceive . or contain. And what are these 
conceptions? --wisdom and virtue in general. ... 
But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far 
is that which is concerned with the ordering of 
states and f~ilies, and which is called temperance 
and justice. 
A much higher form of procreation than propagating children is that of 
the teacher who sows the seeds of ideas in his prote'g~ attends their 
birth and nurtures them; that is, the man who acts as the Socratic'1mid-
wife. " 3 Even more worthy are the universal teachers such as Homer 
and Hesiod; and the most exalted of all are the lawgivers, the true 
statesmen, such as Lycurgus and Solon.~ These, Diotima says, are 
the lesser mysteries of love; the greater mysteries are "more hidden" 
and can be known only if they are pursued "in a right spirit." 5 
ii. The higher mysteries of Diotima. 
The brief section on the ''higher mysteries" of love is extremely 
important, especially since there is no exposition of love in the Republic. 
This passage (210b-212a), in its educational program follows the 
Allegory of the Cave very closely; also, the analysis of love leads to 
1. Plato, Sym., 205d. 
2. Plato, Sym., 209a. · 
3. . Plato, Sym. , 209b. 
4.. Plato, Sym., 209c f. 
5. Plato, Sym., 210a. 
Platonic Ideas or Forms just as the analysis of justice does in the 
Republic. The omission of any detailed treatment of so important a 
concept as Eros in the Republic can only mean that Plato presupposed 
that readers of the Republic would have a thorough knowledge of the 
Symposium. The Symposium is not a chance creation; the tight formal 
structure, the beauty, the dramatic but logical evolution of ideaii and 
the care that has obviously been given to this masterpiece show that the 
work was important to Plato . . And we have already noted above that 
Plato associated the highest form of self-love and wisdom with temper-
ance, justice and statesmanship. The highest expression of the natural . 
instinct for personal immortality is found in the social and political 
values. Plato's views on Eros are absolutely necessary for an under-
standing of the Philosopher-King in the Republic. 
Diotima explains that for a person to be able to comprehend the 
higher mysteries of love, his education should begin in youth; 1 a youth 
should be exposed to beautiful objects and guided by his instructor to 
love only beautiful .forms. Gradually the student should realize that "the 
beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another, " and finally that 
"beauty in every form is one and the same. " 2 As his education proceeds, 
the student may come to realize that beauty of the "mind is more honour-
able than the beauty of the outward form. ,,a The awareness that ideas 
1. Plato, Sym., 210a. 2. Plato, Sym., 210b. 
3. Plato, Sym., 210c. 
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can be beautiful leads to an appreciation of the beauty of institutions, 
law. and the sciences, until "at last the vision is revealed to him of a 
single science, which is the science of beauty everywhere. " 1 
And the true order of going, or being led by 
another, to the things of love, is to begin from 
the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the 
sake of that other beauty, using these as steps 
only, and from one going on to two, and from two 
to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair 
practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, 
until from fair notions he arrives at the notion 
of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the 
essence of beauty is. This ... is trat life above 
all others which man should live. 
Seeing beauty absolute, with ,the "eye of the mind," empowers 
the beholder to bring forth realities and not merely images. 3 Socrates 
concludes the myth significantly by stating that he is convinced that 
Diotima' s theories about love are right. "And being persuaded by them, 
' 
I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end @f happiness 
and immortalit~ human nature will not easily find a helper better than 
love. " 4 
It was, [!>latQl held, impossible, to neglect the 
inexhaustibly renewed energy and enthusiasm of 
man's irrational powers, if one hoped to reach the 
height of illumination which was possible for the 
spirit looking upon the Idea of Good. The thought 
on which The Sym~osium is based is the union of 
Eros and paideia. 
1. Plato, Sym., 210d. 4. Plato, Sym., 212b. 
2. Plato, Sym., 211c. 5. Jaeger, PAl, II, 178. 
3. Plato, Sym., 212a. 
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3. Alcibiades' biography of Socrates. 
Socrates has no sooner revealed the Idea of Beauty,_ than 
Alcibiades bursts into the room roaring drunk and elects himself 
master of the feast until everyone else is drunk, too. He remarks 
that this trick will not work on Socrates, who, when forced to, can 
drink any quanity of wine without showing the effects. 1 The company 
complies with Alcibiades' demand but asks in return that he fulfill the 
rule of this symposium and deliver an encomium to Love. Alcibiades 
declares that when Socrates is present he will praise no one else, not 
even Eros. 
Socrates, Alcibiades says, is like the busts of Silenus because 
his grotesque exterior hides the golden images of the gods within. 2 He 
is also like Marsyas, the satyr, because of his ability to "possess the 
souls" of those who listen to him and charm them with his words until 
. they become self-critical of the life they are leading. 3 Al~ibiades 
glimpsed the inner spirit of Socrates and, since he had a very high 
opinion of his physical attractiveness, he felt sure Socrates would fall 
in love with him and reveal all that he knew to him. 4 The profound 
spiritual power of Socrates, however, conquered Alcibiades, and 
the beautiful youth fell in love with the ugly man which, for the 
Greeks, "was the very height of paradox. " 5 Through Alcibiades, 
1. Plato, Sym., 214a; cf. 176c, 220a. 4. Plato, Sym., 217a f. 
2. Plato, Sym., 215a. 5. Jaeger, PAl, II, 196. 
3. Plato, Sym., 215e f. 
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Plato is showing the profound power of the highest form of Eros--
Socrates' Eros--in contrast to the sensuous attraction of Alcibiades' 
Eros. 
Alcibiades tried every means to seduce Socrates, but his 
erotic passion was no match for Socrates' spiritual Eros and in 
every case he was rejected. Alcibiades' tragedy lies in his refusal 
to yield his "soul" to Socrates' desires because he loved the populari-
ty and flattery of the crowd more than the harder path of true Eros and 
virtue. 1 Socrates does not consider erotic satisfaction just payment in 
return for an education in virtue. 
Later, Alcibiades had an opportunity to observe Socrates in 
battle. His physical endurance was amazing, as was his ability to 
stand extreme cold; when everyone else was suffering from frostbite, 
Socrates, in his threadbare toga, was padding across the ice in his bare 
feet. His courage in battle was exceptional. In one engagement he 
saved Alcibiades' life; Alcibiades received the prize for valor but he 
says that it should have gone to Socrates. At Delium, with the army in 
full flight, Socrates and Laches2 retreated in good order and escaped 
because their very bearing spoke that here were two Athenians who 
would conduct themselves honorably to the last. 3 Socrates physical 
accomplishments, his courage, self-control and spiritual depth 
1. Plato, Sym., 218c f. 3. Plato, Sym., 22la-b. 
2 . . Cf. Plato, Laches, 181b. 
166 
make him totally different from any other man that has ever existed. 1 
Plato has used Alcibiades very cleverly to reveal Socrates' character--
it is a mark of Plato's insight that he recognized the various facets of 
Socrates' personality and realized that this ugly duckling was a new 
and rare species, in many ways the precursor of Nietzsche's Superman. 
Alcibiades concludes his eulogy to Socrates by again comparing 
Socrates to Silenus: 
His words are like the images of Silenus which open; 
they are ridiculous when you first hear them; he 
clothes himself in language that is like the skin of 
the wanton satyr--for his talk is of pack-asses and 
smiths and cobblers a:nd curriers, and he is always 
repeating the same things in the same words, so that 
any ignorant or inexperienced person might feel 
disposed to laugh at him; but he who opens the bust 
and sees what is within will find that they are the 
only words which have a meaning in them, and also 
the most divine, abounding in fair images of virtue, 
and of the widest comprehension, or rather extend-
ing to the whole duty of a good and honourable man. 2 
The symposium degenerates completely into a drinking bout when a 
group of revellers enter; as day breaks, Socrates is conversing with 
Aristophanes and Agathon, who are the only ones still awake, but they 
are drowsy and soon fall asleep. "Socrates, having laid them to sleep, 
rose to depart. . . . ~t the Lyceum he took a bath, and passed the day 
as usual. " 3 
1. Plato, Sym., 221d. 
2. Plato, Sym., 221e-222a. 
3. Plato, Sym., 223e. 
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4. Eros as personality potential. 
Alcibiades is used very cleverly by Plato in the Symposium; 
he arrives late and therefore does not know what has been said previ-
ously by Socrates or any of the other guests. His praise of Socrates 
flows from his own convictions, since he could not have been prejudiced 
in any way by the previous speeches. His description of Socrates the 
lover is completely consistent with the myth of Diotima, and we find 
th3:t Socrates gradually emerges as the epitome of Eros~ As the 
Socrates of the Apology gave us a concrete picture of virtue, so the ab-
stract discussion of love is summed . up in the Symposium by means of 
Socrates' character. The parallel between Alcibiades' independent 
account of Socrates' Eros and the myth of Diotima is Plato's method of 
showing once again that Socrates the teacher is consistent with Socrates 
the man. 
The pathos in Alcibiades' conflict of values lies in his own cogni-
zance of the fact that he has, in his weakness, chosen the less noble 
life, when he might have fully realized hts own Eros, his own destiny, 
by submitting his s:ml to Socrates' teachings. The tremendous im-
portance of proper education is shown by Alcibiades' flagrant misuse 
of his unusual potential, his natural ability, due, Plato indicates, to 
his rejection of Socrates' paideia. The unusual man has the potential 
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for great evil as well as great good; 1 the training and education that he 
receives determines to a large extent the use that he makes of his po-
tential, his Eros. 
i. Eros and areti. 
The myth of Diotima presents Eros as a spirit, a natural force 
characterized by man's desire to know. As a natural force or life-
spirit, Eros iS neither good nor bad; it is potential power inherent in 
the individual which may be good or evil, depending on how it is used. 
As a universal characteristic of living things, 2 this life-force incorpo-
rates Eryximachus' theory of the universality of the principle of Love. 
As a partial description of Eros, Eryximachus' theory is perfectly 
consistent with Plato's, "for Plato holds that between the moral and 
the physical cosmos there is perfect harmony. " 3 In its highest for in, 
love, as the desire for the highest values, the good, is distinctly moral 
but its basis is ''natural." As the potential of an individual for self-
expression or self-realization, Plato's definition of eros utilizes 
Aristophanes' intuition of the primordial striving for completeness im-
bedded in the very essence of man. 
The personality potential of the individual is the source of indi-
vidual differences; not everyone makes eros manifest .in the same way 
1. Plato, Rep., 491e. "The most gifted minds, when they are ill-
educated, become pre-eminently bad." 
2. Eryximachus' theory, as a principle governing all things in the 
universe, is very similar to the ideas of the pre-Socratic Naturalists 
and Empedocles in particular. 
3. Jaegar, PAl, U, 194. 
169 
nor do all persons have eros in the same degree. To appreciate the 
difficulty of speaking of eros it might be well to try to think of the 
meaning of "character." To say that a man is an artist or a poli-
tician or a schoolteacher does not tell us, except by way of formal-
ized prototypes, what his character is, although his occupation !s 
certainly important to that character. We may say that a man is 
friendly, honest, creative, intelligent, etc., and come closer to de-
scribing his character, but he may have other qualities which would 
make him unworthy of the tribute that Hamlet paid his father: "He was 
a man, take him for all in all. " 1--a mute tribute to a man's individu-
ality and, paradoxically, his universality, for somehow we know what 
is meant when it is said of a man that he has "character" --that he is a 
man. 
If from character, which would be analogous to arett{, we ab-
stract the "potential, " the foundation upon which character is reared, 
we may be approaching "eros" as Plato is using the word in the 
Symposium. This irrational force, this dynamic promise of the charac-
ter and personality of the individual must be nurtured, guided and subli-
mated if the "soul1 ' is to identify itself with the highest values towards 
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which it is capable of aspiring. "Thus the concept of Eros becomes an 
epitome of all human striving to attain the good. " 2 Eros precedes aretEt--
1. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act. I, Sc. 2, 1. 89. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 189. 
a man must have eros in order to be virtuous--"divine inspiration" or 
natural capacity precedes rational insight. 1 
In the Protagoras virtue has been defined as knowledge. In 
the Meno Socrates admits that there have been virtuous statesmen in the 
past, but they were not able to teach the citizens virtue; these men, he 
says, were guided by "true opinion" which seems to be like divine 
inspiration. It might be said, then, that eros is to true opinion as 
arete" is to true knowledge~ 
Both eros and arete' have the "good" as their object; the good 
that an individual may strive for is defined in part by the eros with 
which he is gifted and in part determines the use that is made of that 
potential; Plato's description of eros does not seem entirely irrational 
nor does arete seem to be wholly rational. The confusion lies not with 
Plato but with the very nature of the subtle psychological distinctions 
that Plato is trying to draw into some kind of order. In the Republic 
Plato resorts to the tripartite soul in order to make these distinctions, 
but love or eros is not mentioned. In the Phaedrus the tripartite soul 
is definitely linked with love. The dialogues discussed so far have led 
us to believe that the various "virtues" are. united in arete~ but in the 
Republic the cardinal virtues equal justice when they are in harmony. 
While this may seem very perplexing, it actually shows the richness of 
Plato's insight into the very complex problems of the seH--far from 
1. Cf. Plato, Meno, 99e-100a. 
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being entirely contradictory, these different statements are all basi-
cally concerned with the same problems and give a full-bodied theory 
of personality. We are not concerned here with Plato's psychology or 
his theory of the soul, as such, but it must be kept in mind that eros 
in the broad sense with which Plato uses it is extremely difficult to 
discuss without making distinctions that are artificial. Let it suffice 
to say that eros, or latent personality, is plastic within limits; it can 
be brought to its highest pitch by proper training--self-discipline and 
education--but all the training in the world will not make a genius out 
of a moron. 
ii. Eros and self-expression. 
Eros, then, is subject to degrees, and this innate ability or po-
tential accounts for the differences between men. In a given group the 
potential for painting may run from negligible to the level of genius. 
Suppose there are ten persons and we assign each a "potential quotient" 
ranging from 1 for the poorest artist up to 10 for the best. It may be 
that the poor artist realizes 99% of his potential and the best only 70% 
of his. Artistically speaking, the 70% effort of the best student is infi-
nitely superior to the 99% result of the poor student, but in regarding 
the test from the standpoint of character we must respect the poor 
student for doing his very best. Considered in this light, Eros is 
subject to degrees according to native ability and realized potential. 
Eryximachus' idea that the degree of eros which a given thing had was 
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reflected in its "harmony," reappears in the myth of Diotima as a 
loftier concept--as the degree of harmony that exists between a man's 
potential and the values towards which he strives. It now becomes 
apparent that it is not entirely correct to speak of a man's eros as 
potential ability. Behind any ability stands the motivating force, 
power or desire which determines to a great extent the degree to 
which any ability will be developed by the individual. 
All forms of motivation, desire or aspiration, not merely 
erotic attraction, are examples of the force of love, and all forms of 
love aim at individual happiness. 
Every strong and deep urgency of our nature must 
ult-imately be connected with happiness, and must 
be deliberately guided and controlled with refer-
ence to it. 1 
Happiness comes with "possession of the good, " 2 and by the "good" is 
meant that which is natural or essential to our very nature--that which 
is in harmony with our eros. 3 The desire for happiness and the good, 
then, is due to love; 4 a strange sounding statement, indeed, until we 
think of this love as self-love, self-respect, the active regard for 
self-realization. This is "the fundamental fact of all Platonic ethics--
that man can never desire .what he does not think to be good for him. " 5 
What he thinks good for him depends on his eros and his education--his 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 189. 4. Plato, Sym. , . 205d. 
2. Plato, Sym., 204e. 5. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 189. 
3. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 189. 
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"creative" self-expression is as refined as the sense of values which 
discloses and determines the objects of his love. 
Men seek self-expression because they desire immortality, and 
they desire immortality because happiness is the concomitant of the 
"everlasting possession of the good. "l The type of "generation" or cre-
ation through which a man seeks to propagate· himself reflects his level 
of eros. Erotic love and physical procreation are the lowest forms Of 
eros--thus part of Pausanias' theory of love is accounted for. Love 
which inspires the creative works of the poets, artists, etc., is the 
next highest type of self-expression; this is Agathon' s love. The spirit 
that imbues the true and universal teachers is higher still and incorpo-
rates Pausanias' notion that sex in its most refined form is educational. 
The most inclusive and most sublime love of all, however, is that of 
the statesman, the lawgiver who is concerned with ''the ordering of the 
state and the family. '' The assertion that man is a social animal and 
that the "brotherhood of man" is implied in what order there is amongst 
men has been anticipated in Phaedrus' speech. Phaedrus gives Love 
credit for stimulating men with the finest social motives and bringing 
order out of chaos by inspiring men to arete and noble deeds. In all 
its various aspects, eros remains the quest for self-fulfillment and 
happiness as Aristophanes' myth portrayed it. The various contributions 
1. Plato, Sym. ;· ,.206e, italics mine; cf . . 205d. 
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of the different speakers have all been assimil~ted in Socrates' general-
ized theory of eros. 
5. Self-love, education, and the Philosopher-King. 
The potential for the highest ends of eros, however, does not 
insure the attainment of those ends. Education and self-discipline are 
also necessary. As Diotima explains, this training should begin in 
youth with an environment of good and beautiful things, develop to the 
appreciation of good and beautiful principles and finally, if the student 
has the proper "spirit,'' to a knowledge of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness 
as they apply to all things. "Eros is now the force which educates the 
lover himself, by carrying him from lower to higher stages." 1 The 
gradual revelation of eternal truths, dependent on individual insight 
and training is very similar to Plato's development in the · Republic and 
especially in the Allegory of the Cave. 
The strong parallel is important, since in the Republic the final 
justification for granting political "power'' to the Philosopher-King de-
pends on his knowledge of the Good. The ''power" of the ''lover of 
wisdom" rests on the same basis--an intuitive grasp of the Ideas of 
Truth, Beauty and Goodness. "Power'' is used here in the sense of 
applied "force··, ;• applied potential. As we might think of electricity in 
general as "force" and electricity applied to something specific as 
1. Jaeger, P.A-1, IT, 192. 
175 
"power," so we can think of eros as a natural force which gives an 
individual power if properly used. Power would be equivalent to eros 
plus values. It seems reasonable to suppose, since there is nothing 
incompatible between the lover of the Symposium and the Philosopher-
King of the Republic, that they are one and the same person seen from 
different perspectives. The Philosopher-King is certainly "the lover 
of wisdom" personified, and the most sublime object of love in the 
Symposium is statesmanship. 
Plato's egocentric theory of Eros in the Symposium does not 
try to compromise the desire for personal gain--the desire for "my 
good," "my happiness," and "my immortality'' is at the heart of all 
Love, considered in the broad sense in which Plato is using eros. 
Plato does try to show that true self-love leads to the search for the 
best life possible. The man of true eros gradually comes to associate 
his good, his own self-fulfillment, with the highest values and the good 
of others; thus it is that the statesman represents best, supernal Eros. 
The striving and struggle of the "lover" to satisfy the conditions of his 
true and noblest nature reveals the necessity of going beyond his own 
immediate values in the attempt to come to terms with his own destiny. 
"The philosophical self-love which Socrates reveals (is] the ultimate 
basis of all Eros, the yearning to attain one's true nature. "1 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 190. 
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Self-love in the sense of self-awareness, self-imposed re-
sponsibility, self-education is very similar to Aristotle's concept of 
"self -love. " 1 
Eros interpreted as love for the good is at the 
same time the urge of human nature towards real 
self-fulfillment and self-completion, and is 
therefore the impulse towards education and 
culture in the truest sense. 2 
This idea of Love, as Jaeger states, form3the basis for "humanism," 
for the realization that what we are to be is to a great extent our own 
responsibility causes a self-conscious "distinction between man the 
individual as given by nature, and man the higher self. "3 Plato does 
not, however, carry this individualism and humanism to the point where 
"man is the measure of all things"; rather he stresses the similarities 
amongst the individuals who differ. Men are different and they do have 
different values but insofar as they have true eros, they will approach 
identical terminal truths, as a limit, from different points. Men are 
not different so much as they are incomplete. The longing for eternal 
beauty, goodness and happiness stirs the soul of every man and, Plato 
feels, goodness and beauty seen in their true state are the same for all 
men. 4 Education, as Plato says in the Republic, cannot put sight in the 
eye of the soul; it can only point the soul in the right direction so that 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 190. "Diotima' swords are the shortest and best 
commentary on Aristotle's conception of self-love." 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 190. 
3. Jaeger, PAl, II, 195. 
4. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 195. 
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the eye of the soul may see true values for itself. 1 
The Philosopher -King in the Republic makes much more sense 
if Eros is included in his character. The Symposium might be thought 
of as a justification for the Philosopher-King seen through his own eyes, 
whereas in the Republic the Philosopher-King is objectively justified 
from the point of view of the state. Alcibiades, in his praise of Socrates, 
not only r .estates Diotima' s description of eros, he goes beyond the theo-
retical discussion. There can be no doubt that Plato meant Alcibiades' 
speech to depict Socrates as the prototype of Eros; Alcibiades not only 
describes Socrates in relation to erotic love but also in relation to 
courage, temperance and wisdom--the cardinal virtues of the 
Philosopher-King in the Republic. ' Alcibiades has also glimpsed "the 
golden images" within Socrates and even though he cannot understand 
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them he can feel the force of the eternal values which Socrates "possesses." 
If the reflection of the Philosopher-King can be seea in the eros-
inspired man, is it not reasonable to suppose that the converse is also 
true--that the Philosopher-King is a true lover? The Philosopher-King 
in the Republic receives nothing for his efforts--nothing material, that 
is. Plato's insight was that the ' Philosopher-King could exist only if 
his preferred position were a position of personal and not social prefer-
ence. The natural eros of the Philosopher-King has been directed by 
1. Plato, Rep., 518c f. 
himself and his education to the point where he accepts a responsibility 
whose only real reward is his own self-respect or the fulfillment of 
his self-love; this self-realization, through knowledge of the Good, 
assures the true philosopher and statesman of immortality on the Isle 
of the Blest. The Philosopher-King, then, is an individual in the 
fullest sense of the word. His self-imposed and self-accepted responsi-
bility forces him back into the Cave and imposes the thankless mission 
of the educator upon him. 
An analogy from recent history might be made between Mahatma 
Gandhi and the Philosopher-King in order .to show the workings of eros 
and the kind of "power" that the Philosopher-King would exercise. 
Gandhi's political power, in the ordinary sense of the word, was nil, 
and the material benefits from his position of preference, non-existent. 
His power was moral and his reward was the realization of his eros. 
If this interpretation of Plato's theory of Eros is accepted it 
becomes clear that happiness does not depend on material possessions 
or conventional values but rather on the realization of individual po-
tential. It would be easy to take this theory as very similar to "The 
Law of Nature" stated by Callicles in the Gorgias and Thrasymachus 
in the Republic--and it is--but Plato does not let the "naturalness" of 
eros run amuck in the wilderness of relativism. He goes to great 
. pains in the Gorgias to show that the superior individuals who shuck 
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the chains of herd morality and conventional law in order to realize 
"natural" values are in fact substituting one set of unanalyzed, con-
ventional values for another without real concern for their own eros. 
·· Plato proposes that that which is truly natural is harmonious and that 
men educated to proper self-love would not divide into classes in a 
struggle for fruitless power. 
If happiness, then, is a profoundly personal concomitant of 
"natural" harmony between an individual's Eros and the values he 
seeks to realize, it immediately becomes clear that the Socrates of 
the Apology is not a paradox at all. The early dialogues conjoined 
happiness and virtue. In the Apology Socrates is virtue personified 
but it was not clear how he could possibly be happy. Eros, as defined 
in the Symposium, reveals why Socrates could undergo his sentence 
"happily." Socrates had accepted the responsibility of the "gad-fly" 
imposed by divine inspiration and he consistently sought the highest 
values demanded by his Eros--he refused to negate that Eros by be-
having in any way which was incompatible with it, even if it meant his 
own death. He remained faithful to himself and his values and there-
fore could meet his death without fear. Virtue and happiness are not 
immiscible--they imply each other. The conclusions of the "conver-
! 
sational" dialogues concerning happiness are valid, then, and now we 
can appreciate more fully why they are valid. 
t'i: f 
6. The Meno. 
The conversational dialogues and the Protagoras constantly 
move in the direction of associating virtues and values with knowledge, 
and in the Socratic dialogues those virtues and values are personified 
by Socrates, the philosopher, the man of wisdom. But in the Socratic 
dialogues there was something else, a moral conviction, a "spirit," 
which reappears in the Symposium as eros. Plato has introduced an 
irrational element, a divinely inspired source of man's motivations 
for values which also determines to a certain extent the values for which 
he can strive. The desire for immortal perfection and happiness is the 
wellspring of this irrational drive for self-expression and self-reali-
zation. The Meno draws together vi-rtue, knowledge, immortality and 
divine inspiration or true opinion in a negative discussion reminiscent 
of the conversational dialogues. The Meno draws the threads together, 
but there is no solution in this dialogue. 
Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is ac-
quired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by 
teaching nor practice, then whether it comes to 
man by nature, or in what other way? 1 
In the opening lines of the Meno the problem of the dialogue is 
stated. The question of whether virtue could be taught was answered in 
the Protagoras by showing that "virtue is knowledge"; since knowledge 
can be taught, it followed that virtue could be taught, but the Protagoras 
1. Plato, Meno, 70d. 
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did not show what kind of knowledge virtue is. The Meno indicates for 
the first time1 the type of knowledge which Plato feels is the basis of 
virtue. 
It is a new type of cognition, which cannot be 
learned from anyone else, but, if the thought in 
the soul of the e~quirer is led on in the right way, 
arises of itself. 
i. What is virtue? 
When Meno asks Socrates if virtue can. be taught, Socrates re-
plies that he cannot answer the question because he does not know what 
virtue is. 3 Me no does not see why the definition of virtue should cause 
any difficulty and explains that "virtue is relative to the actions and ages 
of each of us in all that we do. "4 Socrates politely rejects Meno' s 
swarm of virtues. He points out that there ane many different kinds of 
bees but insofar as they are all bees they have something in common. 
Socrates is willing to admit that there are many virtues, but it is not the 
differences between virtues that interest him; rather it is the essence 
of virtue, the common property which makes a virtue a part of Virtue. 
Meno finds it very difficult to follow Socrates. Finally, Socrates 
resorts to an analogy from geometry. 5 A square, a circle and a triangle 
1. Actually, the myth of Diotima has already discussed this type of 
knowledge, but in connection with eros--in the Meno this kind of 
knowledge is definitely connected with virtue. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 171. 
3. Plato, Meno, 71a. 
4. Plato, Meno, 71e-72a. 
5. Plato, Meno, 74b-76d. 
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are all different, but they are all geometric figures; what is the common 
property which makes them all figures? Meno still does not compre-
hend until Socrates phrases his questions and answers in the jargon of 
Gorgias, Meno' s teacher. The subtle satire in this passage is directed 
at the effects of Sophistic education, which crams the student's head full 
of glib phrases and leaves his power of reasoning attenuated. Meno 
does not really understand Gorgias' definitions of "figure" or he could 
apply the same type of reasoning to "virtue." He cannot abstract from 
particular cases the factor common to them all. 
Jaeger devotes a considerable portion of his chapter on the 
Meno1 to the logical relationships that he feels are indicated by it. 
First, the Meno shows the connection between the Ideas and virtue. 
The 'something' through which all the separate 
virtues can be seen to be not manifold, but one 
and the same, Socrates calls the eidos .... The 
Platonic eidos is always forked out in relation 
to the problem of virtue. 
Jaeger feels that the Meno is proof that Plato never did identify his 
Ideas with "logical concepts" or ''universals." The essence of virtue 
is the sum of all that can be said about virtue "as a whole. "3 "The 
answer to 'What is virtue?' is not a definition, but an Idea. "4 The 
Platonic Idea is both a logical universal and an ontological entity, but 
Plato never posited the existence of the universal apart from the 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 161-166. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 162. 
3. Jaeger, PAl, II, 163. 
4. Jaeger, PAi, II, 163. 
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particular, Jaeger asserts, because he had never abstracted universal 
1 
concepts as such. 
Whether Plato was conscious of the niceties of the logical dis-
Unctions between a logical universal and his Ideas, as logical dis-
Unctions, is a mo?t question; whether it would have made any difference 
in his formulation of the Idea (assuming that he was ignorant of the logi-
cal distinction) is another. The technical exposition of the later dialogues 
is handicapped, no doubt, by Platd s limited technical vocabulary, but 
his practical, moral philosophy suffers very little. The epistemological 
and metaphysical status of the Idea seems at times confused and 
awkward because Plato could not or would not use a formalized techni-
cal jargon; but the Idea as a practical standard of choice and behavior 
is more "scientific" because of the amalgamation of abstract critical 
thought and actual behavior. Neither uncriticized behavior nor doctri-
naire consistency are sufficient as standards, . even if they are "true 
opinions" harmonious with the Idea, if they have not been "verified" in 
reference to one another. 
Socrates' lengthy explanation and numerous analogies finally ac-
complish their purpose and Me no defines virtue as "the desire of things 
honourable and the power of attaining them. "2 In a manner by now fa-
miliar, Socrates shows that things "honourable" are good and that no 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 16.4-165. 
2. Plato, Meno, 77b. 
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man consciously chooses anything for himself that is evil. If he chooses 
an evil, he has made the choice thinking that it was good. Since all men 
naturally desire what is good for them, Meno' s definition of virtue need 
not include "the desire of things honourable" and therefore reduces to: 
Virtue is the power of attaining the good. 1 
The questions which Socrates asks and the conclusion which is 
reached indicate clearly that "power" and "good'' are understood by 
Meno to have been used in the conventional sense and not that of the 
Symposium. Socrates argues, as he does in the Euthydemus, 2 that 
health, wealth and all the ''good" things of life are good only if justly 
acquired and justly used--he does not go on to ask if just decisions must 
be based on knowledge, for that would anticipate the central question of 
the dialogue. Meno' s definition of virtue, Socrates says, reduce·s to 
"justice," which is a part of virtue; therefore the definition iS circular 
and does not explain anything. 3 We cannot explain "the nature of virtue 
as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue. ,4 The defini-
tion of justice in the Republic is entirely consistent with the above 
argument as far as it goes, and this is the first indication that justice, 
as Plato uses the term in th.e Republic, is analogous to arete' or virtue. 
1. Plato, Meno, 77b-78c. 
2. Cf. Plato, Euthyd., 280d-e. 
3. Plato, Meno, 79b f. 
4. Plato, Meno, 79e; a partial explanation of the negative, conver-
sational dialogues. 
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ii. Socrates and the Slave. 
At this juncture, Meno breaks in with an argument that he has 
learned from Gorgias, which states that it is impossible to learn any-
thing. If a man knows, "he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; 
for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire. " 1 
Meno' s borrowed theory causes Socrates to state the doctrine of remi-
niscence as an alternative which is opposed to Gorgias' skepticism. 
"Reminiscence" is a purely hypothetical theory of knowledge as stated 
by Socrates in this passage, with no direct connection to virtue. Many 
wise men have held, Socrates says, that the soul is immortal; if the 
soul is immortal, it is entirely possible that the soul has seen and known 
everything and is therefore able to bring to mind all things if properly 
stimulated by learning or recollection. The process of bringing to light 
things already known, however, is not easy. 2 
Socrates puts the theory of reminiscence to a test with one of 
Meno's slaves, a young boy who has never studied any geometry, to see 
if the boy can "recall" the correct solution to a geometric problem. 
The only aid that the slave receives is the stimulation and guidance of 
Socrates' questions. 3 After a few questions the young boy realizes that 
his first answer was wrong and Socrates turns to Meno and says: 
1. Plato, Meno, 80e. 
2.. Plato, Meno, Ble-d. 
3. Plato, Meno, 82a-84a. 
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Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in 
his power of recollection? He did not know at 
first, and he does not know now; but then he thought 
that he knew, and answered confidently; now he has 
a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he 
knows. He is better off in knowing his ignorance 
for we have certainly, as would seem, assisted him 
in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and 
now he will wish to remedy his ignorance. But do 
you suppose that he would ever have enquired into 
or learned what he fancied he knew until he had 
fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not 
know, and had desired to know? Mark now the 
farther development. I shall only ask him, and not 
teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me; 
and do you watch and see if you find me telling or 
explaining anything to him, instead of eliciting his 
opinion. 1 
Socrates continues questioning ·until the boy "sees'' the correct 
answer without being told what it is. It is possible to question much of 
Plato's oversimplified demonstration, but more important are the posi-
tive insights revealed by the little drama. The "non-directive" tech-
nique employed by Socrates shows once more the importance he 
attached to the awareness of ignorance in the quest for knowledge. The 
passage also brings out Socrates' "progressive methods," by stressing 
student interest, student participation and one other factor not empha-
sized so often among progressive educators: the instructor must have 
a profound knowledge of the subject under discussion in order to know 
that the argument is moving in the right direction. Another question 
implicit in this section is that of how we arrive at any meaningful 
1. Plato, M.eno, 84a-d. 
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solutions to problems--what does it mean to "see" the answer to some 
difficulty when we were ''blind" to the solution an instant previous to 
the insight? 
Since the young slave has recalled things that he had not learned, 
Socrates proposes that knowledge must be the remembrance of things 
already known to the immortal soul. 1 "I like what you are saying, " 
Meno comments when Socrates concludes. Platoindicates through 
Socrates his approval of the type of argument and his awareness of 
technical difficulties. 
And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I 
have said of which I am not altogether confident. 
But that we shall be better and braver and less 
helpless if we think that we ought to ,m quire, than 
we should have . been if we indulged in the idle fancy 
that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to 
know what we do not know;--that is a theme which 
I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost 
of my power. 2 
Plato's educational credo is contained in this statement. Ther.e is no 
sense in assuming a premise which negates philosophical speculation 
or the value of philosophyat the beginning of an inquiry. Plato is as-
serting the primacy of practical, moral reason in the face of theoreti-
cal objections. 
iii. Can virtue be taught? 
Virtue has not yet been defined, and Socrates insists that he 
cannot tell whether or not it can be taught if he does not know what it is; 
1. Plato, Meno, 85c-86b. 2. Plato, Meno, 86c. 
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but since Meno seems more interested in this question than in the defi-
nition of virtue, Socrates proposes that they proceed by hypothesis; 
that is, what are the minimum conditions that virtue must satisfy if it 
can be taught .? First if it can be taught, it can be known. "Then if 
virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught:?'' 1 If it is taught and it is 
virtue it must be good. But is virtue know ledge? In order to find out 
if virtue is knowledge, Socrates suggests that they pursue an investi-
gation of how knowledge and virtue are related to goodness. Virtue is 
good; if there is any good which is not knowledge, it may be virtue, "but 
if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that 
virtue is knowledge?"2 
Socrates now returns to the argument that was dropped when he 
interpreted Meno! s first definition of virtue to be the equivalent of 
justice. Virtue, he says, is good and is profitable. There are other 
things, such as wealth, beauty, etc., that are also good if properly 
utilized, but they may be harmful if used improperly. 3 The value of 
the potential goods depends on the wisdom exercised in using them. 
And in general, all that the soul attempts or en-
dures when under the guidance of wisdom, ends 
in happiness. . . . If then virtue is a quality of 
the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it 
must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the 
1. Plato, Meno, 87b. 
2. Plato, Meno, 87d. 
3. Plato, Meno, 87e. 
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things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful 
in themselves, but they are all made profitable 
or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; 
and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must 
be a sort of wisdom or prudence? 1 
H virtue is knowledge, then good men are not by nature good but are 
made good by instruction--but this supposition may be erroneous. H 
it is true it can stand examination, for ''a principle which has any 
soundness should stand firm not just now, but always. " 2 Here we have 
the first real indication of the kind of knowledge that Plato has been look-
ing for--eternal and objective values. 
iv. Who are the teachers of virtue? 
H virtue is knowledge and is taught, there must be teachers and 
disciples; Socrates is testing the soundness of the theory that virtue is 
knowledge by asking who the teachers of virtue are and whom do they 
teach? Socrates asks this question of Anytus, one of the men who accuse 
Socrates in the Apology of corrupting the youth. Plato cleverly intro-
duces Anytus as a satirical aside and as a justification of Socrates, for 
he shows Socrates making a complete fool of this smug philistine on a 
question that he should certainly be able to answer if there had been any 
grounds for his accusation in the Apology. 3 Anytus is the son of a 
wealthy and distinguished father and therefore represents the kind of 
1. Plato, Me no, 88c. 
2. Plato, Meno, 89c. 
3. The confusion in tense, of course, arises from the Apology's having 
been written before works depicting Socrates earlier in life, in which 
actions that have not as yet happened to him are justified or explained. 
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person that Socrates is going to ask about. 
Socrates suggests that perhaps the Sophists are the teachers of 
virtue--at least, he says, they profess to be. Anytus is aghast at such 
a thought, even though he has never studied with a Sophist and knows 
nothing about them. 1 The Sophists can hardly be as bad as Anytu.s 
thinks, Socrates comments, for some of them, such as Protagoras, 
have enjoyed very good reputations over a long period of time. H they 
had been as bad as Anytus painted them they would have been found out 
and discredited. In any case, if the Sophists are not the teachers of 
virtue, who is? Any Athenian gentleman, Anytus answers, who has 
learned virtue from the previous generation of gentlemen. 2 
Socrates admits that there have been many virtuous men in 
Athens, but that does not prove that they were teachers of virtue. 
Themistocles was a good man, but his son was undistinguished even 
though he was given every advantage of education available in Athens at 
the time. H virtue could be taught, would not Themistocles have taught 
his son himself instead of having him trained in minor accomplishments 
such as horsemanship, fencing, . and so forth? 3 The same is true of 
1. Plato, Meno, 92c. This dramatic bit shows Anytus as inordi-
nately prejudiced against the Sophists, even though he knows nothing 
about them; and in the Apology, one of the charges brought against 
Socrates is that he is a Sophist. Anytus typifies the fifth century 
Babbitt in his narrow-minded conventionalism. 
2. Plato, Meno, 93a. 
3. Plato, Meno, 93e. 
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Aristides, Thucydides and other famous Athenians. 1 Anytus, who can 
see his own case in Socrates' references, becomes enraged and warns 
Socrates that if he persists in questioning people he will come to a bad 
end. 
Meno concedes that there is no unanimity of ,opinion among his 
. ' 
countrymen on the possibility of teaching virtue. 2. The poets contra-
diet themselves and are in such confusion that they cannot be the 
teachers of virtue. It seems that there are no teachers of virtue, which 
would appear to be evidence that virtue cannot be taught. 3 Meno arg\ies 
that there have been good men; if virtue cannot be taught, how are they 
to be accounted for? That is not the only difficulty the argument has 
caused. Socrates observ.es that if there are good men and their goodness 
depends on wisdom in using their attributes, and if knowledge can be 
taught, the argument is involved in a hopeless contradiction--it would 
appear that virtue cannot be know ledge. 4 
v. Knowledge and true opinion. 
Socrates suggests that they have created undue complications be-
cause they have not made any distinctions between "true opinion" and 
knowledge. He proposes that the way out of the dilemma is to recognize 
that "true opinion'' is as good a guide to action as knowledge -is, but that 
1. Plato, Meno, 94 ff.; cf. Prot., 320a and Laches, 179 ff. 
2. Plato, Meno, 95b f. 
3. Plato, Meno, 95d-96a. 
4. Plato, Meno, 96d. 
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a person who is guided by right opinion cannot teach virtue to others. 1 
Now this is an illustration of the nature of true 
opinions: while they abide with us they are beauti-
ful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human 
soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they 
are not of much value until they are fastened by 
the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, 
friend Meno, is recollection. 2 
This distinction between "true opinion" and "true knowledge," Socrates 
states, is one of the few things of which he is sure. 3 
And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because 
they were wise, did Themistocles and those others 
of whom Anytus spoke govern the states. This 
was the reason why they w~re unable to make 
others like themselves--because their virtue was 
not grounded on knowledge. 4 
The conclusion drawn is that virtue is neither natural nor acquired but 
that it is an instinct given by divine power to the virtuous. 5 This 
instinct cannot be supposed to be accompanied by reason or knowledge 
"unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen some one who is 
capable of educating statesmen. " 6 Such a man and his virtue would be 
"a reality among shadows." 7 But, Socrates declares, as the dialogue 
draws to a close, all this cannot be decided until the nature of virtue 
itself is investigated .. --an investigation that is postponed until the 
Republic. 
1. Plato, Me no, 97. 5. Plato, Meno, 99c-100a. 
2. Plato, Me no, 98a. 6. Plato, Meno, lOOa. 
3. Plato, Meno, 98b. 7. Plato, Meno, lOOb. 
4. Plato, Me no, 99b. 
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It may seem that the dialogue has ended without reaching any 
conclusion but actually it has advanced the argument considerably. 
Socrates never does refute the paradox that it is impossible to learn 
what we do not know, which is brought up by Me no during the argument; 
instead he proposes a practical alternative. He proposes that theoretical 
philosophy should not run counter to life as it must be lived, but should 
form the basis of the best life possible--a theory of knowledge should 
form the foundation of education for citizenship and statesmanship. The 
dialogue began with an inquiry into the nature of virtue, but when Meno 
used the paradoxical argument that nothing can be known, Socrates in 
turn proposed the theory of reminiscence which suggests that knowledge 
is the recall of things already known to an immortal soul. 
Gorgias' argument that it is impossible to teach knowledge to 
someone else is true to a certain extent, in the light of Socrates' defi-
nition of knowledge. Knowledge is not acquaintance with facts, it is an 
understanding of the meaning of those facts--an understanding which is 
impossible without the active cooperation of the student and which has a 
profound influence on the student's personality or soul. 
True learning is not passive reception, but a labori-
ous search, which is possible only if the learner 
spontaneously takes part in it. Plato's whole de-
scription makes it clear that scientific or philosophical 
enquiry has a moral effect, and steels the character. 1 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 170. 
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Knowledge of this type certainly cannot be taught in the ordinary sense 
of the word, and Plato does not mean by education what is usually meant--
education is a lifelong process in which the intellectual and physical en-
vironment play an extremely important part. This is the reason that 
Plato's educational theories cannot be separated from the rest of his 
thought. 
The educational _paradox used by Meno is not merely eristic logic; 
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it has a good deal of sense in it, as any educator should know. Even if edu-
cation is defined in a narrower sense than Plato's paideia (as it is today), 
there remains the methodological problem of whether a student should 
be asked to assimilate facts that he cannot really appreciate in the hope 
that understanding will eventually come, or whether a broad perspective 
should be presented in the hope that the student will be stimulated to dig 
out the facts for himself. Plato employs both methods in the Republic, 
but it is only the latter which is thought of as real education. Because 
real education is the search on the part of the individual himself, we can 
now appreciate Socrates' use of the elenchus to convince people, as he 
did Meno' s slave, of their ignorance; for the motivation to seek actively 
for real knowledge has its origins in the awareness of ignorance that 
carries with it the hope of enlightenment. 
The theory of reminiscence is not connected with virtue until the 
end of the dialogue, when "true opinion" is differentiated from knowledge. 
True opinion, Socrates shows, is an insufficient standard for political 
action, for virtuous men of the past have not been able to improve the 
citizens or teach others virtue; in fact, they could not even keep the 
virtue that they had, once they entered public life. True opinion is a 
divine instinct for making correct value judgments and as such is almost 
identical with eros in the Symposium, which was also described as an 
intuitive drive towards values. In the Symposium, Diotima relates the 
educational process by which eros could be directed to knowledge of 
Beauty and Goodness--knowledge which would reveal reality rather than 
images of reality. 
The Meno ends on the seemingly skeptical note that until there is 
some virtuous man whose knowledge is secured by the "tie of cause" and 
who is capable of teaching statesmen, the question of whether virtue can 
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be taught will have to remain in doubt. H, however, true opinion is analo- . 
gous to eros, and it would seem that it is, we can anticipate the con-
clusions that will eventually be reached and also the kind of education 
that will guide the man of true opinion to true know ledge' and make of him 
. a statesman who can educate others in virtue. The Symposium presents 
the argument that egocentric eros is most completely realized in the 
statesman. The Meno develops the idea that the "divine instinct" of the 
virtuo~s man must be governed by the knowledge of eternal values, ob-
jective norms that are good for all time. The virtuous man, then, com-
bines eros or divine inspiration and true knowledge. The egocentric 
"eros" of the Symposium is developed in the Meno into politically 
significant "true opinion" and shows that natural ability must be guided 
by eternal values. 
The knowledge of eternal truths, it was hypothesized earlier in 
the dialogue, was known to an immortal soul which, under favorable 
conditions, recalls what it has always known. In some of the later dia-
logues Plato formulates this thought in other ways to suggest how the 
soul "knows," but he never doubts that it is the soul which truly knows 
nor is any doubt cast upon the theory of reminiscence, 1 or the material 
effect that knowledge has upon the soul. The connection between the 
theory of reminiscence and virtue indicates the kind of knowledge that 
is virtue. In the Me no, Plato 
deltberately centers the discussion on the origin of 
. knowledge. But we must remember that, through-
out, he means the knowledge of virtue and good--
i.e. the new, Socratic knowledge. And that 
knowledge is inseparable fro~ its object, and 
incomprehensible without it. · 
Since it is the immortal soul that is educated or nurtured, we 
can appreciate Plato's concern with education and also the full meaning 
of his warnings in the earlier dialogues that faulty education is dangerous 
to the soul. This new type of knowledge which Socrates proposes as the 
basis of real education, determines the type of education that shall be 
used in the Republic for the training of the Philosopher-King--education 
1. Cor.nfor¢1, PT~, 5. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, n; 161. 
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of the total individual which prepares him to grasp for himself the 
prinCiples that govern his own virtue. Plato feels that the intuitive 
knowledge which is awakened in the soul is the basis of real virtue, and 
it becomes clear why it has been so difficult to define virtue and edu~ 
cation and why the conversational dialogues were inconclusive--in a 
sense, virtue cannot be defined! The only real definition of virtue is the 
virtuous man, the m~n who knows--the dialectic has returned to the 
Socrates of the Apology and the Crito as the only definition of virtue that 
is possible. 
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Since it is the actual individual who is the definition of virtue, it 
is now evident what Socrates' cryptic assertion that "virtue is one'' really 
. means--virtue is the unity of various virtuqus traits harmoniously resolved 
in the personality of a person who has the knowledge necessary to make 
valid moral judgme~ts. The harmony of the soul, knowledge, and moral 
choice are all based on eternal values known to the soul--in a sense, then, 
as Jaeger points out, 1 virtue is united in the Idea. . A virtuous individual's 
knowledge of what ultimately governs his virtue is the Idea. Education as 
the process of the dialectic cannot be defined in so many words either--
it is an experience, "the. awakening of the inherent capacities of man. "2 
Plato's philosophy is centered in virtue and education and, since they are 
experiences of the individual's soul, we can now accept more readily his 
statement that his real philosophy was never written nor could it be written. 
1. See p. 183. · 2. · Jaeger, PAl, IT, 167. 
CHAPTER Vlli 
DIA..LOOUES INTRODUCTORY TO THE REPUBLIC 
PART IT: THE GORGIAS 
The Gorgias is Plato's longest dialogue, excluding the Republic 
and the Laws. Dramatically it is less effective than the Symposium or 
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the Protagoras because its form is so very complex. Various arguments 
are developed simultaneously; many of the important passages are highly 
condensed, and some of the most interesting statements are not de-
veloped at all. The Gorgias often seems redundant, but it is an extremely 
important dialogue because, of all the works discussed so far, it gives 
the clearest picture of the nature of Plato's political thought and its 
close association with education and his moral philosophy. The questions 
that lie behind the argument are: Must the politician or rhetorician be 
a just man? What are or should be the aims of the politician? 
Gorgias, who developed rhetoric, represents a formidable philo-
sophical opponent to Plato's thought, because he challenged the power 
of reason to find any reality in experience beyond the flux of sense ex-
perience. "Even if Reality could be known, knowledge of it could not be 
communicated to others. " 1 Gorgias is , skeptical of the possibility of any 
real knowledge and even if it is possible, he is sure that it cannot be 
taught to others. 2 This "technic.al" skepticism--it is doubtful that 
1. Fuller, HP, 106. 2. Cf. Plato, Meno, 80e; see p. 186. 
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Gorgias ever applied or advocated it in his practical, ethical thinking--
was carried over into the political thinking of Plato's time by his 
students, who advocated a power theory of politics and ethical relativism 
on the grounds that they were Natural. According to this doctrine of 
Natural Law, success and power were the marks of "natural" arete 
and were the means to happiness. Plato with his idea that virtue is 
knowledge, that real political success depends on self-realization, not 
power, and that happiness is the reward of virtue, cannot let the theories 
that Gorgias proposed or inspired go unchallenged. 
Rhetoric represents more than a form of education with which 
Plato did not agree; it represents in a way the spirit of the times th.a!_ 
Plato wanted to revolutionize. The realistic, the pragmatic, the bour-:-
geoise had reacted against the excessive intellectualism which they felt 
the Sophists typified, but there was implicit in the candid nonmoral 
tenets of rhetoric a directness of action that appealed to the Athenian 
mind and, as long as its nonmoral character was not made evident, it 
did not offend their conventional values. 1 "The sophistic movement was 
a purely educational phenomenon, whereas rhetoric was the new culture 
as it affected the state in practice. n 2 
Plato the moralist could not accept the ethical relativism im-
plicit in rhetoric; Plato the philosopher found Gorgias' skepticism 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 136-137. 2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 127. 
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intolerable; Plato the political theorist did not agree that power was the 
end of political action, although he did agree that the superior should 
rule; in addition, Plato the educator was in competition with schools 
of rhetoric that owed their existence to Gorgias, who invented the 
"art." The Gorgias is a criticism of a form of education which advo-
cated material success and political power without regard for ethics as 
its ends. Nothing could be more completely opposed to Plato's own edu-
cational program, and this, it would seem, is the reason for his giving 
so much space to its refutation in the Gorgias. Plato is not creating a 
philosophical system for its own sake; his thinking is critical and is 
propounded with the idea of founding a better society by practical edu-
cational methods. 
His efforts were always directed towards bringing 
the best state into existence somehow, and uniting 
those qualities which are urually separate on 
earth, power and wisdom. 
Plato's criticism of the theories characterized by Gorgias in this dia-
logue is primarily practical and not theoretical; therefore, his main 
argument is not with Gorgias but with his disciples. 
From a criticism of rhetoric, as it was used in the politics of 
his time, Plato develops the ideals necessary to statesmanship; ideals 
necessary for the personal value of a healthy ''soul" and the social value 
of a good state. In the Protagoras the political nature of virtue is lost 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 98. 
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in defining virtue itself, while in the Meno, the political necessity of 
virtue is introduced at the end of the dialogue and remains undeveloped. 
The Gorgias assembles these dialogues by critically analyzing the pre-
vailing political ideals of power and unbridled individualism--ideals 
which, if accepted uncritically, have no "measure." 
The "goodness" of political action or, for that matter, of any 
choice is the "measure" which should be used by the statesman to guide 
his personal activities (as we have seen in the Symposium) and those of 
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the state. The true statesman must know what ends the state should work 
for and must be able to teach others what those ends are if the state is 
to continue to be governed by the best possible choices for the citizens 
as individuals and as a whole. The Gorgias is more critical than con-
structive; that is, the political sentiments of the time are criticized and 
positive correction is hypothesized, but the dialogue goes no further than 
establishing the need for a normative ethics as a foundation for statesman-
ship and society. The importance of the virtuous statesman-educator 
and the need of a moral basis for society, demonstrated in the Gorgias, 
is the prologue to the ideal state and the Philosopher-King which evolve 
from the attempt to define justice in the Republic. 
1. What does Gorgias teach? 
Plato's use · of Gorgias as a symbol of rhetoric is much the same 
as his use of Protagoras to symbolize sophistry. As a further parallel, 
Gorgias is characterized sympathetically; it is not against Gorgias 
personally that Plato is marshalling his forces; it is the use of the "art'' 
that he developed that Plato wishes to castigate. The dialogue begins 
with an investigation as to what rhetoric is. When Socrates asks Gorgias 
what he teaches, he receives a straightforward answer: "Rhetoric, 
.Socrates, is my art, " 1 an art which he professes to be able to teach to 
others. 
What is the art of rhetoric concerned with, Socrates wants to 
know. It cannot be defined as discourse or the art of using words ex-
clusively, since there are other arts to which these definitions apply. 2 
Gorgias answers that rhetoric has to do with the greatest and best of 
human things--''being that which gives to men freedom in their own 
persons, and to individuals the power of ruling over others in the 
several states. "3 Gorgias' definition presupposes a knowledge of what 
the greatest and best of human things are and ultimately his definition 
equates "good" to "power. " There is no doubt that Gorgias is using 
"power" in the ordinary sense and not in that attributed to eros and 
arete' in the Symposium, for he says: 
What is there greater than the word which per-
suades the judges in the courts, or the senators in 
the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or 
at any other political meeting: --if you have the 
1. Plato, Gorg., 449a. 3 ~ Plato, Gorg., 451e-452d. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 449d. Cf. Taylor, PMW, 107. 
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power of uttering this word, you will have [others 
working] not for himself, ~ut for you who are able 
to persuade the multitude. 
In the final analysis, "persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric. " 2 
Persuasion, Socrates observes, is common to all forms of 
instruction. In recognizing rhetoric as a form of education, it is 
Plato's purpose to bring out the fact that you persuade a person with 
some object in mind; mutual benefit and personal gain are the most 
general classifications into which the purposes of persuasion can be 
divided. What is the subject about which rhetoric persuades and what 
is its object?3 These are rather awkward questions, since rhetoric 
has no "subject" and cannot be objectively defined; it can be defined 
only in terms of the effect it produces. "Rhetoric,'' Gorgias answers, 
"is the art of persuasion in courts of law and other assembles, ... and 
about the just and the unjust. " 4 Socrates will return to this admission 
that the rhetorician can distinguish the just from the unjust later in the 
dialogue. 
Socrates proposes that there is a distinction between knowledge 
and opinion and that either may be used as the basis for persuading 
others; Gorgias agrees. 5 The rhetorician does not pretend to teach or 
persuade others on the strength of knowledge; "then rhetoric, as would 
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1. Plato, Gorg., 452e. 4. Plato, Gorg., 454b, italics mine. 
2. Plato, Gorg. , 453a. 5. Cf. Me~97 f.; seep. 192-193. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 453d. 
appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the 
just and the unjust, but gives no instruction about them." 1 That is true, 
Gorgias says, for no large multitude could be informed, in a short 
space of time, about things such as justice. Gdrgias tries to defend 
himself against the criticism implicit in Socrates' questions; that is, 
that rhetoric may be used to pe~petrate injustice since it is not neces-
sary· that the rhetorician's persuasive ability be based on knowledge or 
concern for the truth of what he is talking about. The rhetorician, 
Gorgias states, 
can persuade the multitude better than any other 
man of anything which he pleases, but he should 
not therefore seek to defraud the physician or 
any other artist of his reputation merely because 
he has the (JorensiSJ power. 2 
For this reason Gorgias disavows any responsibility for abuses of that 
power on the part of his students. 3 
"The rhetorician," Socrates comments, "need not know the truth 
about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant 
that he has more knowledge than those who know?"4 
"Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?" 
Gorgias has already admitted that the rhetorician is concerned 
with the just and the injust, 5 and he is therefore forced to acknowledge 
1. Plato, Gorg., 455a. 4. Plato, Gorg., 458c f. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 457a. 5. Plato, Gorg., 454b. 
3. Plato, Gorg. , 457b. 
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that the rhetorician must know the nature of justice in order to be able 
to distinguish between them. 1 Gorgias cannot deny, at this point, that 
the man who knows what is just will be just, without placing his "art" 
in a bad light. ''According to the argument," says Socrates, "the 
rhetorician must be a just man; ',' who will never willingly do an in-
justice. 2 But Gorgias has said that if a rhetorician misuses his power, 
the injustice is not to be blamed on the teacher; the inference is that not 
all rhetoricians are just men--a flat contradiction of Gorgias' previous 
statement. 3 
2. What is the definition of rhetoric? 
When it becomes evident that Gorgias has contradicted himself, 
Polus, one of his disciples, breaks into the conversation angrily. The 
contradiction arose, he claims, because Gorgias was ashamed to admit 
that justice and injustice were no concern of rhetoric. 4 He wants to 
know what Socrate~. thinks the art of rhetoric is. In Socrates' opinion, 
rhetoric is not an art at all "but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which 
knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word 
'flattery'. "5 Socrates carries out this humorous but meaningful satire 
by saying that the soul, like the body, has two arts which attend it; 
gymnastics and medicine tend the body while legislation and justice are 
1. Plato, Gorg., 460b. 4. Plato, Gorg., 461b. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 460c-e. 5. Plato, Gorg., 463b. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 460e. 
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their counterparts in the care of the soul. There are four counterfeit 
arts which correspond to the true arts but a counterfeit art "having no 
regard for men's highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of 
the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is one of the 
highest value to them." 1 No form of flattery is an art or technebecause 
it cannot give any rational explanation of the nature of its own application. 
"And I do not call any irrational thing an art. " 2 Socrates concludes by 
summarizing the forms of flattery. Cookery is the form of flattery that 
takes. the place of medicine; cosmetics and garments that of gymnastics; 
sophistry is th.e flatterer's form of legislation, while rhetoric is his 
substitute for justice .. 
This section gives a good insight into a very important concept in 
Plato's thinking--the concept of techn8. Plato's aim Js to make politics 
and ethics into "arts"; an art or techne is grounded on special, almost 
theoretical knowledge, that includes and goes beyond experience; that is, 
it includes specific training for certain ends, but it is not pure theoreti-
cal knowledge because it is always connected with actual practice. 3 
Plato often uses analogies from the professions, especially medicine, 
207 
because the combination of practical experience and theoretical knowledge 
and investigation exemplified by these vocations is similar to the method 
1. Plato, Gorg., 464e. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 465a. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, II, 131 and n. 30, 389. 
3. Jaeger, PAl, II, 129-130. 
that he feels should be followed in founding a science of ethics and a 
science of politics. 
The good life, which is always Plato's aim, cannot be realized 
. without the art or techne/ of "measurement" and by contrasting the true 
arts of medicine, legislation, etc., with the sham or flattering arts, he 
shows that the latter do not have the rigorous character nor the clearly 
defined purpose of the true techne. 1 
The techne was the ideal on which Socrates believed 
knowledge should be modelled. It is easy to see 
why, if we remember that the ultimate aim of all 
Plato's search for exact knowledge was a practical 
aim, namely, the science of the state. . . . Political 
science is based on a complete theoretical under-
standing of reality. In this case Plato is postu-
lating a new science of politics, and explains what 
it is by con~rasting it with the political rhetoric 
of his day. 
i. Power is not an end in itself. 
Polus is dumbfounded at the analogy between rhetoric and 
flattery--rhetoricians have great power in the state. They can kill or 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 130. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, II, 130. Jaeger may have overemphasized the im-
portance of techne in relation to knowledge in this section; in 
connection with ethics and politics it seems more reasonable to 
assert that the techm( is to be founded on knowledge, rather than · 
that the knowledge should be patterned after the techne~ even if it 
is meant only that it should be patterned after techrie" methodo-
logically. See Wild, PTM, 88 ff. , for a presentation that tempers 
that of Jaeger. Wild stresses the subordinate role of techne to 
life. "The arts advance only by first dividing and then conquer-
ing, one step at a time, but a man lives and acts as a whole all 
at once." 
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exile men with imp_unity. Socrates denies that this is really power if 
power is held to be a good, 1 and Polus does assert that power is good. 
The ability to sway the mob is not real power, Socrates says, for tyrants 
and rhetoricians "do literally nothing which they will, but only what they 
think best. n2 In other words, the rhetoricians must continually please 
the mob by doing or saying what they think will best suit the circum-
stances, and not what they may really think is the better procedure. 
Therefore, they are ruled by the opinion of the mob in the end and have 
no real power at all; they cannot appeal to a self-determined standard of 
what is best for themselves, but must continually resort to a standard of 
expediency. 
Power for its own sake is not really power at all; power used as 
the means to ends consciously sought and known to be good is the only 
meaningful use of political control, for" if a man does something for 
the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that 
for the sake of which he does it. "3 Men will the ends and not the means 
of their actions and in willing they seek ends that are conducive to their 
good. No man wills what he does if he does evil, for doing evil is ulti-
mately injurious to himself. 4 Polus has admitted that power is good 
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and, further, that what is done without reason is evil. 5 Polus, of course, 
1. Plato, Gorg., 466b. 4. Plato, Gorg., 468d. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 466d. 5. Plato, Gorg., 467a. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 468c; cf. Laches, 185d. 
has been thinking Of power as good in the sense of its being materially 
advantageous, whereas Socrates is thinking of it as morally good or, 
if misused, morally evil. If great power is a potential moral good, the 
tyrant or rhetorician who uses it to kill or exile men without reason is 
not only evil but he does not have great power, for he cannot control 
himself or his willed decisions because the ends that he has willed are 
senseless and therefore evil. "Doing injustice is the greatest of evils," 
even greater than suffering injustice. 1 
Polus comments that with views such as these, Socrates could 
not even tell whether a great king were a happy man or not. ''And I 
should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of 
education and justice. "2 
"What! and does all happiness consist in this?" 
"Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine . " 
ii. Doing injustice is the worst evil. 
Socrates states that it is impossible to be unjust and happy;3 
doing injustice is worse than suffering it and if an injustice is done it is 
better to suffer punishment than to escape and be thought just. 4 Socrates 
proceeds to prove his point, even though he uses basic tenets from 
1. Plato, Gorg., 469c; cf. Rep., 347e ff. This is the problem with 
which the Republic begins:--
2. Plato, Gorg., 471a. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 472c. 
4. Plato, Gorg., 473b-c. 
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;.,, 
Polus' own philosophical position. Things are considered beautiful in 
relation to some standard; that is, they are usually called beautiful in 
relation to the pleasure they afford or to their utility. 1 In the same way, 
laws and institutions can be thought of as beautiful if they are pleasant 
or useful. 2 Polus agrees to this criterion and its application to the 
"beauty of knowledge. ,3 Socrates is not presenting his theory of beauty 
but that of the Sophists, in the same way that he presented pleasure and 
pain in the Protagoras as the criterion of good and evil that "most people" 
hold. 
Polus, who feels that pleasure and pain is the criterion of good 
and evil, admits ~hat doing evil is a greater disgrace than suffering in-
justice, but despite this he asserts that it is better to do injustice than to 
suffer it. 4 The contradiction that seems .so glaring when stated in this 
way is in reality not nearly so evident- -most people suffer from this very 
conflict, which is obvious only from a thoroughly analyzed moral po-
sition. Polus has the same difficulty that Protagoras had with courage. 5 
He has failed to see that he is using in a nonmoral sense a term whose 
very meaning depends on the existence of morality. Injustice is morally 
bad, but "injustice" has no meaning unless a moral frame of reference 
is assumed; to say, as Polus does, that injustice is better in some cases 
1. ~_lato, Gorg., 474d f. 4. Plato, Gorg., 475b-e. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 474e. 5. Seep. 140-142. 
3. Plato, Gorg. , 475a. 
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than justice (by this, it must be remembered, he means materially bene.:. 
ficial) makes sense only if the "good" that results from injustice is con-
sidered nonmorally--but this is impossible, for "injustice" has no mean-
ing in a nonmoral situation. Polus, who stated that justice and injustice 
have no place in rhetoric, finds it impossible to argue for an order of 
precedence among values while remaining nonmoral. He found it im-
possible to deny that doing evil is a greater disgrace than suffering in-
justice; this admission concedes the existence of morality and is enough 
to destroy his whole case that rhetoric is not concerned with justice and 
injustice, for it is inconceivable that moral good can result from in-
justice. Socrates is trying to show that a potential material good is good 
only if its acquisition and use are also moral. 
If pleasure and pain is the criterion of good and evil and if doing 
evil is a greater disgrace than suffering injustice, and disgrace is an 
evil, then Socrates has shown by Polus' own admissions that doing evil 
is worse than suffering injustice since disgrace as the greater evil would 
also be the most painful. In order to show that it is better to accept just 
punishment than to escape, Socrates proposes that in every action there 
is an agent that acts, and a patient that is acted on, and that the patient 
is affected according to the way the agent acts. 1 If the agent punishes 
justly the patient suffers justly and therefore honorably. The honorable 
1. Plato, Gorg., 476b-d f. 
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is good and therefore either pleasant or useful, to use Polus' standard, 
and the person punished justly is benefited; that is, his soul is im-
proved.1 
"Injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the 
soul, are the greatest of evils!"2 As medicine frees a man from disease, 
so punishment, if it is deserved, frees the soul from injustice and the 
man who suffers punishment is better off than the man who escapes 
punishment;3 what, then, "is the great use of rhetoric ... in helping a 
man excuse his own injustice ?"4 Socrates has shown that rhetoric is 
of no use to the politician, or rather, to the statesman, for it does not 
represent true power. He has also shown why he thinks that accepting 
punishment, if deserved, is better than "protecting yourself" with. the 
aid of rhetoric. 
3. Callicles' argument for Natural Law. 
Callicles, who is to present a more forceful statement of Natural 
Law and egocentric individualism than Polus, is amazect,and assumes 
that Socrates is jesting; for if he is not, · "the whole of human life is 
turned upside down. "5 Callicles, who is a politician and therefore 
representative of the type of person that he and Socrates are arguing 
1. Plato, Gorg., 477a-b. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 477e. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 478a-c; cf. Prot. 324b, punishment is senseless 
unless it is a form of education; see p. 131. 
4. Plato, Gorg., 480b. 
· 5. Plato, Gorg., 481b. 
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about, finds it difficult to assoc~te moral conviction, such as Socrates', 
with politics. As a "flatterer'' of the people, Callicles must constantly 
consider the opinions of the majority ·and he warns Socrates repeatedly 
that he should do so too; but Socrates is not interested in pleasing the 
majority of people; he is interested only in seeking a consistent set of 
values with which he can live be:n,eficially as an individual and as a member 
of society. "I would rather ... the whole world should be at odds with nie, 
and oppose me," he says, "than that I myself should be at odds with 
myself, and contradict myself. "l 
Callicles chides Polus, for in admitting that to do injustice was 
more dishonorable than to suffer injustice, he made the same mistake 
Gorgias had made; such moral considerations are only relevant to "the 
popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural but only con-
ventional. "2· The superior individual should follow natural law rather 
than conventional law, because the conventional law is made by the 
majority, who are weak, in order to protect themselves from the strong. 3 
This is not just. · "Justice consists in the superior ruling over and having 
more than the inferior. "4 The bold-faced hypocrisy of Callicles and 
his ilk lies in their willingness to flatter the mob that they despise in 
order to obtain power--power as a means to their own pleasure. 
Callicles' anti-democratic position is the final philosophical extreme 
1. Plato, Gorg., 482c. 3. Plato, Gorg., 483b. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 482e. 4. Plato, Gorg., 484d. 
which Socrates must defeat in the name of moral politics. 
1 
Philosophy, Callicles grants, has a place in education, but if it 
is pursued past youth it makes a man effeminate. 2 In the practical world 
a man must learn how to handle himself realistically--there he will learn 
· the value of rhetoric. Socrates is a case in hand; he is endangering 
himself by not knowing how to defend himself in court. The challenge 
is clear-cut; Socrates is to represent philosophy .and Callicles rhetoric. 
Callicles, with the examples of Gorgias and Polus in mind, will not 
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founder on the rocks of moral distinctions as easily as they did. Socrates 
does not equivocate about his position either. 
Now there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that 
which you censure me for making, --What ought the 
character of a man to be, and what his pursUits, 
1. Popper, OSE, I, 102-104. Popper presents the thesis that the 
Gorgias, since it shows Socrates attacking Callicles' theory of 
the rule of the superior, is a Socratic dialogue, whereas the 
Republic is a Platonic dialogue--the difference being that the 
Socratic dialogues are humanistic and ·"protectionistic" while 
the Platonic dialogues are "historicistic" and totalitarian.. There 
is no justification, however, for this arbitrary distinction. The 
Gorgias and the Republic ~e not opposed; they only seem so 
because Popper insists on seeing the Philosopher-King as a 
tyrannical dictator which, it is true, Socrates does attack tn the 
Gorgias. In the Gorgias, Socrates is not attacking the theory 
that the best shoUld rule--he is denying that those who are 
incompetent and think they are superior should rule. In other 
words, he is asking what the standard of the best should be; in 
so doing, the Gorgias is a necessary preface to the Republic 
because it helps to distinguish the tyrant from the Philosopher-
King by investigating the nature of political power. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 483c-486e. Callicles represents the realistic 
conservatives who opposed philosophy as unpractical and vitiating 
to the will. See p. 200. 
and how ftr is he to go, both in maturer years and 
in youth? 
i. Who are the superior men? 
In carrying out this purpose, Socrates engages Callicles on the 
question of what it is that makes the superior man superior. At first 
Callicles maintains that the stronger, the better, and the superior man 
are the same thing but when Socrates points out that the weak as a whole 
have more physical power than any one superior individual and would 
therefore have a "natural" right and not merely a conventional right to 
make the laws and define justice as equality, Callicles is forced to define 
"superior" in terms other than physical power. 2 With Socrates' guidance, 
he affirms that the wiser and better should rule and, Callicles adds, they 
should have more than the inferior. 3 In what way, Socrates wants to 
know, must a man be wiser in order to warrant a larger share--and what 
should it be a larger share of? --if a man is a shoemaker and the wisest 
about shoes, should he have the largest and most shoes?4 
The wise politicians who are valiant and able are what he meant, 
Callicles says, and not the superior craftsmen--Callicles thus includes 
courage with wisdom as the mark of a superior man and concludes that 
the wise and courageous should rule the state and have more than their 
subjects. 5 Callicles' constant insistence that the rulers have more than 
1. Plato, Gorg., 487c. 4. Plato, Gorg., 491a f. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 488d. 5. Plato, Gorg., 491c. 
3. Plato, G"'r'g., 490a. 
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their subjects shows Plato's awareness of the corrupting influence of 
this motive of personal gain in the politically ambitious and in this way 
prepares us for the necessarily frugal existence of the Philosopher-
King in the Republic. 
This is all very well as far as this "superior" individual is a 
political ruler, but what are his personal characteristics? "Every man 
is his own ruler, but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for 
him to rule himself; he is only required to rule others?" 1 Socrates is 
suggesting that the ruler must also be temperate. If Socrates shows 
that the superior man must be temperate in order to rule, the cardinal 
virtues of the Republic will have been shown to be necessary to a ruler 
even if Callicles' Natural Law is taken as the original premise. 
Callicles objects violently to this proposal. Temperance is more easily 
associated with morality than courage and wisdom and if Callicles ad-
mits that the superior individual must have a personal standard of be-
havior in order to rule, Socrates would have the same lever that has 
already caused Polus and Gorgias to contradict themselves. Callicles 
does not make the task easy for Socrates; he denies that the superior 
man must be temperate and states his case for egocentric hedonism as 
2 
the natural and therefore right criterion of pehavio:[!_. 
1. Plato, Gorg., 491d. 
2. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, II, 140-141. 
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I plainly assert, that he who would truly live 
ought to allow his desires to wax to the utter-
most, and not to chastise them; but when they 
have grown to their greatest he should have the 
courage and intelligence to minister to them and 
to satisfy all his longings. . . . And the truth is 
this:--that luxury and intemperance and licence, 
if they be provided with means, are virtue and · 
happiness--all the rest is mere bauble, agreements 
contrar1y to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. 
If happiness depends on satisfying desires, the happy man can 
never be satisfied- -his soul is like a leaky vessel or a cask which can 
never be filled. 2 Scratching, Socrates observes, will relieve an itch 
and as the gratification of a desire it is pleasant; does it follow that 
the man who itched all over constantly would be happier than a man 
with an occasional cutaneous irritation? 3 This analogy seems absurd 
to Callicles but he does not see that any pleasure hounded to excess 
just because it is pleasant in some circumstances is just as absurd. 
As long as Callicles makes no distinction between good and bad pleasures 
and as long as he feels that only the experience of desire pleasantly 
satisfied is happiness, he must accept the scratching analogy. Callicles 
continues to maintain that all pleasure is good; he does agree, however, 
that courage and knowledge are not the same as pleasure. 
Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and 
good are the same; but that knowledge and courage 
are not the same, either with ~ne another, or 
with the good [. e. pleasure] . -
1. Plato, Gorg., 491e-492c. 3. Plato, Gorg., 494b-e. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 493b-c. 4. Plato, Gorg., 495d. 
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If we keep in mind that Callicles has proposed that the superior indi-
vidual is wise and courageous, the type of contradiction that he is in-
volved in is clearly evident and the devious course of Socrates' 
argument becomes more intelligible. 
ii. Is pleasure the good? 
Socrates proposes that good and evil are mutually exclusive and 
that aJl things are either one or the other but not both; 1 also, that "all 
wants or desires are painful" and that in satisfying a desire, pleasure 
and, pain are present simultaneously since the desire is pain and the 
satisfaction is pleasure. 2 "For are they not simultaneous, and do they 
. not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the 
body?"3 If this is so and if good and evil are mutually exclusive, then 
pleasure cannot be the good since pleasure and pain exist in the same 
thing at the same time whenever a desire is satisfied. 
The inference is that the good is not the same as the 
pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there 
is a cessation of pleasure ana pain at the same 
moment; but not of good and evil, for they are 
different. 4 
At this point Socrates introduces a thought that foreshadows the theory 
of forms in the Republic: "Are not the good good because they have good 
present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present 
with them ?" 5 
1. Plato, Gorg., 495e. 4. Plato, Gorg., 497e. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 496d-e. 5. Plato, Gorg., 497e. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 496e. 
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The foolish, the wise, the cowards and the brave all experience 
pain and pleasure in about the same degree and often about the same things; 
therefore it is not the experience of pleasure or pain that differentiates the 
wise from the foolish or the courageous from the cowards. 1 "But surely 
the wise and the brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are 
the bad ?"2 Callicles affirms this observation by Socrates and since he 
could not have arrived at this conclusion using the pleasure (good) and 
· pain (evil) "possessed" as a standard for differentiating the good from the 
bad, he has tacitly admitted that some standard for moral judgment does 
exist; but first Socrates must wrest from him an affirmation that some 
pleasures are good and others bad. 
Good and evil men both experience joy and pain and if pleasure 
is the criterion of "good" the evil man may have even more pleasure 
because he indulges himself more; it follows that "the bad man is as 
good and bad as the good, or perhaps even better" if it is asserted that 
the "good and the pleasant are the same. "3 Plato is indicating the 
complete relativism inherent in egocentric hedonism- -a relativism 
in which good and bad have no meaning. Callicles can hardly accept 
this conclusion, since it would destroy the validity of his primary con-
tention that some men are by nature superior and should rule and have 
more than the inferior, by right of Natural Law. Callicles is on the 
horns of the dilemma: if he continues to assert that pleasure is the 
1. Plato, Gorg., 497e-499b. 3_. Plato, Gorg., 499b. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 498c. 
good, there is no ground for proposing that the superior should rule, 
and the conventional law of the herd is as good as any; if he wants to 
maintain that the superior should rule, he must admit to a standard of 
the "good" other than pleasure, and if he admits that pleasure is not the 
standard he will have a hard time denying that temperance is a necessary 
characteristic of the ruler. 
Callicles retires from his stand concerning pleasure as the good; 
he pretends that he has really believed that "some pleasures are good 
and others bad" all the time. 1 Once Callicles makes this concession, 
the argument continues much the same as it did in the Protagoras. 2 
Callicles grants the validity of the previous argument which showed that 
"the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to 
be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of them," 
and that pleasure is sought for the good and not the good for the sake of 
the pleasure. 3 "Will depends on choice, and ... what we always choose 
in willing is the good. "4 As in the Protagoras, 5 Socrates contends 
that in order to choose the pleasures that are good you must "have art 
or knowledge of them in detail"--once this point is made, Callicles can 
no longer argue that philosophy should not continue beyond youth since 
1. Plato, Gorg., 499c. This is the admission Socrates sought when 
he used the scratching analogy. (494b f. ) 
2. See pp. 137 ff. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 499e; cf. Gorg., 467c ff. 
4. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 142. --
5. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 142-143 for a comparison of the Gorgias and 
Protagoras. 
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the province of philosophy is value judgment or, as Socrates says: 
"You will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and 
to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious 
than this ? " 1 
iii. Temperance and the statesman. 
In order to distinguish rhetoric from philosophy, Socrates re-
turns to his analogy of the flattering arts, whose only end is to produce 
pleasure, and the true arts based on knowledge, which seek the good. 
You and I have agreed that there is such a thing as 
good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, 
and that pleasure is not the same as good, and 
that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the 
one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit 
and process of acquisition of the other, which is 
good.2 
The true arts make "provision for the soul's highest interest" and are 
based on knowledge and awareness of the purpose that they are meant to 
fulfill. The flattering arts depend on routine and the experience of what 
has produced pleasure in the past. 3 Poetry, music and tragedy aim only 
at producing pleasure and if poetry were stripped of music, meter, and 
rhythm the result would be rhetoric. This uncomplimentary comparison 
of poetry to the flattering arts is the first of many critical passages in 
which Plato denies that poetry is a true art and thereby denies that the 
poets are reliable founts of knowledge; the poets often reveal truths but 
1. Plato, Gorg., 500b-c. 3. Plato, Gorg., 50la-c. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 500e. 
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their inspiration is inconsistent and irresponsible because it is not 
governed by reason. Rhetoric, the prose counterpart of poetry, is 
the flattering art which Socrates claimed it to be, unless Callicles can 
present some new evidence. Callicles says that it is true that some 
rhetoricians are merely flatterers but there are also those who are 
really concerned with the welfare of the people. 
I am contented with the admission that r he to ric 
is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and 
disgraceful declamation; the other, which is 
noble and aims at the training and improvement 
of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say 
what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, 
to the audience. 1 
It is interesting to note the qualifications that Socrates demands 
of the nnoble rhetoric"--qualitie.s that would make the rhetorician identi-
cal with the philosopher, as Socrates defines the philosopher. 2 Socrates 
wishes to know which ones among the rhetoricians that Callicles knows 
have these qualities. .There are none living, Callicles replies, but 
Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles are examples from the 
past. 3 Socrates, however, does not agree that these men were "im-
provers of the people.'' "Will not the good man, who says whatever he 
says with a view to the best, speak with reference to some standard and 
1. Plato, Gorg., 503a, italics mine. 
2. Cf. Phaedr:", 262b; 270d ff. for a more detailed comparison of the 
rhetorician and the philosopher in which the "noble rhetorician" is 
' compared with the philosopher. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 503b . 
. . --
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and not at random?" 1 Regularity and order in reference to some 
standard, the methodology of the techne', is necessary to realize the 
good--the good soul is therefore in order and harmony; it is lawful and 
thus temperate and just . . 
With this line of reasoning, Socrates shows that temperance is 
necessary to the statesman and the cardinal virtues of the Philosopher-
King in the Republic are finally united in the "noble rhetorician." 2 The 
goal of the true rhetorician will be to "implant justice iri the souls of 
his citizens ... to implant every virtue and take away every vice. "3 As 
a doctor does not allow a sick man to gratify his desires at the expense 
of a cure to the body so the statesman should not indulge the souL of 
the citizen. at the expense of its health--and justice and temperance 
are essential the soul's health. Self-control and temperance, then, 
are better than the license that Callicles advocated earlier in the 
argument. 4 
Callicles refuses tq continue the argument when this contra-
diction becomes evident but Gorgias intervenes and asks that they finish. 
Socrates summarizes the argument, which has shown that ple~sure is 
not the good but rather that the good is good because of some virtue 
present in an object or person. 
1. Plato, Gorg., 503d; 3. Plato, Gorg., 504e. 
cf. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 145-146. 4. Plato, Gorg., 505c. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 504d. 
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But the virtue of each thing, whether body or 
soul, instrument or creature, when given to 
them in the best way comes to them not by 
chance but as the result of the order and truth 
and art which are imparted to them. 1 
The soul which is orderly, the temperate soul, · then, is better than the 
intemperate soul; it is virtuous because . of the order and truth that it 
has received from the proper education of its eros. The temperate man 
will do what is proper for him to do in relation to man and gods; he will 
be just, and holy and courageous too. 2 Again we find the unity of virtue 
expressed by Plato, this time in relation to temperance and justice. 3 
The temperate man "cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can 
' . 
the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and 
he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed. " 4 Temperance 
and justice are mandatory for a well-ordered state and the happiness of 
the individual, since anyone who is not just and temperate is incapable 
of friendship. 
And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion 
and friendship and orderliness and temperance and 
justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and 
men, and that this universe is therefore called 
Cosmos or order. 5 
Arete or excellence is not the result of chance but of the deliber-
ate order achieved by a thing through the excercise of the art peculiar 
1. Plato, Gorg., 506d. 4. Plato, Gorg., 507b. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 507a-b. 5. Plato, Gorg., 508a. 
3. Jaeger, PAl, II, 146. 
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to it. "Everything becomes good when its own peculiar. type of order, 
its cosmos, becomes supreme and is realized in it." 1 If the good is 
understood in the broad sense in which Plato seems to .intend that it 
should be, "ethics is only a special case of the effort made by all things 
to achieve perfection. "2 The Symposium described eros as the moti-
vating force in man's quest for self:-perfection- -a quest realized most 
completely by the statesman who has utilized his eros by controlling it 
and directing it towards the highest values. 3 In the Symposium, the 
dialectic starts with self-love and arrives at the statesman; in the 
Gorgias it starts with the problem of the statesman and arrives at the 
conclusion that friendship is the basis of society. The lover of wisdom . 
in the Symposium and the "noble" rhetorician of the Gorgias are es-
sentially the same "statesman" and both are necessary for an under-
standing of the Philosopher-King. 
4. The statesman as an educator. 
Socrates next investigates the statement that he could not defend 
himself, his family or his friends because he is not a rhetorician. He 
reiterates his belief that to do evil is worse than to suffer it--is there, 
then, any means by which a man can protect himself justly? 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 146. 
2. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 146. 
3. See pp. 162 ff; 175 ff. 
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By what devices can a man succeed in obtaining 
the two advantages, the one of not doing and the 
other of not suffering injustice? must he have the 
power, or only the will to obtain them? .... Is 
the will only sufficient, and will that prevent him 
from doing injustice, or must he have provided 
himself with power and art; and if he have not 
studied and practised, will he be unjust still? 1 
It is interesting to note that good intentions are not enough to insure the 
goodness of an act; Plato includes the utilitarian precept that the conse-
quences are important too. 2 A person must have correct training, 
knowledge and experience in order to have the "power" to avoid doing 
injustice, even unintentionally. Justice is an art, a techm{, because it 
includes the theoretical intent and the practical consequence in the same 
way that a master cabinetmaker must have a design in mind and the 
ability to execute it- -lacking either, he is not a master of his techne~ 
As far as ethics is concerned, Socrates is proposing that moral education 
is still necessary to insure that intent and consequence are both satis-
fied, even if a person already has a "good will." You can intend what is 
right only if you know what is right and you can be sure of the conse-
quences only if you have the power to fulfill your aims. 
In many ways this is one of the most important passages in the 
dialogues for an understanding of Plato's ethics, politics and educational 
theory. It is one of the most explicit statements of the twofold nature of 
1. Plato, Gorg., 509d-e, italics mine. 
2. See pp. 82-83 for a similar development in the Charmides. 
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all his philosophy and it is especially enlightening because of the obvi-
ous reference to Socrates' trial in this part of the dialogue. 1 
The Apology shows us a virtuous man who refuses to use anything 
but the truth in his own defense and since it is the use of this truth that 
has brought him to trial in the first place, Socrates is helpless--he 
will not retaliate unjustly, that is, defend himself rhetorically. For his 
attempt to educate the people in the ways of virtue and justice, he re-
ceived the death sentence. The rank injustice of Socrates' death crystal-
lizes the problem of virtue in contrast to conventional morality and that 
of law as it is related to justice. 
And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, 
if not wholly, yet as far as possible? ... I think that 
such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or 
even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of 
the ruling power. 2 
The answer to the problem posed by Soc~ates' death lies, for Plato, in 
the just statesman, the paradox of the Philosopher who is to be King--
a development that has already been suggested in connection with the 
exegesis of the Socratic dialogues. 3 
There is no doubt that the frequent references in the Gorgias to 
Socrates' lack of ability to protect himself are allusions to Socrates' 
trial. That Plato should refer back to that tragedy in connection with a 
criticism of rhetoric indicates the place that Socrates' death has in 
1. See especially Plato, Gorg., 521d-522e. 3. See pp. 123 ff. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 510a. 
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connection with the conflict between nonmoral law and justice. The 
whole of the Gorgias contrasts nonmoral law or rhetoric with justice, · 
which is championed by philosophy in the person of Socrates. The 
actual Socrates had the will and the power not to do injustice; he had the 
will but not the power to protect himself from suffering injustice. 
Rhetoric, the flatterer of the people, represents an unjust form of 
law, and it is this that Plato is going to such pains to criticize in the 
Gorgias. In the above passage, Socrates suggests that the only way a 
really virtuous man can avoid injustice is for the virtuous individual to 
be the law. He must not only have the art, which Socrates had, he niust 
also have the power, which Socrates did not. 
It may seem that Plato's solution overemphasizes the protection 
of the virtuous citizen, 'that he is proposing that the state exist for the 
sake of the statesman. This is hardly the case. Plato sees in the just 
statesman the answer to the best possible society. The twofold nature 
of Plato's philosophy alternates constantly between the individual and -
society; all of his thought can be put in terms of subjective individuality 
and objective society. Eros is highly individualistic but its highest 
expression is political; aret~ is a personal attribute but only the citizen 
can be truly virtuous; knowledge depends on subjective insight but one 
must be educated to the point where that knowledge can be grasped; the 
Good and the Ideas are objectively true but subjectively realized; 
knowledge of the Good leads to personal immortality but it also imposes 
229 
a social responsibility; intent is subjective and the consequence as far 
as it concerns others is objective; and so forth. 
Plato's dialectic and his insistence that his philosophy never 
was written can best be understood in regard to this alternating per-
spective. The individual and society can be brought together only by 
means of education; education in the broadest sense; education thought 
of as the meeting of individual minds which, though inviolably ·personal, 
do or should have common ends. This meeting of minds, the search for 
the common ground which is the Idea, takes the form of the dialectic 
and works itself out in serious conversation; because this is philosophy 
for Plato, he could truly say that his philosophy was never written. We 
have seen that he suggests that the just individual must have power in 
order to protect himself from injustice and we will see that he proposes 
that the just individual with the power must be an educator. 
i. Power--the ability to live well. 
Callicles heartily agrees that in order to be sure he will suffer 
no injustice, a mail should have power as a ruler or even a tyrant. He 
is, however, thinking of ';power" in the conventional sense once more, 
so Socrates contrasts the use of power in the hands of an unjust tyrant 
and power in the proper hands. 1 The unjust tyrant will not tolerate 
better men than himself around him and will despise inferiors; . therefore, 
he will choose his friends from persons who are willing to fawn, but who 
1. Plato, Gorg., 510b. 
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are similar to himself. 1 This is the course recommended by Gorgias, 
Polus and Callicles as the way for a man to become "great" and have 
"power," since the citizens of the Athenian democracy are also 
tyrannical. 
But if you suppose that any man will show you the 
art of becoming great in the city, and yet not con-
forming yourself to the ways of the city, whether 
for better or worse, then I can only say that you 
are mistaken. 2 
If the underling is like the tyrant, can he avoid doing injustice 
which, because it corrupts the soul, has been admitted to be the greatest 
of evils? 3 But if you do not conform, Callicles says, you endanger your 
life, whereas the study of rhetoric would save you. 4 There are many 
other arts, Socrates says, which preserve life, but they are not pre-
tentious. Swimming will save your life too, when it is necessary to know 
how to swim; your life is in the hands of the navigator on an ocean 
voyage- -why should these arts be less respected than rhetoric? 5 Not 
living but living well is the object of life. 6 Is expediency and pleasing 
people in order to gain evanescent political power worth what it costs 
the soul? Socrates does not think so, for he says: "I would not have 
us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power. ,7 
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1. Plato, Gorg. , 510b f.; cf. Lysis, 214b ff. 5. Plato, Gorg., 511c-512a. 
2. Plato, Gorg. , 513b. 6. Plato, Gorg., 512b. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 510e. 7. Plato, Gorg., 513a. 
4. Plato, Gorg. , 5llc. 
Socrates' argument sounds good to Callicles, but he is not quite 
convinced as yet. Socrates then describes power in the right hands and 
how it should be used. 
ii. Power--the ability _to do good. 
There are two processes of training all things, in-
cluding body and soul; in the one, as we said, we 
treat them with a view to pleasure and inlhe 
other with a view to the highest good .... 
Pleasure has been shown to be a false standard--the highest good re-
mains. The object of the highest good is the greatest improvement of 
the soul or the body, depending upon which is being ministered to. 
And must we not have the same end in view in the 
treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not 
try and make them as good as possible? For we 
have already discovered that there is no use in 
imparting to them any other good, unless the mind 
of those who are to have the good, whether money, 
or office, 2or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. 
The improvers of the people must have ability, training, knowledge and 
experience to be able to educate the people properly. 3 The true politician 
· should be tested as a builder might be for proficiency in his techne', his 
art, before being given power: who were his teachers? what has he ac-
complished?4 To all this Callicles agrees. Socrates then confronts this 
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man of the world who has advised him to get his head down out of the clouds, 
this successful and practical practitioner of rhetoric, with the question: 
.... 
1. Plato, Gorg., 513d, italics mine. 3. Plato, Gorg., 514a-b~ 
2. Plato, Gorg., 513e-514a. 4. Plato, Gorg., 514c f. 
who has he as a politician improved? l The point is painfully relevant; 
in spite of his vigorous prosecution of the case for rhetoric, Callicles 
is deflated with one sharp pin-prick of Socratic observation. Callicles 
cannot claim any real good to have been the result of his powers of 
persuasion, and yet it has been granted that the duty of the public man 
is the improvement of the people. 
Callicles is not alone, however; Pericles, Cimon and the other 
"great" statesmen that Callicles mentioned previously did not improve 
the citizens either. 2 Pericles was tried and convicted by the people he 
was supposed to have educated and made better; either he was guilty and 
not a true statesman because he was dishonest or, if he was innocent, he 
was not a true statesman because he neglected his job as an educator who 
should have taught the people not to be unjust. The other statesmen of 
the past suffered similar fates at the hands of the people they should have 
made good; they were not real statesmen, they were flatterers of the 
people who actually made them worse rather than better. 3 
I do think that they were certainly more serviceable 
than those who are living now, and better able to 
gratify the wishes of the State; but as to transform-
ing those desires and not allowing them to have their 
way, and using the powers which they had, whether 
of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of 
their fellow-citizens, which is the prime object of 
the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these 
respects they were a whit superior to our present 
statesmen. 4 
1. Plato, Gorg., 515b-c. 3. Plato, Gorg., 517b fL 
2. Plato, Gorg., 515c-517a. 4. Plato, Gorg., 517b. 
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Because he has the power and the opportunity to teach the people, 
no statesman can be unjustly put to death by t~e city that he ruled. 1 
The case of the statesman is much like that of the Sophists, who profess 
to be teachers of virtue and then accuse their pupils of not paying their 
fees or of wronging them in some other way. Does there "not appear to 
.... be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, 
and then blaming him for being bad?"2 The only public man who is safe 
from being treated unjustly by the city is the man who removes injustice, 
as a doctor would a tumor. When the argument has reached this con-
elusion, Socrates asks Callicles: 
Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive 
and struggle to make the Athenians as good as 
possible; or !m I to be the servant and flatterer 
of the State? 
In spite of the argument, Callicles advises the latter course, repeating 
once again his warning that if Socrates does not conform he may be 
brought to trial. In an obvious reference to the actual trial of Socrates, 
Plato has Socrates prophesy that he probably will be accused by some 
miscreant--"nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. "4 
Socrates anticipates his death because he is "the only or almost 
the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics. " 5 As 
the only politician of his time, he looks to what is best and not what is 
1. Plato, Gorg., 519c. 4. Plato, Gorg., 52ld. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 519b. 5. Plato, Gorg., 521d. 
3. Plato, Gorg., 52la. 
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most pleasant, so that if he were brought to trial he would be tried 
"as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment 
of the cook. " 1 The cook could show all the pleasant and tasty things 
that he had given thein in contrast to the bitter potions, medicines, diets, 
etc. , of the doctor. The doctor's only defense is the truth, but his claim 
that he did all these unpleasant things for their own good would hardly 
be convincing to little boys. 2 Socrates' own fate would be much the 
same; his only defense would be the truth, which would not sound very 
convincing to people who were accustomed to being pleased and flattered, 
especially since his truth is an indictment of their moral frailty. 
And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and 
perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, 
and use bitter words towards them, whether in 
private or public, it is useless for me to reply, 
as I truly might:--' All this I do for the sake of 
justice, and with a view to ycaur interest, my 
judges, and to nothing else.' 
Even though it may mean his death, this is the only defense that Socrates 
wants, for no real harm can come to the just man. 
5. Reward and punishment of the soul. 
Socrates tells a myth to show graphically what he means by say-
ing that the good man can suffer no real harm and that injustice is the 
greatest of evils. The myth in the Gorgias is very similar to the 
1. Plato, Gorg., 521e. 3. Plato, Gorg., 522c. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 522a. 
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eschatological myths that conclude the Phaedo and the Republic. 1 In 
the Phaedo, when Socrates says that "the soul when on her progress to 
the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education, " 2 he 
expresses very well the essence of the myth in the Gorgias. It must be 
remembered that paideia has a wider connotation than is usually associ-
ated with education; real education is defined in terms of the soul by 
Plato--that which affects the soul, any conviction, action or choice that 
changes, adds to or destroys a part of the total personality is a form of 
nurture or education. In the myth this is pictured by a soul that bears 
visible scars of indiscretions or injustices committed in life. 3 The 
condition of the soul determines whether it travels to Tartarus for 
punishment or to the Isle of the Blessed and eternal happiness. Edu-
cation, which has so much to do with the condition of the soul is therefore 
very important to our eternal well-being. 
Of those sent to Tartarus, the ones who suffer most are the kings 
and tyrants who were unjust. For them there is no hope of being re-
leased from punishment, so they serve as examples for the souls that 
are being corrected by punishment. They are forever damned, "for they 
are the authors of the greatest and most impious crimes, because they 
have the power. "4 
1. Plato, Phaedo, 107c-114c; Rep. 614b-52lb. 
2. Plato, Phaedo, 107d. -
3. Plato, Gorg. , 524d f. 
4. Plato, Gorg., 525d. 
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And yet in that very class E>f ruler~ there may 
arise good men, and worthy of all admiration 
they are, for where there is great power to do 
wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing, 
and greatly to be praised, and few there are who 
attain to this. 1 
Plato's avowed purpose of utilizing power for public and individual good 
can be seen once more in the above passage, which foreshadows the 
coming of the Pliilosopher-King in the Republic. 
An interesting sidelight of the myth is furnished by the board of 
judges which passes on the condition of the souls: Minos and Rhadaman-
thus are Asiatic and Aeacus is a European. 2 In confutation of theories 
like those of Popper and Kallen, who would make of him a totalitarian 
"racist," Plato allows souls from all over the then known world into 
his heaven, and even allots for them judges who will not be prejudiced. 
There is no pressing reason why Plato, if he were a racist, should 
introduce this description of the judges at all; but if he held, as the use 
of the Slave in the Meno might indicate, that the highest values in life 
are possible to any soul, depending on its eros and education, then the 
different judges make sense as an indication of that feeling. 
Socrates concludes the myth by affirming his belief in its es-
sential truths and by stating his purpose in life: "I desire only to know 
the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well 
1. Plato, Gorg., 525d. 
2. Plato, Gorg., 524a. 
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as I can. " 1 The order of procedure proclaimed by Socrates in the 
Apology is confirmed2--before a man can participate in politics to his 
benefit and that of the people he must be virtuous. 
When we have practised virtue together, we will 
apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, 
or we will advise about whatever else may seem 
good to us, for we shall be better able to judge 
then .... Let us, then, take the argument as our 
guide, which has revealed to us that the best way 
of life is to practise justice and every virtue in 
life and death. 3 
6. The Gorgias and the nature of man. 
Plato chose to criticize rhetoric because of the influence of 
orators in the Athenian politics of his day, and also because there were 
teachers who professed that training in rhetoric was the correct edu-
cation for guiding the policies of the state. 4 The connection between 
education and the state in the Gorgias is shown by Plato's shift from 
the use of "virtue" to that of "justice." In the Protagoras, the political 
implications of education emerge from a discussion of whether virtue 
can be taught; it is assumed that man is a social animal and that a truly 
virtuous man is a citizen, a political animal. The relation of the citizen 
to the state is not developed in the Protagoras, however; the Gorgias is 
the first dialogue really to explore this relationship. Whereas ''virtue" 
has the quality of pertaining particularly to the individual, "justice" 
1. Plato, Gorg. , 526d. 3. Plato, Gorg., 527d-e. 
2. Plato, Apol., 36c; see p. 116. 4. Jaeger, PAl, II, 153. 
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has the broader connotation of involving the moral association of citi-
zens, and Plato's use of "justice" in the Gorgias may be thought of as 
indicating the evolution of his thought from the individual to the citi-
zen to the statesman and finally to the Philosopher-King. 
Why is it that Plato's criticism of rhetoric in the Gorgias is much 
more vehement than was his criticism of sophistry in the Protagoras?--
both claimed to teach the art of politics. 1 Plato's argument with 
Protagoras was not with his alleged purpose or with his sociological 
rationale for education, but with his assertion that his rationale justified 
his purpose; Plato questions Protagoras' grounds for claiming to be 
able to teach virtue and his definition of virtue. When Socrates and 
Protagoras change places, we understand that it is not the practice of 
sophistry that Plato objects to, but the fact that the Sophists can give no 
valid justification for being able to teach that which is good for their 
students if their relativistic philosophy is also asserted. 
Plato's antagonism is much more pervasive with rhetoric than 
with sophistry; it is a criticism both of the practice and ends (or lack of 
ends} of rhetoric. Rhetoric is proclaimed as a techne: . an art of politics, 
concerned with the greatest and best of human things; this is also Plato's 
"' aim and, since his definition of "techne" and its purpose is very differ-
ent on almost all counts from the propositions upon which rhetoric is 
1. See Jaeger, PAl, IT, 142-143, for the differences and similarities 
between the Protagoras and Gorgias. 
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based, he must meet and defeat them before stating his own. Rhetoric 
is a particularly important educational opponent because, as Callicles 
presents the argument for its use, it represents implicit presuppositions 
on the nature of man which are diametrically opposed to Plato's much 
more so than do Protagoras' teachings. 
Rhetoric presents the platform: that the end of politics is power; 
..that man is basically selfish and must jealously protect his interests at 
all times--it is better to do injustice than to suffer injustice; that man 
is a pleasure-seeker only; that law is conventional and does not apply to 
the superior me.n who can make their own law; that ethics has nothing 
whatsoever to do with politics. In opposition to this, Plato proposes: 
that the end of politics is human happiness; that man loves himself and 
therefore will not willingly do injustice, which is the greatest evil to his 
soul; that man · s·eeks the highest good and not pleasure alone; that the 
superior individual is subject to law to an even greater degree than the 
ordinary man because he knaws what law is and will not knowingly choose 
other than the good which it represents; that the highest expression of 
morality is political--eros is fully developed in the statesman. These 
differences are more sharply defined in each of the three stages of the 
argument in which rhetoric is represented successively by Gorgias, the 
rather s1aid but not unreasonable teacher; Polus, the pretentious but naive 
student; and Callicles, the experienced and forceful politician. 
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The true nature of the rhetorician is shown by Plato in the Gorgias 
through the three defenders better than it is in any argument in the work. 
They characterize the various weaknesses of rhetoric and the "power 
motif" that underlies the wish to "persuade" people at will; for all of 
Callicles' vigorous arguments in the cause of the natural right of the 
superior-to rule, his ideas reveal a basic insecurity--he wants power in 
order "to have more" than his natural inferiors and to be able to protect 
those advantages. Callicles, of course, is speaking of material pos-
sessions--Socrates' rebuttal is that the really superior man has more 
than his inferior to begin with and does not need power to get more; but 
he is thinking of the character and virtues of the individual. The really 
superior man is in a position to give, but what he has can not be taken 
' --
away from him except through his own injustice. The just person, if 
he is not in a position of authority, however, is in a precarious situation 
as far as having injustice done to him; he has only the truth to defend him-
self with and nothing seems more defenseless than the lone truth that 
appears naked and modest among a mass of lecherous half-truths. 
Socrates says we must learn to protect ourselves 
against the danger of doing wrong. That protection 
can be given only by knowledge and the understand-
ing of the good, 'the political techne': for since no 
one does wrong willingly, everything depends upon 
that techne. 1 
The political techne' is one that the ruler must have, and the chief duty 
imposed by that techne' is the education of the peop1e. 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 147. 
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i. Gorgias' inconsistency. 
The first stage of the argument is far from a refutation of rhetoric; 
Socrates is guilty of considerable sophistry as he forces Gorgias into a 
contradiction by showing that the means and the ends of rhetoric are 
opposed if rhetoric is held to be "good." Gorgias claimed that the ends 
of rhetoric are the "greatest and best of human things" and that rhetoric 
is concerned with the just and the unjust; but the means--persuasion 
without the slightest regard for its being based on knowledge or. concerned 
with truth--is entirely inconsistent with those ends. It is also evident 
from the discourse that rhetoric cannot be defined in terms of its subject 
matter or its purpose; the purpose to which the power of persuasion will 
be put depends on the individual with the rhetorical ability. 
Rhetoric's greatest defect is that there is no ob-
jective knowledge, no firm philosophy and view of 
life behind its words--it is inspired not by an 
ethical code but simply by ambi.pon, unscrupulous-
ness, and the lust for success. 
This self-aggrandizement is summed up as Natural Law, which makes 
certain assumptions as to the nature of man but which is not a "view of 
life" since the relativism implicit in this position must allow every 
"superior" man to define his own pleasures and ends . 
. -Polus tries to avoid the contradiction that Gorgias fell prey to 
by denying that the ends of rhetoric are concerned with ethics at all but 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 135. 
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he maintains that rhetoric is an art and that the end of rhetoric, power, 
is good. Socrates first explains why he does not recognize rhetoric as 
an art; it is not an art because it has no rationally defined subject; it is 
only a manner of speaking without any rational purpose; its only purpose 
is to flatter the listener so that the speaker may get what he wants whether 
what he wants is good or not. Socrates must demonstrate that power is not 
an end in itself in order to complete his case and he does this by showing 
that the rhetorician must continually keep the pleasure of the mob in 
mind; therefore, none of his decisions are entirely his own. Polus' de-
feat comes, as Callicles points out, in a manner similar to Gorgias', and 
again the sophistry involved negates the complete refutation of rhetoric; 
but the issues are now clearly defined. As Socrates says, the result of 
the argument with Callicles, the third contestant, should represent the 
truth. 1 
ii. Callicles and Natural Law. 
The argument with Callicles is serious throughout and the dialectic 
is tortuously complex. Callicles presents an unvarnished, nonmoral 
I 
extreme of Gorgias' position, and he maintains a much more consistent 
argument than either of his predecessors, so that Socrates is forced to 
take up one at a time the various links in his chain of reasoning. Callicles 
justifies the use of rhetoric on the ground that some men are by nature 
superior and that it is only just that they should rule and have more 
1. Plato, Gorg., 486d f. 
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material possessions that their less gifted fellow-citizens. Callicles, 
in effect, is trying to meet Socrates' moral arguments before they arise 
by asserting that rhetoric need not be defined objectively; it is not con-
cerned with morality or ethics; it needs no rationale or justification--
the superior man is its rationale and its purpose. Rhetoric represents 
power over other men, and the end of power is the satisfaction of the 
desires of the individual--no other purpose is necessary. 
The urge to obtain power is an impulse rooted too 
deeply in human nature to be disregarded. . . . It 
compels us to take up a definite attitude o~ the 
question of the nature and value of power. 
Power, as we have seen in the Symposium, is closely related to 
eros, the will to self-realization; whether the urge to power remains as 
Callicles defines it or is sublimated to meet Socrates' definition of self-
realization as arete/ or justice depends on whether the will to power is 
governed by a techne~ whether eros is educated scientifically to the high-
est good. The education of eros to the highest good depends on active 
self-love, which implies for Plato not only moral interest in one's self 
but also a political interest in the citizens of the state. A whole ethics 
depends on the use that is made of "power. " 
Socrates attacks Callicles' posit~on by showing that the "superior" 
man's "power" must lie in something other than physical strength--the 
superior man must be wise and courageous. Callicles accepts these 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 132-133. 
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added qualities readily, for he cannot suspect that wisdom and courage, 
as Socrates defines them, are moral terms; but he balks at including 
temperance among the characteristics of the natural ruler--the superior 
man should not be under compulsion from any source, even his own will. 
He should be free to indulge his fancies and appetites whenever and how-
ever he desires; what good are freedom and power if a man cannot do as 
he pleases? 
The assertion that pleasure is the good and that it is subject to 
no standard other than the satisfaction of desires forces Socrates to in-
vestigate pleasure and pain. Good and evil are mutually exclusive but 
pleasure and pain occur at the same time whenever a desire (pain) is 
being satisfied (pleasure). All men experience pleasure and pain but 
not all men are good; therefore, the distinction must rest upon some 
other basis. We cannot judge another person as good or bad on the 
basis of his pleasure, which is completely subjective; if we can say that 
a man is good there must be some objectivity to that value judgment, 
which would also be moral. 
If Callicles continues to maintain that pleasure is the good he has 
no grounds for asserting that any man is superior to any other and no 
cause for rejecting conventional law as un-Natural. As soon as he admits 
that there are good and bad pleasures, however, his case against phi-
losophy collapses--Socrates immediately wants to know how a man, 
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superior or otherwise, is to decide between good and bad pleasures if 
not by "an art of measure." And it is this "art of measure" with which 
philosophy is concerned; an art which discloses a way of life directed 
towards the good rather than pleasure alone. 
Plato distinguishes true will from arbitrary de-
sire. The man who does what he wants is running 
after a sham good which he desires. But the only 
thing he can will is a true good. For in desire he 
can always be deceived about the value of the thing 
desired; but no one can knowingly will what is bad 
and injurious. 1 
Power, correctly conceived, is the control of your own will in 
seeking the good; that is, in being just to yourself and others. But is 
it enough that the just man or the virtuous man b~ able to control himself 
and direct his irrational energies towards the highest good? --the truly 
good man in a corrupt society cannot protect himself from having in-
justice done to him (as happened to the actual Socrates). The truly just 
man can be guaranteed the advantages of moral goodness and physical 
security only if he has the power to govern himself and the state. If he 
had political power he would still will the greatest good for himself and 
the people, to make them better so that they would not treat him unjustly 
and would realize the highest values possible. 
When Socrates compared the flattering arts with the true arts he 
said that justice and legislation were the legitimate arts that tEnd the 
1. Jaeger, PAl, II, 134. 
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soul--a rather strange statement until we think of it in connection with 
the development, which showed that real political power is possible only 
to the just person, and the just person must have an ordered soul, a 
"lawful" soul. That power, justice and education--that is, politics--
are definitely related to the soul and its welfare is shown in the 
concluding myth. 
Once Plato indicates that politics is a matter of the soul, it 
follows that education for citizenship or for statesmanship would be . 
primarily education of the soul, and since it is to everyone's advantage 
that the citizens be good, the chief function of the state or the statesman 
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is to educate the people to be better. Socrates ends the dialogue by indi-
cating that the investigation is not over--before we apply ourselves to 
politics we must be virtuous--and we suddenly realize that "virtue," 
"justice," "soul" and "good" have not been defined in the Gorgias. The air 
has been cleared, however, and all the fundamental problems have been 
raised--it remains for the Republic to assemble them in a positive 
exposition. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
1. The problem so far. 
The early dialogues are, in a sense, an attempt to define the 
personality and character of Socrates. We never lose the individual's 
perspective of values as they pertain to him personally, but the problem 
does expand from the very egocentric conversational dialogues to a con-
sideration of the individual in society and finally to the individual's re-
lation to social problems. The Symposium, Meno and Gorgias are more 
positive statements on the fundamental issues raised in the conversational 
dialogues, the Socratic dialogues and the Protagoras, but Plato's dialectic 
moves on and they in turn present prob~ems that are not resolved until 
assembled in the magnificently simple structural development of the 
Republic. In each of these works, _ and in the other early dialogues, too, 
the movement of the dialectic shows that the highest values for the indi-
vidual, as an individual, are realized in concert with the society of which 
he is a part; · that is, the most complete individual is the person who sees 
that his own advantage is inexorably linked with the good of his fellow 
citizens. 
With the conclusion of the Gorgias we complete the negative in-
vestigation of arete--Plato has raised all of the basic issues and has 
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shown the values and ends for which Socrates or the Philosopher-King 
will not strive; in so doing he gives us, to a certain extent, a positive 
definition of value and virtue. There is no real answer to the "edu-
cational problem" of whether virtue can be taught, in these dialogues, 
since we finally arrive at the conclusion that virtue cannot be defined! 
That is, virtue can only be defined as Plato has done in these dialogues 
taken as a whole--arete' can only be defined by the actual existence of the 
virtuous man,and since we the readers and Plato know that such a man 
did exist, we know that virtue can be defined and taught--the definition 
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is the Socrates of the early dialogues, the actual full-bodied Socrates in 
all of his complex amalgamation. Virtue cannot be separated from the 
choices, decisions and actions of the just man--the potential Philosopher-
King! 
If virtue is to be taught, however, we must redefine what we mean 
by teaching; but before Plato can justify a new meaning for education he 
must establish the need for a new definition. The early dialogues do just 
that--by subjecting the prevailing attitudes, theories and the various types 
of education of his own day to a searching analysis, Plato sets the stage 
for the positive development of his thought in the Republic. 
The works that precede the Symposium, Meno and Gorgias state 
the problem of individual ethics: What is virtue and why should I want to 
be virtuous? The Socratic dialogues widen the scope of ethics by showing 
that the man of character is intrinsically connected with society. The 
conflicting opinions, the confused definitions and the complex issues of 
the early dialogues show adequately the importance of clear, critical 
thinking on the fundamental problems .of experience--the need for 
conscientious and consistent consideration of the educa~ional problem. 
The most important questions of the previous writings are organized and 
worked up organically in the Protagoras--systematic analysis begins 
with an investigation of the nature of virtue which reveals even more 
fully, because the development is more systematic, the need for a better 
understanding of terms such as good, knowledge, happiness, and virtue 
itself. 
i. Later developments in the educational argument. 
The Symposium returns to the inquiry into the happiness of the 
individual--not happiness as related to "virtues" or material goods--
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but in connection with a profound study of "life-force" and self-realization. 
Happiness is shown to depend on the conscious development of man's 
natural potential, his eros. Socrates' generalized definition of love de-
picts man's irrational energy, his longing for self-perfection, as the 
"power" which inspires a man to struggle for knowledge of everlasting 
values, to express himself through the highest values to which his personal 
eros can aspire. Happiness, then, depends on the fulfillment of individual 
potentialities. The desire to express ourselves is natural, since all men 
seek eternal happiness and immortality; but unless eros is controlled and 
educated towards. true Beauty and true Goodness, our natural abilities 
may be expressed in unnatural ways that dissipate our energy. 1 True 
happiness depends on converting the irrational force of eros into the 
rationally directed realization of "the good life," the life harmonious 
with natural and immutable values. The statesman, Socrates says, is 
the person who is capable of realizing to the fullest the potential values 
of this life; the man with the potentialities of the true statesman is in a 
position to realize Eros most completely, provided that he does become 
2 
the true statesman. 
The Meno might seem at first to be a restatement of the central 
question of the Protagoras, since it begins by asking once again if virtue 
can be taught; the analysis that follows is more concerned with the logic 
of the unity of virtue than the Protagoras was, but nothing essentially 
new is added to the argument. The theory of reminiscence, however, is 
251 
a new and important thought; it suggests that the immortal soul can, under 
the proper conditions and with the proper education, recall the imperish-
able truths that it has always known. The theory of recollection does 
not become really important until the conversation shows that there are 
no teachers of virtue because virtuous men or statesmen of the past have 
not lmown "the tie of cause"; their opinions and decisions were directed 
1. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 23 f. Nettleship's analysis of "the love of 
wisdom" as a component of the "philosophic spirit'' in the Republic 
shows a marked similarity to "eros" of the Symposium. 
2. Nettleship, EPR, 22. "Lovers of learning or wisdom ... are said 
to enjoy the fullest experience and to live. the highest life." 
by divine inspiration or "true opinion," but since they did not know the 
ground for those opinions they could not teach others to be virtuous--
their eros was not secured by true knowledge. The Meno is the first dia-
logue to discuss virtue in connection with the epistemological problem of 
whether anything can be known at all. The theory of reminiscence is 
intrinsically conjoined with the immortality of the soul and transcendental 
norms--in this brief section Plato's epistemology. and metaphysics are 
sketched positively for the first time in relation to the soul. The occasion 
for this disclosure is the educational problem. Plato offers the theory 
of reminiscence in the Meno as a rebuttal to Meno' s ulogical" argument 
that nothing can really be known; an argument which, if valid, would 
destroy the meaning of education. 
The Gorgias is a criticism of rhetoric and, since rhetoric had so 
large an influence on the politics and law of Plato's day, the dialogue is 
also a criticism of Athenian values. 1 The argument takes place in three 
stages; the discussion with Gorgias shows thatan unanalyzed conflict 
exists between ends and means in the "art" of rhetoric. Gorgias contends 
that rhetorical persuasion is not concerned with truth or knowledge but 
should, nevertheless, be used justly; he has claimed that the power to. 
persuade others is the greatest of human goods, whether you know what 
you are talking about or not; but he also maintains a conventional view 
1. Cf. Gomperz, HAP, IT, 331. 
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towards morality by asserting that because you have the power does not 
mean that you should be unjust. Gorgias does not see that there is any 
conflict in maintaining both positions, but how would a rhetorician who 
did not really know what he was talking about know if he were being just 
or unjust? This criticism runs through all the discussions and it is for 
this reason that Socrates is concerned with showing that to do injustice 
is a greater evil than to be the victim of it, for if you perpetrate evil 
when you have the power to do good, your own soul suffers. 1 In terms 
of eros, you have not realized your potential, and in terms of the theory 
of reminiscence, you have not secured your opinions with the knowledge 
of unchanging principles. 
Polus is more consistent than Gorgias, but he too wishes to assert 
the advantage of nonmoral rhetoric while maintaining conventional moral 
253 
opinions. Callicles, who sees clearly the inconsistency of his predecessors, 
flatly rejects all moral considerations in connection with the use of rhetoric. 
The superior man, he says, has a natural right to power; it is only just 
that the superior should rule. His argument is logically tighter than Polus' 
or Gorgias' and Socrates' elenchus is consequently much more complex 
and much more thorough than in the earlier part of the dialogue. In the 
end the discussion shows that the indiscriminate use of power has no 
1. Cf. Gomperz, HAP, IT, 332. Gomperz refers to the conflict in-
herent in rhetoric as "that disposition to set happiness here and 
virtue there," but this gives the rhetoricians, as depicted by Plato, 
too much credit--they are not (cf. Meno, 95c) concerned with virtue 
at all but do give lip service to conventional moral opinions. 
standard, no purpose or justification, other than the satisfaction of the 
desires of the person with the power; but pleasure, the only reason 
Callicles can give for wanting power, is no criterion for asserting the 
superiority of any man over any other, and Callicles has no grounds for 
his contention that according to Natural Law the "superior" should rule. 
The Gorgias demonstrates that power and the ability to persuade 
others are only means .and not ends in themselves and, since the just man 
wills ends and not means, power and rhetorical ability can be judged as 
good or bad only in the light of the ends for which they are used. The 
just man wills only ends that are good. Because he has his own best 
interests at heart and because his own best interests include the im-
provement of his fellow citizens, the just man's power is primarily 
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power over himself, and his rhetorical ability should be based on knowledge 
of the good and should be used to educate the citizens~ The man of in-
tegrity can be secure only in the best possible community, where his 
character and standards will not be subjected to unjust criticism--the 
truly just man, then, will be a statesman and an educator. 
ii. Plato's criticism of Athenian education. 
Plato's early dialogues continually criticize the various kinds of 
education available in Athens as being inadequate when contrasted to 
Socrates' paideia. Socrates' character and his mission as a teacher are 
essentially one, and the analysis of his character, in these dialogues, is 
effected through an analysis of his education, the theor.y of which Plato 
unfolds negatively through a critical evaluation of his rivals. The Meno, 
as its argument evolves, shows that the four types of education current 
in Plato's day had failed to make men virtuous. 
Meno, who has studied with Gorgias the rhetorician, cannot · tell 
Socrates what virtue is and Anytus, who represents the conventional edu-
cation of Athenian "gentlemen" is in no better a position with his prosaic 
opinions--Socrates cites . the famous Athenians who were supposed to have 
been men of character but who could not teach their own sons virtue. 
When Men:o re-enters the conversation he agrees that the gentlemen in 
his country are not in concordance as to what virtue is or how it should 
be taught; the Sophists were not in agreement either and Gorgias, who 
does not profess to teach virtue, does not think that it can be taught. 
The poets, the fourth class of educators, are so contradictory with them-
selves and other poets that they cannot be considered the guides to true 
paideia. These are the four types of education that are, in part at least, 
opposed to Plato's education--education which he indicates in the Meno 
is based on the soul's recall of eternal principles. 
The conversational dialogues, concerned :as they are with preva-
lent opinions of the time, show that traditional education had not prepared 
the citizens of Athens for inquiries such as those pursued by Socrates, 
and by showing these confused and conflicting thoughts, Plato exposes 
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the lack of a consistent attitude towards the fundamental moral problems 
·of the individual--a failing due to faulty education. Time ·and again, 
Plato cites the virtuous men whose sons were given the best available 
traditional education, but who nevertheless turned out badly, in order to 
show that this e~ucation was not adequate. 
The Sophists are criticized, in general, because their relativistic 
philosophy would seem to deny that there could be any ultimate purpose 
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in education; their theory was not consistent with their practice, for the 
individual Sophists {Protagoras, for instance) did claim that their teaching 
had a purpose and that it was valuable to the students. Not all sophists 
taught subjects that were directly related to virtue--Plato is primarily 
concerned with those Sophists who claimed that they could teach virtue. 
The "virtue" that they considered to be the purpose of their teaching, 
however, was little better than the conventional mores of the traditional 
education--they prepared their students to be successful, but were not 
vitally interested in giving them any basis for choosing the best possible 
life, for making valid value judgments, or for s.rei~g life as a unified 
whole. Factual information, Plato points out by his criticism of the 
Sophists, does not equal virtue, and success and material possessions 
do not make a man happy if he does not know how to use them wisely. 
Plato is more critical of rhetoric than any other form of education, 
in his early works; he rejects the validity of Natural Law when it implies 
license for those who think they are. superior men; he also denies that 
pleasure is the criterion of the good and that man can be a nonmoral 
individualist; the basis of any society is eros, and the basis of a good 
society is justice. No man can do himself or society any good if he is 
content to persuade people to his views without any real knowledge of 
what he is talking about or any concern for the ultimate worth of his 
opinions, merely to gain political power. Since man wills ends and not 
means, the rhetorician should be concerned with the intrinsic value of 
the ends for which he speaks because (they affect his well-being in the 
long run. Power and persuasion are only means; rhetoric cannot prepare 
a man to choose ends that are good; therefore rhetoric is not real edu-
cation and the power it affords is not real power, since it depends on the 
people, who must be continually flattered if it is to be maintained. 
The poets are rejected as educators because they contradict each 
other.and themselves, and because they cannot give any rational expla-
nation of what their poetry means. Agathon, in the Symposium, gives a 
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beautiful speech in praise of Love, but compared to the other speakers his 
inspired contribution adds nothing of intellectual value to the discussion. 
\ 
The poets, Plato· shows in the Protagoras, can be interpreted to fit the 
case, and in the Gorgias he lists poetryamong the flattering arts, with 
little purpose other than the pleasure it affords. The poets, then, are 
not the true educators, either. Pl3:to' s criticism of the poets in the early 
dialogues is limited, but in the Republic they and artists generally are 
1 
criticized extensively. 
iii. Positive aspects of Plato's criticism of education. 
The criticisms that are applicable to all these methods of teaching 
form the basis of Plato's own education. None of these types of learning 
mold the total personality with rationally defined purposes in mind or 
furnish the-student with a consistent set of values; none of them install 
a self-critical attitude or the motivation for seeking the highest values 
in a life conceived as a unit; none of them furnish the ground for be-
havior consistent with belief, and all leave the fundamental problems of 
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ethical living undefined or at best defined according to conventional values. 
Because the moral individual is not critically analyzed, these 
forms of education speak of courage, temperance, justice, etc., as 
separate virtues, and because the moral individual is not taken as the 
focal point of society, the relation of the citizen to the state is not ex-
plained in terms of purpose; that is, the purpose of the state is not 
defined with regard to the purpose of the individual. If the purpose of 
the individual in society is success, or pleasure, or power, the charac-
ter of the state will be analogoui ; that is, the structure of the state 
meets the requirements of the ideals of the individuals in the state. 2 If 
1. See Nettleship, EPR, 50-86 for a very fine analysis of the places 
in the Republic of "art," "mus+c'' and the criticism of the poets. 
2. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 47-49. i'The character of a people is re-
sponsible for its social and po~iticallife, and ... education is mainly 
important because it produces 
1
or modifies that character and thus 
affects the public interests." (48) 
I 
I 
the best state possible is the aim, then the individuals in the state must 
constantly appeal to the highest valubs in life; values which Plato felt 
I . 
were primarily moral. On t}1e othet hand, if the best possible iife is 
the desire of the individual, he mus seek to actualize the best possible 
1 
state. 
In seeking to define the best J ife possible, Plato attempts to 
utilize the positive aspects of all thi forms of education that he criticizes. 
i 
One of Plato's unique contributions Ito philosophy is the use that he makes 
of the irrational motivations of men by showing that these "natural" drives 
I 
can be organized into a meaningful ~hole ~ he proposes that powerful 
emotive forces should be governed ~y and directed toward a purpose so 
rationally appealing that the comp+ ents of personality will be constantly 
directed by knowledge to the greatest good of the individual as a whole. 2 
Plato does not condemn plel sure as pleasure but criticizes its 
use as the standard of life; he does not deny that love or eros is a value--
I 
on the contrary, when sublimated J can be the source of the highest 
values. The will to power, as sta /ed by Callicles, is also transmuted 
into a pusitive value; when seen in j'relation to the best interests of the 
" soul, " the whole man, power comes to mean the power to will the good, 
the power to be just at all times; il other words, the power to control 
1. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 98 f. 
1 
2. Field, POP, 97. "Complete virtue consists in the proper ordering 
and control of the various emotional tendencies by knowledge." 
Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 6, 10-11' 92-93. 
I 
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one's self. The social instinct for ~ ~e approbation of our fellow men is 
one of the hardest to overcome for ~he sake of the highest values; for this 
! 
nonrational instinct is an insidious ~orce that is allied with conventional-
ism, . with the uncritical acceptance! of the existing social pattern. 1 Plato 
I 
proposes that this drive and other jonlogical emotive forces shonld 
be used to advantage in education; out an ideal strong enough to unify them 
I 
m:eaningfuij.y must first be shown t1 be possible--the Good in the Republic 
is that ideal. -
By trying to integrate all the potentialities of man, all the various 
aspects of personality that are "na,lral," Piato demonstrates that no 
~ personality potential or desire [should be appealed to exclusively as 
the guide of "the good life." A pre~isposition to any one of life's many 
possibilities results in an "inversion" of values that is unnatural; the 
principle that should govern is the intrinsic goodness--the good--of any 
value seen in relation to all the values, purposes, and ends · of life con-
ceived as an organic whole. 2 
Intellectualism to the exclusion of action and pleasure makes a 
man effeminate and vitiates his will. Pleasure or power pursued without 
discretion makes of a man a "leaky vessel"; one that is insecure and 
insatiable. Love that does not aspire to the highest values makes man no 
1. Nettle ship, . EPR, 6-7. "The real educator and real sophist is public 
opinion itself. " 
2. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 23 ff. 
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better than a lustful animal. The educational program which would direct 
the "soul" to the insight necessary for "seeing" life as the harmonious 
resolution of natural potentialities is described in the Republic, but the 
Symposium, Meno, and the Gorgias indicate the basis for that program 
as it evolves from an investigation of the nonlogical drives of man. 
The "educational argument" takes on a new meaning in the light 
of the Symposium, Meno, and Gorgias. The Symposium presents the 
thought that man's happiness depends on the fullest realization of his 
natural potential and that the motivating force behind self-realization is 
love, the desire for self-expression rooted in the longing for immortal 
perfection and happiness. The highest expression of this desire is the 
quest for wisdom, a desire which can be guided or educated to the 
point of fulfillment, but which cannot be satisfied by the transfer of 
factual knowledge from teacher to student. 
Both the Meno and the. Symposium state that the awareness of 
ignorance, the insight into the unrealized potentialities of man, is the be-
ginning of real wisdom. 1 The person who is stimulated by this awareness 
may struggle on to real knowledge--the knowledge of unalterable norms 
known to the immortal soul. Such a man would be truly virtuous, truly 
just, and since the just man wills ends that are good and since the highest 
function of the just man is that of the statesman, he will accept the 
1. Plato, Meno, 84a.-d; Sym. , 204a-b. See pp. 187, · 160. 
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responsibility and teach the people to be better. The truly powerful 
man is a just man, and he can protect himself and the principles for 
which he stands only if he is a statesman-educator who will rule on the 
basis of eternal values and not by "true opinion." Because he "possesses" 
true knowledge he wills ends that are truly good for himself and because 
he is an intrinsic part of society these ends will be good for the state. 1 
The best life possible and the good state are necessarily associated, 
and their materialization depends on the soul's recall of supernal essences. 
The possibility of the soul's recalling these eternal truths depends on the 
profound awareness of ignorance (Socrates the gadfly) and proper 
guidance (Socrates the midwife); thus it is that we come to realize the 
full importance of the need for Socrates' new paideia which will be prima-
rily education for the "soul," the total personality, including its irrational 
elements. 
2. The problems that foreshadow the Republic. 
With the development in the Symposium, Meno and Gorgias in 
mind, let us return to the problems that were raised by the conversational 
dialogues and the Socratic dialogues for a brief rEtsume/ of how the "edu-
cational argument" stands as we approach the Republic. 2 
1. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 99-101. "The true interests of society coin-
cide with those of its highest natures.... The knowledge of the 
principles which should guide human conduct ... will make a man a 
true statesman." (100) 
2. See pp. 90; 150 ff. 
i. Is it possible to know? The description of the ~ssent to and 
apprehension of absolute beauty and goodness in the myth of Diotima 
and Socrates' theory of reminiscence in the Meno answer this question 
affirmatively by proposing that true knowledge can be known by an 
"awakened" soul. 
ii. What kind of knowledge is virtue? Virtue is the knowledge of 
unchanging principles known to the soul and recalled when properly 
educated. 
111. How can virtue be taught? Virtue cannot be taught in the 
ordinary sense of the word, since virtue is not a subject or a "thing" but 
an actual person such as Socrates. The teacher can only elicit the 
cooperation of the student, who must search and strive for himself to 
reach true insights, by showing hirri his ignorance of true knowledge. 
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iv. What is the relation of the virtues to Virtue itself? Although 
the Meno reasserted that virtue is one, we still do not have any real answer 
to this question. The Meno showed that virtue depended on the soul's 
recollection of eternal values; therefore if virtue is knowledge, and 
knowledge depends on the condition of the immortal soul, we can 
hypothesize that virtue depends on the condition of the soul and look for 
this conclusion in the Republic, since the problem of defining justice in 
the Republic is the same as that of virtue in these earlier works. 
v. What are the ends of education? The ends of education are 
the enlightenment of the individual through tre properly educated soul to 
reveal the well ordered state; the life which realizes to the fullest the 
potentialities of the individual because it and the state in which it exists 
both aim at the "good." 
vi. Does happiness depend on virtue? Only the truly good life 
is happy and the truly good life results from knowledge of ends which are 
good; a man who has this knowledge will not will ends that are not really 
good for himself, and the man who always wills the good is virtuous; 
therefore, happiness depends on virtue. 
vii. Are the philosopher-teacher and the statesman the same? 
The Symposium, Meno, and Gorgias leave no doubt that the Socrates of 
the Apology and the statesman are one and the same. 
viii. Law vs. j'ustice: The Gorgias contrasts law and justice by 
opposing rhetoric and philosophy. Callicles represents nonmoral law 
and Socrates represents justice. When Socrates declares that the just 
man must have "power" in the state to protect himself and to educate 
the people, Plato's. answer to the conflict between law and justice is 
shown to be an educational revolution in which the virtuous man is to 
become the law. All doubts as to the nature of the statesman disappear 
when Socrates states that he is the only statesman of his time. 
ix. Individual differences: H individuals differ in their natural 
abilities, their eros, how are we to determine who has the true eros?--
who is the "statesman?" This question, implicit in the Protagoras and 
the Symposium, is not answered in the early dialogues, which consider 
the virtuous man and the statesman as individuals--in connection with 
society it is true but nevertheless from the perspective of the reader who 
may be a potentially virtuous man--whereas the Republic describes the 
educational selection of the statesman objectively. 
x. What is the criterion of the good life? In the Protagoras 
Plato raised the question of the standard, the "art of measure" by which 
choices are governed. Pleasure is the standard of "most people" but 
pleasure is rejected in the Gorgias as the standard; Socrates states 
that pleasures exist for the good and not the good for the pleasures; 
also the virtuous man always wills ends that are good. But what is the 
good? The theory of reminiscence proposes that the good for man is 
governed by knowledge of timeless values and the myth at the end of the 
Gorgias shows that the soul' .s condition is determined by the goodness of 
the ends willed; so we can hypothesize that the good affects the soul and 
depends on objective norms. Again it is left for the Republic to answer 
this question. 
There are many other questions that are left unanswered by the 
Meno, Symposium, and the Gorgias; some of the most important ones 
in connection with education are: What is the relation of the individual 
to the State? How are we to think of the soul? How is the relationship 
between the soul and politics, indicated in these dialogues, to be thought 
of? What kind of education moulds the soul? What does Plato mean 
when he suggests that the just man should have the power in the state? 
What is the status of the good? How can it be known? How is the best 
possible life to be known? How is the best possible state to be known? 
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These questions push on beyond the educational problems of the 
early dialogues and cannot be given due consideration here; but they 
might be kept in mind during the very brief summary of the Republic 
that follows. 
3. The Republic. 
i. The relation of the Republic to the earlier dialogues. 
Plato relates most of his ideas in the beautifully simple con-
struction of the Republic, where he gives each conception its proper 
place in a complete social structure; in many cases, the real im-
portance of his thoughts in the SQorter dialogues can only be appreciated 
through the Republic and, conversely, much of the Republic presupposes 
the earlier dialogues. 1 The Symposium has shown that the desire to 
know is rooted in the very nature of man; the Meno reveals the kind of 
knowledge which Plato feels the statesman must have if there is to be 
any basis for social action; the Gorgias indicates why the statesman, for 
his own good and the good of society, must appeal to a moral standard 
rather than pleasure or power as the criterion of his own ends and those 
of the state. 
The Gorgias does not place the states:r;nan in society but is rather 
a critical introduction that clears the ground for the positive development 
in the Republic by analyzing the political ideals existing in Athens in 
Plato1 s time. To resolve the conflict between Athenian law and justice, 
1. Cf. Jaeger, PAl, ll, 94-96. 
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Plato declares that a complete reorganization of Greek society is 
needed to accommodate a new kind of statesman, who will be primarily 
an educator. The Gorgias announces the aim 
to bring the state back to its educational task. In 
such -a state, and only in such a state, is it 
possible for an educational ideal like that of 
Socrates, which takes human perfection as its 
absolute standard, to be justified in its claitp to 
be the basis of all the art of statesmanship. 
The ethical basis of social organization that develops in the Meno 
and is codified in the Gorgias is established. as logically necessary to the 
ideal state in the Republic. The state, not the individual, is the ethical 
form of man. 2 Plato's emphasis on personal participation in education 
and his theory that education affects the soul and must be guided by a 
real concern for the true values of life would definitely indicate that the 
individual is the moral agent but that he can realize his full ethical 
stature only in the best possible society. 
A brief summa~ry of the structure of the state that leads up to the 
discussion of The Good, The Line and The Cave is all that can be 
attempted here--the nucleus of Plato's value theory and the importance 
of education in attaining these ideals appears in these relatively short 
passages which explain best in a condensed form the essence of Plato's 
philosophy in the Republic. 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 154. 
2. Windelband, HP, 126. 
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The first Book of the Republic is a preface to the main body of 
the text proper; in this introductory book the current theories of the 
origin of law and morality are reviewed in a manner reminiscent of the 
conversational dialogues. 1 The discussion proceeds "until at last we 
seem to be left with the whole of popular opinion and experience arrayed 
upon the side of what is called injustice. " 2 Socrates' argument with 
Thrasymachus is essentially a restatement of the points discussed in the 
Gorgias where power and irresponsible individualism are rejected as 
political ends. 
The preliminary argument on the nature of justice ends negatively, 
but in response to a sincere desire on the part of Glaucon and Adeimantus 
to know a better definition than any proposed in the first Book, Socrates 
accepts their challenge to show that justice in the individual is good in 
itself even if the individual is not recognized by others as just. He is to 
demonstrate that justice, unrecognized and unrewarded, is better than 
injustice, even thoughthe unjust man may be recognized and rewarded 
by popular standards as just. If we remember that this same problem 
occurred in the Gorgias where the discussion was concerned with the 
most propitious life for the individual, it is evident that the attempt to 
define justice in the Republic is, as with the earlier dialogues, an 
attempt to define "the good life . "3 
1. Jaeger, PAl, IT, 95. 3. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 1-2. 
2. Nettleship, EPR, 2. 
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Socrates proposes that in order to define justice they should 
erect a theoretically perfect state and then "look for its counterpart on 
a smaller scale in the individual. "l The perfect state would necessarily 
be just, and if it reflects the values of the individual citizens, the com-
ponents of the just individual will be "writ large" in the structure of 
the state. 
ii. The ideal state. 
Socrates states that society exists because individuals who are 
not satisfied with mere subsistence create the "luxury-loving state" in 
which individuals are not self-sufficient, and that society and the citizen 
are best and most efficiently served when the individual specializes in 
the task for which he is best equipped. 2 Society is therefore stratified 
according to function and ability, the producers forming the lowest group. 
The next higher group, the Auxiliaries or protectors of the state, occupy 
a position similar to the Spartan warrior class, and are chosen for ad-
ditional education because of their courage and loyalty to the ideals of 
the state. The third and highest group is selected from the ranks of the 
Auxiliaries to receive still further education to fit them for the occupation 
of the Guardian or ruler of the state . 
As Socrates describes the logical and psychological growth of the 
perfect state he also describes "as an element in its realization that what 
1. Plato, Rep., 368c, (Cornford, 55.) 
2. Nettleship, EPR, 4. ''The same limitations which force the indi-
vidual into society also makes him a useful member of it." 
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may be called the first system of education. " 1 This educational system 
has the dual function of preparing individuals for citizenship and of 
selecting the most promising candidates for the Auxiliary and eventually 
the Guardianship of the state. In general, the education described in the 
first section of the Republic can be classified under the same headings as 
the traditional Athenian education: music and gymnastics; both are con-
cerned almost exclusively with the development of character by making 
the basic virtues habitual. 2 
One of the fundamental problems of education is to adjust the 
complementary but conflicting elements of reason and the adventurous 
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spirit; music is meant to train the mind and gymnastics the courageous 
spiriL 3 Plato believes that the nature of personality or the "soul" is such 
that it assimilates, especially in the early years of youth, the character 
of its surroundings and the tenor of the education that it receives. Since 
all aspects of education have an effect on the moral fiber of the individual, 
all aspects of education are subjected to moral standards, and it is in 
this section that we first find a criticism of art and poetry made from the 
point of its total effect on the personality of the individual. Art and poetry 
can and should aid in education but to do so they must be consistent with 
the ends of that education. 
1. Nettleship, EPR, 5. 
2. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 47. Anderson (intro. ), Meno, 17. "Habit, for 
Plato, is the basis of morality. " 
3. Nettleship, EPR, 31. 
When Socrates has shown the interrelationship of the various 
functions upon which the state depends, he summarizes the virtues of 
the state: it has wisdom because the most learned and the wisest have 
been chosen to rule; it has courage and good administration on the field 
of battle and in the state because the Auxiliary have been chosen for their 
bravery, intelligence and steadfastness; it has an all-pervading temper-
ance because the better part controls the worse. From the analogy of 
the state, Socrates derives the conclusion that when everyone performs 
the function for which he is best suited, the principle operates which is 
in itself essentially the definition of justice for which they have been look-
ing, and that it is the condition necessary to the harmonious state. 
Justice as defined in relation to the state has essentially the same 
meaning when applied to the soul. Socrates points out that there seem to 
be three types of motivations common to all men that can usually be 
discerned in a situation of choice, and that these fundamental components 
of personality often seem to conflict with one another. There is the 
rational side of man; there is the willful or spirited element which, in the 
best natures at least, sides with reason when there is a conflict between 
reason and appetitive desires; and finally there is the many-headed Hydra 
of the acquisitive and appetitive desires--the basic drives and emotions 
common to the biological organism and the elemental form of desires that 
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are rooted in the very nature of man. 1 These three aspects of the soul 
are analogous to the three levels of the perfect state; the perfect man, 
therefore, will be governed by reason and maintain control over his 
desires with the help of his will; a procedure that will result in the harmony 
and self-control that produces temperance and the just man. Justice in 
the individual, as in the state, is necessary to produce perfection and 
internal harmony; therefore justice, recognized or unrecognized, is of 
the highest value to the individual. 
iii. Knowledge of the Good. 
The hypothetical state could be realized, Socrates says, only if · 
philosophers were to become kings, or if a king were to aspire to true 
philosophical knowledge. The state which Socrates described in theory 
from the bottom up would, in practice, have to be established by the 
Philosopher -King from the top down. In order to do that, he would have 
to have true knowledge of the unchanging forms of reality obtained through 
reason, as opposed to opinions or beliefs obtained from the senses. The 
ultimate knowledge of reality is realized through knowledge of the Good. 
Justice in the individual now becomes extremely important, since only 
1. Plato's psychology is over -simplified here and the description above 
does not pretend to present an accurate picture of his theory of the 
soul; it is only meant as an indication of the structure of his argument. 
For more detailed treatments see: Nettleship, EPR, 5-29; Field, POP, 
108-124; Fuller, HP, 151-152, 159; Brett, HP, Chaps. 4-9; Wild, 
PTM, Ch. 4. 
a just man can realize the Good, and only a knowledge of the Good can 
reveal the true Form of justice. 
If a man must be just to know the Good, we can appreciate the 
vital part played by the educational clime--the physical and intellectual 
atmosphere--that surrounds the potentially just man; Plato repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of the total environment because those who 
have the potentiality for the greatest good also have the ability to do the 
greatest harm if their personalities are not properly "nurtured." 
It would at first appear that knowledge of the Good is not an end 
in itself, but a means to a good social structure. If, however, the good 
state is the ultimate Form for good men, and if a man can realize his 
potential only in the good state, the Good would become the purpose of 
life, for as Socrates says: 
What advantages can there be in possessing every-
thing except that which is good, or in understanding 
everything else while of the good and desirable we 
know nothing? 1 
What is the worth of justice or the ideal state if it is not known how or 
why it is a good or even that it is a good? 
It is interesting to note that once the ideal state has been sketched 
by Socrates, the question of the possible existen_~e ·.of• such a state 
immediately resolves itself into a discussion of the Philosopher-King 
and his knowledge of "the art of measure," the Good. From the Good, 
1. Plato, Rep., 504b, (Cornford, 215.) 
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Plato passes on to the Line which analyzes the ascent to knowledge of 
the Good epistemologically. It is not until Plato has described the 
state, the statesman, his standard of action and the possibility of 
knowing that standard that we have the final synthesis in the educational 
1 
analogy of the Cave. In this brief section, then, the order of the early 
dialogues is reversed and without a knowledge of the development in the 
smaller works it might seem that Plato's theory of education is merely 
the logical conclusion deduced from his metaphysics; it is here that the 
"practical" development of the .early dialogues helps in understanding 
the place of the Good in relation to education. 
Socrates does not define or explain the Good itself, but draws 
an analogy to the sun, which is necessary to sight and the visibility of 
the objects of sight, but is neither the eye nor the object seen. 
This, then, which gives to the objects of knowledge 
their truth and to him who knows them, his power 
of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of 
Goodness. . . Both knowledge and truth are to be 
regarded as like the Good, but to identify either 
with the Good is wrong. T~e Good must hold a 
yet higher place of honour. 
A further analogy is made to the sun, which is necessary for growth and 
nourishment and yet is not the same as these processes. 
And so with the objects of knowledge: these 
derive from the Good not only their power of 
being known but their very being and reality; 
1. See Wild, PTM, Ch. 5 for a ~ll integrated discussion of the analysis 
of the Sun, Line and Cave. 
2. Plato, Rep., 5Q8a, (Cornford, 219.) 
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and the goodness is not the same thing as being, 
but bey~nd being, surpassing it in dignity and 
power. 
Goodness then takes on the added meaning of the creative power 
responsible for the very being and the reality of the Forms, while at the 
same time it remains the ultimate reason or purpose that lies behind the 
flux of the phenomenal world; that is, the world of appearance exists so 
that Goodness can be realized by means of reason in order to establish 
that society which would be the ideal realization of mankind's function on 
earth--the well-being of man and his happiness; the life worth living. 
In retrospect the Meno and the Gorgias now take on a fuller mean-
ing, and conversely the necessity for the idea of the Good in the Republic 
becomes clearer. In the Meno true opinion as a guide to the action of 
statesmen was criticized because it could not be taught. The statesmen 
of the past did not know the final cause, the real nature of their own 
virtue. Socrates said that the true statesman must have real knowledge, 
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but he did no more than hint what that knowledge should be. Now, knowing 
the position of the Good in the state, we can go back and complete the ' 
statement; true virtue and true statesmanship obtain from knowledge of 
the Good. Whereas the statesman appears in ~he Meno as an example of 
the kind of knowledge that is virtue, he appears in the Gorgias consciously 
developed as the object of all the previous definitions of virtue, knowledge 
and love. Again looking back, the statesman .Socrates is talking about in 
1. Plato, Rep. , 509c, (Cornford, 2.20. ) 
the Gorgias becomes much more comprehensible if the education and 
character of the Philosopher-King in the Republic are kept in mind, for . 
they are one and the same. 
The absolute necessity for the conception of the Good in the 
Republic i s apparent if it is r .ecalled that in the Protagoras and Gorgias 
Socrates forces an admission that the ''art of measure" is the most im-
portant thing in life. He is criticizing · sophistic education for not teach-
ing with reference to some inclusive purpose, some objective norm. 
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This same criticism occurs in the Meno, where true knowledge is shown 
to be known only in conjunction with a standard, and in the Gorgias, where 
meaningful political action towards ends is possible only if the ends are 
known and furthermore known to be good. 
It is a fundamental paradox of human existence that only after you 
have done a thing can youknow how you should have done it in the first 
place; it may help to think of the Good in this way. Plato himself admits 
the accidental nature by which the ideal state could be realized; an 
essentially just man, a man of superior eros, who is not satisfied 
with "right opinion," no matter how well it may fit the bill, but who 
struggles on to real knowledge is rare enough, let alone that he should 
have the absolute power necessary to establish the Republic. The 
knowledge of the Good alone can reveal to the ruler the right order and 
relation of things and people in society which will assure the perpetuation 
276 
of the ideal state and the welfare or happiness of its citizens. It is this 
absolute conviction of the rightness of things that allows the Philosopher-
King to resist compromise and that makes him the teacher of the people. 
Once this absolutely right system of values is established, there is no 
need for any change in principles, for any change would be for the 
worse. 
iv. The Line. 
The Line which is introduced immediately after the discussion of 
the Good explains epistemologically the method by which knowledge of 
the Good is obtained. The four stages of cognition are essentially the 
same as the ladder of abstraction described by Diotima in the Symposium. 1 
In the brief exposition of The Line, Plato's dualistic attempt to 
resolve the problem of the flux in the sensible world and the necessity 
for permanance and objectivity in the standards which govern value 
judgments, is evident. He is trying to reconcile Heraclitus and Parmenides 
by using Protagoras' theory of sense perception abstracted beyond sensi-
ble objects. 2 The place of mathematics in this hierarchy of abstraction 
shows the influence of Parmenides' number theories which culminates 
in his own theory of eternal Forms that exist and 'receive their meaning 
from the Good. 
The Line in Plato's analogy is divided into two unequal parts 
1. Plato, Sym., 210a-212b. See pp. 163-164. 
2. Plato, Rep., 534a, (Cornford, 254.) 
and each segment is further divided into two sections of the same pro-
portions as the original division. 1 
INTELLIGffiLE 
WORLD 
WORLD OF 
APPEARANCES 
OBJECTS 
The Good 
Forms 
Mathematical 
Objects 
Visible 
Things 
Images 
STATES OF MIND 
Intelligence 
D (noesis) or 
Knowledge ( episteme) 
c Thinking 
(dianoia) 
B Belief 
(pistis) 
A Imagining 
(eikasia) 
Section A represents the uncritical acceptance of sense perception 
and Section B the conceptions or beliefs about perceptual objects; true 
opinion as discussed in the Meno and the Gorgias would fall in this 
category. Section C is characterized by mathematical thinking because 
it uses actual things (geometrical diagrams) to make assumptions which 
are not criticized or proven and from which conclusions are deduced. 
Mathematical thinking "is compelled to pursue its inquiry by starting 
from assumptions and traveling, not up to a principle, but down to a 
conclusion"; intelligence or knowledge, on the other hand, "moves in the 
1. Cornford, ROP, 222. The diagram reproduced here is from .F.. M. 
Cornford' s translation of the Republic. 
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other direction, from an assumption up towards a principle which is not . 
hypothetical. " 1 Once having known this first principle, intelligence 
may turn back and, holding on to the consequences 
which depend upon it, descend at last to a conclusion, 
never making use of any sensible object, but only of 
Forms, moving through{orms from one to another, 
and ending with Forms. . 
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The real meaning of the Good is contained here; for only knowledge 
of the final principle can disclose the true nature of the steps leading up 
to the Good. · 
These four states of mind, imagining, belief, thinking and in-
telligence increase · in "clearness and certainty corresponding to the 
measure in which their objects possess truth and reality. "3 
v. The Allegory of the Cave. 
In order to clarify and illustrate this rather abstract discussion 
of The Line and the Good, Plato introduces the justly famous Allegory 
of the Cave. 4 The entire allegory is an explanation of education and its 
counterpart, the uncritical acceptance of experience. As Plato says: 
"Here is a parable to illustrate the degrees in which our nature may be 
enlightened or unenlightened. " 5 In the Allegory, Socrates tells of 
prisoners who have spent all their lives facing a wall in a cave chained 
1. Plato, Rep., 510c, (Cornford, 224.) 
2. Plato, Rep., 511c, (Cornford, 226.) 
3. Plato, Rep., 511e, (Cornford, 226.) 
4. Plato, Rep., 514a-521b, (Cornford, 227-235.) 
5. Plato, Rep., 514a, (Cornford, 277.) Cf. Wild, PTM, 180 ff. 
in such a way that they cannot move their heads at all. Shadows are cast 
on the wall by images carried between a fire and the prisoner's backs. 
A modern version of the Allegory might utilize the analogy of a sound 
camera showing moving pictures on the wall of the cave. 1 Because the 
chained prisoners have never seen anything else, they accept the shadows 
that they see as reality, and if a prisoner were released and shown the 
source of these images he would probably not accept it as more real than 
the shadows unless educated to the conception gradually. H this poor 
fellow were dragged out of the cave, the sunlight would blind him; but 
slowly, as his eyes became accustomed to the light, he would see real 
objects · in their natural surroundings and eventually realize that the 
seasons, life and all things depend on the sun (the good. ) This freedom 
and knowledge of real things would cause him to pity the prisoners in the 
cave. Back in the cave his eyes, now unaccustomed to the gloom, would 
perceive the images on the wall but dimly and he would appear a dolt t.o 
his unenlightened companions who would laugh derisively when he tried 
to tell them that what they saw was not real at all. 
In his commentaries following the Allegory of the Cave Plato says 
of the Good: "Without having had a vision of this Form no one can act 
with wisdom, either in his own life or in matt~rs of state. "2 The ascent 
1. Cornford, ROP, 223. 
2. Plato, Rep., 517c, (Cornford, 231. ) 
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from the cave to true knowledge, however, shows that education must 
be thought of as a guiding influence to the soul rather than a supply of 
knowledge for it. The function of education is "not to put the power of 
sight into the soul's eye, which already has it, but to ensure that, 
instead of looking in the wrong direction, it is turned the way it ought to 
be."1 
. The well-ordered state must be ruled by the best; therefore, 
says Socrates: 
The business of us who are the founders of the State 
will be to compel the best mind,s to attain that 
knowledge which we have al-ready shown to be the 
greatest of all--they must c.ontinue to ascend until 
they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended 
and seen enough we must not allow them. . . to 
remain in the upper world: they must be made to 
descend again among the prisoners in the den; and 
partake of their labours anq honours, whether they 
are worth having or not. 
But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them 
a worse life, when they might have a better? 
You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the 
intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making 
any one class in the State happy above the rest; the 
happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held 
the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, 
making them benefactors of the State, and therefore 
benefa~tors of one another; to this end he created 
them, not to please themselves, bu~to be his 
instruments in binding up the State. 
1. Plato, Rep., 518c, (Cornford, 232.) _ 
2. Plato, Rep., 519c-520a, (Cornford, 233-234.) 
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The above passage is often cited as proof of Plato's totalitarian tenden-
cies, since not even the Philosopher-King is free from the obligation of 
serving the interests of the state. The "force," however, that makes 
them descend into the cave is a moral force; the Philosopher-Kings have 
been given a more thorough education than their fellow citizens and they 
must accept the responsibility of their favored position. 
A state can, never be properly governed either by the 
uneducated who know nothing of truth or by men who 
are allo'Ied to spend all their days in the pursuit of 
culture. 
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Those who have been especially educated and finally know the Good 
must return to the relatively distasteful task of ruling society, for "the 
law is not concerned to make any one class happy, but to ensure the 
welfare of the commonwealth as a whole. " 2 
4. Plato's philosophy in relation to education. 
The structure of the Republic follows the development of the 
"educational argument. " The inquiry starts by asking, "Why should I be 
just?" In other words, what is the value of justice to the individual? 
The analogy between the soul and the state that follows does not seem as 
strange with a knowledge of the early dialogues as it might if the Republic 
were considered by itself. Plato develops the idea that the values to which 
the individuals aspire determine the form of the .state; the ideal state would 
1. Plato, Rep., 519c, (Cornford, 233.) 
2. Plato, Rep., 520a, (Cornford, 234. ) 
then reflect the nature of the perfectly just soul. 1 The stratification of 
society in the Republic is based on the empirical fact that individuals do 
differ, that they differ in the degree of their eros. The perfect state and 
the just soul are harmonious with each other and themselves because they 
function organically; they unify diverse values purposively--and the 
purpose is the good life. Virtue is finally defined as the organic unity 
of virtuous ele:q1ents in the soul--the soul which is harmonious because 
its eros is fully realized. 
The actual existence of the state depends on the Philosopher-King 
whose justice is grounded on the knowledge of eternal values and not 
"true opinion.'' These values, or Forms, are revealed through the soul's . 
intuitive knowledge of the Good. The analogy of the Sun indicates the 
metaphysical reality of the Good; The Line presents the argument that 
the mode of perception, the way in which ap. object is known, has a one-
to-one correlation with its metaphysical status; that is, sense perception 
"knows" the least real objects whereas rational intuition discloses the 
. . 
most real objects. The Allegory of the Cave sums up the relation be-
tween education, epistemology, metaphysics and politics and shows the 
pivotal position that Socrates• new paideia has in those relationships. 
The prisoner would remain in the cave if he were not led gently--that 
is, educated in the Socratic manner- -from the belief in the reality of the 
images, up out of the cave so that he can perceive for himself that all 
1. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 3. 
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life depends on the Sun. It is his duty to return into the cave to educate 
his less fortunate companions with this knowledge. The release from 
the cave begins with education and ends with an educational mission. 
i. Education and epistemology. 
The educational problem of the early dialogues soon becomes an 
epistemological problem and, if we think of what Plato means by 
knowledge, it is easy to see why a theory of knowledge is implicitly 
connected with his metaphysics, ethics and political philosophy. So-
called "factual" knowledge does not concern Plato in these dialogues; 
as he says in the Euthyphro, 1 there is no reason to argue about those 
things that are factual--they should be verified. The problem is not 
quite that simple; and in the Theaetetus Plato examines knowledge more 
carefully as it applies to the physical world. 2 In these early dialogues, 
though, Plato is thinking primarily of a type of knowledge that is a 
personal experience and therefore impossible, as he says, to put into 
words--the experience of "possessing" justice, or temperance or 
courage. How are these "possessed" ideals, the core of virtue, to be 
taught? As Socrates says to Callicles: 
0 Callicles, if there were not some community of 
feelings among manki:rtl,, however varying in 
different persons--! mean to say, if every man's 
feelings were peculiar to himself and were not 
1. Plato, Euthyph. , 7b-.G, 
2. Wild, PTM, 260 ff. Wild analyzes the relation of knowledge and 
true opinion as Plato treats it in the Theaetetus. 
283 
shared by the rest of his species-:--1 do not see 
how we could eler communicate our impressions 
to one another. 
real education is concerned with the transfer of these "ideas," we im-
ediately see the need for a new definition of education. 
If true knowledge lies in the "possession" of these norms we can 
ppreciate the fact that they cannot be "taught"; knowledge of the law 
oes not make a man just; vast learning does not make -a man wise. The 
ifference between the wise and the learned man, the lawyer and the just 
an is in the use they make of their knowledge; that is, whether we can 
ely on them as persons of character and whether their knowledge has 
evealed the essential truths implicit in what they know. But how is 
he moral conviction of the wise man and the man of justice to be taught 
if it consists primarily of a personal experience, knowledge known to 
the soul? 
Plato's epistemological theory takes on meaning in relation to 
the rest of his philosophy because it is no mere technical solution to the 
problems of knowledge theory. Self-knowledge in terms of ideal and 
eternal objects combines Socrates' divine inspiration, his eros, his 
intense personal conviction in truth and the power of logos with the Greek 
sense of history, the Heraclitean flux, the "fate" of great Greek litera-
ture. Part of the Greek tradition sees the world as an uncontrollable 
movem.ent of events that often makes people victims of its senseless 
1. Plato, Gorg., 481c. 
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machinations; an equally strong tradition identifies that which makes 
man human with the body politic. Man is only man in society and he is 
to be honored or blamed in accord with his. actions as a citizen. 1 The 
awareness of man the political animal and man the puppet of fate made 
the Greeks historically conscious; it is no accident that the first great 
historians, Herodotus and Thucydides, were Greek citizens. Plato's 
objects of knowledge not only had to solve the technical problems of 
previous philosophy in relation to "knowing" but also had to include 
Greek culture, since, as has been pointed out so often previously, his 
philosophy was a way of life and had to be reconciled with the cultural 
heritage that formed so much of life in the Greek city-state. 
To avoid the Sophistic assertion that all things are relative be-
cause the senses that know and the objects known are in a constant state 
of flux and therefore that there can be no abiding knowledge, Socrates 
tried to define universal moral values; whether he proposed that the 
validity of such definitions rested on the common nature of man as 
Plato has him say in the above quote from the Gorgias we cannot know. 
Plato took the Socratic dictum2 "Know thyself" and the character of 
Socrates himself not only as a working model for the improvement of 
the individual soul but also as the standard for the ordering of the state--
1. Plato, Rep., 617e, (Cornford, 335.) Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 40. 
2. "Know thyself" was borrowed by Socrates from the oracle at Delphi. 
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an innovation impo.sed by Plato's historical sense that a change in values 
often brings about the degeneration of the state and by the conservative, 
aristocratic strain in his thought which harked back to better days when 
the best ruled because of their superior character and moral fiber. 
Plato unites the traditions of the city-state, especially its conception of 
the organic society, with Socrates' faith in knowledge as the source of 
true virtue, and his humanism to redefine the ideals of the state and 
the education of its citizens by adding political power to Socrates' char·ac-
ter, thereby making of him the Philosopher-King, who embodies the 
values of the state and is the educator of the people. 
But how is the Philosopher-King to teach virtue if virtue is an 
"experience" intrinsically allied with the total personality of an actual 
person in actual situations of moral choice? If Plato had been satisfied 
to assert that virtue and knowledge were solely for the improvement of 
the individual soul through the intuition of transcendent essences he 
would have had to go no further than to propound a mystical philosophy 
based on revealed truth; but the added burden of trying to define true 
knowledge in terms that would not negate the values of life in this world 
but would organize them for human happiness on earth imposed certain 
educational qualifications on the nature of knowledge and virtue. 
If integrity depends on knowledge and if the community depends 
on the individual citizens for its character, it follows that the well 
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ordered community will be that in which true knowledge is the criterion 
for the standards of the state and for its rulers. Such a program is 
feasible only if virtue is the knowledge of some object that a person can 
apprehend after being properly educated .. If true knowledge is knowledge 
of some ineffable object revealed only to the chosen few who are "graced" 
by the divine insight--that is, if you cannot be educated to know--then the 
case for the assertion that "you owe it to yourself" to realize the highest 
possible values loses its moral force . 
.Standards of social behavior must have some objective status, 
and the knowledge which discloses these stanctards must likewise have 
objectivity; the senses and the objects of sense perception were obviously 
unreliable as norms and, since Plato had the example of Socrates before 
his mind, what could be more natural than associating Socrates' paideia 
with true knowledge? Socrates' education did not give information, but 
asked soul-searching questions that were clearly not concerned with 
sensible objects; yet the moral conviction exemplified by his death 
seemed to be grounded on knowledge more certain than any dogma, or 
theory based on factual knowledge. The spark tha he kindled in Plato's 
soul moved Plato to analyze Socrates and his form of education in search 
of a new way of knowing and new objects of knowledge--having seen a 
virtuous ·man, Plato did not rest until he defined that virtue and the edu-
cation upon which he felt it depended. The result was the Forms, which 
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had the objectivity necessary for social standards, but which were known 
by the rational insight of the virtuous man, who could be guided and 
inspired by the education that he received to realize knowledge of them 
for himself. The nature of the objects of true knowledge, then, determine 
the education that the potentially .just man should receive. 1 
ii. Education and the Platonic Forms. 
The Platonic Forms have had various interpretations; in fact, 
Plato himself gives several interpretations of their significance. It has 
been proposed that Plato should be taken literally; that the Forms repre-
sent actual archetypes that have a separate and eternal existence inde-
pendent of man. Others feel that Plato's description of the Forms is 
only a picturesque attempt to formulate logical universals. A compro- · 
mise proposes that the Forms are ideal values, eternal but unrealized 
except in the actual value situtation involving particulars. The actual . 
metaphysical status of the Forms, while hardly unimportant, is perhaps 
not so vital to education as the methodological aspect of the Forms. 
MethodologicallY, the Platonic Forms are a simple concept, al-
though a very difficult one to put into words without getting overly complex 
or ridiculously simple. Plato was willing to grant that what we know is 
1. Cf. Nettleship, EPR, 9. As Nettleship points out, the form of edu-
cation is arrived at in the Republic through an analysis of "human 
nature." "In order to understand Plato's theory of education, we 
must understand his psychology." Both this statement and mine 
above assert the same fact from different points of view: education 
is for the soul. 
dependent upon what we experience; even when he propounds the theory 
of recollection as the source of the knowledge of true relations, he states 
that it is the immediate experience which brings forth the recollection. 
Many persons, however, are exposed to the same types of experience, 
and whereas some use it to advantage, others either do not make use of 
that experience or else misuse it. The difference between the superior 
man and the lesser man is that the former exposes his experience to 
rational self-criticism and evaluation. In some cases the superior man . 
is guided by "true opinion" or rational insight--the "feel" for the right 
choice in a given situation. The distinction between the two is extremely 
important. If true opinion is the highest form of knowledge that man can 
obtain, then truth is the exclusive property of the mystics who are fortu-
nate enough to be divinely inspired. On the other hand, if rational self-
criticism and evaluation can reveal objects of true knowledge, then the 
way is open to educating persons up to the point where the final synthesis 
is realized in an intuitive flash. Granted, the end product is a "mystical 
intellectualism, " as Pater calls it, but it is a mysticism that can be 
nurtured by education. 
In order to understand the nature of the Forms, let us refer, in . 
true Platonic style, to the art of cooking. What is it that makes a 
superior cook? Experience?--certainly. Good recipes? ·--of course. 
But experience and recipes may be had by many people; what is the 
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personal quality that distinguishes the good cook from the mediocre? 
It might best be called craftsmanship--that active concern with past 
experience which has led to such sure knowledge that the cook can fly 
in the face of the written recipes to adjust for the particular case. 
There is no one recipe for pie or for apple pie or even for a 
given kind of apple pie. A good cook will take into account the kind of 
pie, the kind of apple and the desired results, and then proceed on the 
basis of previous experience to produce the best result possible with 
the material given. Although there may not be any one recipe (or 
definition) of a pie, there is a certain "form" to pie making; a certain 
similarity of procedure, of content and of purpose. The man, therefore, 
who would be best qualified to judge the best actual pie would be the man 
who had the widest experience with the advantages of all the various types 
of pies that can possibly be made, provided, of course, that he had a 
serious concern for the best possible pie and the natural ability, the 
"good taste" to discriminate and choose the best. 
Leonardo Da Vinci studied very carefully the art of making his 
painting vehicles and recorded exactly how the best solution could be ob-
tained. Apprentices, intent on following the master's directions to the 
nth degree, continually got cloudy solutions, whereas the master, who 
not only knew the instructions but knew the reasons behind them, 
seemingly violated his own formula constantly; but his mixtures were 
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always clear. The form of truth as it applies to this world is not a 
static definition of any thing or things but such a knowledge of principles 
that amid the shifting sands a straight course may be charted towards a 
goal--the good life for onself and all men. 1 
It was Plato's contention that it was not beyond the reach of man 
to study the nature of temperance, courage, wisdom, justice, goodness, 
love, · beauty and so forth in the same way as the pie expert would inquire 
into the nature of the best possible pie. Of course the "Form" of beauty 
is a much more difficult thing to grasp than the form of "perfect. pie"; 
this is true of all the "Forms" and especially of the relationship of the 
Forms to one another, for it is only in the insight of how the individual 
Forms are related in goodness that the final truth is apprehended. Even 
this seemingly esoteric doc~rine .. has an essentially simple explanation 
if it is thought of methodologically, although it is not easily stated . 
. Justice, we may agree with Plato, is good in itself; that is, we 
do not seek justice for any other reason than to be just--if we do we are 
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not just. Beauty we may seek in itself; beauty is good--it is lts own 
justification. This we may say of truth also. But if Beauty, Truth and 
Justice are good in themselves, what do we mean by good? If good here 
implies a value judgment, what is that which we use as a standard to judge 
principles which are themselves self-sufficient standards of action?--as it 
would seem they are, if they are good in themselves. The life which is 
1. Cf. Plato's statement on the nature of law, States., 294 ff. See p. 296. 
truly good is the standard, for in the good life justice, truth and beauty 
all have their proper place. If we ask in what sense justice is good, 
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the answer is that it is good as a necessary part of the good life. Granted, 
a life that is good may encompass the beautiful, the true and the just, 
but how is the good of the "good life'' to be understood? Since Plato 
asserts the immortality of the soul we may conclude that the Good does 
not exist for the .sake of life but that life exists for the sake of the Good. 
We have finally arrived at a point where we can say no more--the Good 
is the Good and that is all that it is possible to say on the basis of human 
experience. 
The methodological inte.rpretation of Forms as they apply to the 
practical choices and value judgments that we must continually make in 
life--choices important to ourselves, and those that include the welfare 
of others--is the ethical description of the Forms as they enter into the 
tissues of living; but :what of the Forms themselves? This question 
forces Plato to a consideration of the metaphysical significance of 
the ideal values; he experimented with various explanations, none of 
which were wholly successful or free from vexing problems, and it is 
to his everlasting credit that he himself was the first to bring up every 
important criticism that has since been used against the theory of Forms . . 
There is no space nor need for taking up the various metaphysical in-
terpretations of the Forms; their practical significance is all that is 
vital here and, although he formulated various doctrines, Plato never 
did reject the real and objective existence of ideal values. 
iii. The Platonic synthesis. 
Education as portrayed in the Allegory of the Cave guides the 
soul from the lowest form of perception to the highest; these modes of 
"knowing" have objects that vary in their degree of reality; when the 
soul "sees" the Good) its reality and "light" truly reveal these various 
degrees of reality for the first time; thus education, epistemology and 
metaphysics are integrally connected. The Good is the criterion of 
"the good life," and knowledge of it allow.s the just man to will ends that 
he knows are ·good; the knowledge of true reality, then, implies that the 
good life is the ethical life. The just man, to lead the ethical ife, must 
ha,ve power in the state, he must be the law, and this in turn means that 
he must be an educator--the Philosopher-King--since ends consistently 
good imply the best society in which the happiness of the citizens, ~ 
whole, must be given preference; and their happiness depends on their 
being made better and freely willing that the Philosopher -King should 
1 
govern. 
Education, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and axiology are 
in this fashion related and interwoven by Plato in the Republic, but the 
investigation is not at an end. The problem that started with the 
1. Plato, Rep., 4'31b f., (Cornford, 126 ); cf. States., 276e. 
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individual's concern for his own well-being and evolved into a conception 
of the perfect state has advanced to the point where Plato must do what 
he says reveals the nature of reality--he must examine his principles. 
This investigation begins in the Republic, when Plato presents an analysis 
of the eternal Forms. His philosophy after the Republic is concerned 
with problems all of which are contained in embryo in the analogies of 
The Sun, The Line, and The Cave; but to enjoy the full importance of 
these problems, they must continually be related back to the "educational 
problem" and the ideal state. 
5. The later dialogues. 
For all its tremendous importance, we have had little to say 
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about the soul, as such, because Plato has so little to say about the nature 
of the soul in the early dialogues. The Republic, primarily through the 
analogy of the soul and the state and later the Myth of Er, increases 
our understanding of the soul a great deal and, while it is true that 
Plato's educational theories cannot be considered complete without a 
more thorough analysis of his psychology, the later dialogues add so 
much material of such great variety that the prerequisite definition of 
the soul cannot be arrived at on the basis of the early dialogues alone; 
therefore an evaluation of his theory of education in the light of his fully 
formulated theory of the soul is impossible in this thesis. The Phaedo, 
Phaedrus and, to a lesser extent, the Philebus are sources of Plato's 
theory of the soul in the later works. 
None of the later dialogues are entirely unimportant to Plato's 
theory of education because of the close connection that exists between 
all the various facets of his thought; they consider, on a higher level, 
problems that we have already seen are important to education: the 
relation of the Forms to each other; the meaning of "being''; the nature 
of knowing and knowledge, and so forth throughout a list of questions 
that laid the foundation for philosophy in western civilization. 
In the Phaedrus, Plato again criticizes rhetoric but not nearly 
so vehemently as in the Gorgias~ The analysis of form and the theory 
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of the soul in the Phaedrus are also important educationally. The Phaedo, 
as has already been mentioned, is very important because of its 
treatment of the soul, as is the Philebus, which is also significant 
because of its discussion of pleasure--a concept fundamental to the 
evolution of Plato's ideas on education, especially in the Protagoras 
and Gorgias. 
The Timaeus, Parmenides, Theaetetus and the Sophist, con-
cerned as they are with cosmology, metaphysics, epistemology and 
logic are key dialogues in forming a complete picture of Plato's philoso-
phy, but of even greater significance to his "practical" moral philosophy 
is th.e re-evaluation of the state which Plato begins in the Statesman and 
to which he adds his final thoughts in the Laws. 
In the Republic, Plato resolved the problem of the conflict be-
tween law and justice by making the just man the law; by adding "power" 
to the personality of Socrates he created the Philosopher-King, whose 
right to rule was such that any law determining his actions would be 
unnecessary and might be unjust. To appreciate why Plato could so 
· easily dispense with law in the Republic we might appeal to one of his 
own favorite analogies--that of the doctor. Why do we go to a doctor 
when we are ill? Why is it that we don't regulate by means of law the 
way a doctor shall go about diagnosing and treating our diseases? 
We go to a doctor because he has knowledge· which we do not have, 
because he has studied, observed and treated disease; that is, because 
he has the education, training and experience that we feel is needed to 
treat a problem which we do not fully. understand. We go to the doctor 
of our own free will because we have faith that he has our best interests 
at heart, at least as far as physical health is concerned. We do not 
require that his judgment be governed by law, because we assume that 
he will know better than the law what is needed in each individual case, 
and that the nature of his profession is such that he will do what he judges 
to be best in all cases. In the same v:ein, Plato says of the statesman: 
The best of all is that a man should rule, having 
wisdom and power both. Law does not adequately 
comprehend what is noblest and most just for every · 
individual, and therefore cannot enforce what is 
absolutely best. The differences of men and actions, 
and the endless irregular movements of human things, 
do not admit of any simple, universal rule. And no 
art can lay down a rule which will last for all time. 
Unchanging rules are the 1eath of art. Its strength 
has to be superior to law . 
. 1. Plato, States., 294 ff. 
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The Statesman indicates Plato's movement towards reinstating · 
law in the community even though he reaifirms his belief in the ideal of 
the Philosopher-King--but in the Statesman the completely just man is 
recognized as an ideal, too good to be realized on earth. Plato also 
classifies the types of states more carefully in the Statesman than he 
did in Book VIII of the Republic; he now recognizes two forms of 
democracy and assigns them more favorable positions in relation to 
other types of government than he did in the Republic. That Plato saw 
the conflict between law and justic e in Socrates' death is once more 
shown when he remarks bitterly that with the readmission of law the 
execution of Socrates is justified, for "no one should presume to be 
wiser than the laws. "l 
Although Plato; s philosophy evolved, he never gave up the ideals 
of the just individual in the perfect state. He refers to the state de-
picted in the Laws as the second best state. Wh~ther Plato's experience 
in trying to educate Dionysius IT to be a Philosopher-King discouraged 
him, or whether he simply lost faith in the ability of man to aspire to 
ideals so lofty as those in the Republic we cannot say; but whatever the 
reason was, it caused him to re-examine the state and readmit law as 
the ruling force in the community. The second best state places as 
much emphasis on education as the Republic does, but it is education 
1. Plato, States., 299c .. f. Cf. Sabine, HPT, 75. 
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more as we think of it today and not clearly identified with Socrates' 
paideia. Since the Laws gives a great deal of power to various insti-
tutions in the state (especially the Ministry of Education) it is as im-
portant in many ways as the early dialogues and the Republic for the 
material that it can furnish for evaluating modern education. 
Plato's attempt to temper the ideals of the early dialogues and 
the Republic with a more pragmatic approach to the problems of the 
state is not so successful artistically, but it shows that he realized that 
the omission of law in the Republic was an error--an error, however, -in 
the direction of perfection and, because he found it difficult to admit that 
perfection was not the goal, the Laws does not resolve the problem of 
reintroducing law very convincingly. The failure is understandable, 
since the introduction of law destroys the moral force of the Philosopher-
King--it justifies Socrates' death and thereby compromises Plato's ideal 
of education. When he gave up the ideal man and the ideal state, Plato 
was faced with the task of reorganizing his entire philosophy; a task 
that he was not equal to in his old age. 
That the Laws does not succeed as the Republic did in solving its 
problems does not mean that it i.s not an importantwork--far from it. 
The practical measures that were v.ai ved aside in-the Republic because 
they would be solved by the Auxiliary or the Guardians are important in 
the Laws, where Plato is emulating the legislators of the past, such as 
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Solon and Lycurgus, in describing the basic tenets of a working consti-
tution. Many of his insights are extremely cogent, but his efforts to 
combine the best elements of existing states with the values of the 
Republic in a mixed constitution, the first of which there is a record, 
is not very consistent. The concept of the mixed constitution, the balance 
of powers, however, is in itself a valuable contribution to political 
theory--a theory that was developed by Aristotle and later by political 
theorists in Europe, notably Montesquieu. 
Education under law rather than under the Philosopher-King 
becomes institutionalized in the Laws, and is closer to training than 
paideia; its chief function is to train the citizens to be in harmony with 
the law of the land. Plato spends more time on the methods, regulations, 
and administration of education than he did in the Republic and not so 
much with the product, the aspirations and ends of education; those, 
after all, are defined by the law more than the individual. Here we can 
note a strange phenomenon; education in the state governed by law is 
less· democratic than education in the state governed by a benevolent 
despot; education that is democratic in its scope is authoritarian in its 
application and education that is' aristocratic in its selection is demo-
cratic in its application I That is, Plato's education in the Republic is 
directed to the individual, under the assumption that the truly educated 
individual will be the perfect citizen. In the Laws Plato's aim is not 
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the perfect individual, whom he gives up as an ideal realized only in a 
divine realm, but a homogeneous citizenry where individuality is second 
to obedience to the laws. In more than one respect Plato's insti-
tutionalized education in the Laws is analogous to modern education. 
6. Criticism of Platd s educational theories. 
Plato's philosophy has been criticized from many different and 
not always supplementary positions. His metaphysics, epistemology, 
theology and psychology have all received their share of objections, many 
of them anticipated in the dialogues themselves, but recently, with the 
picture of Fascism, Nazism and Communism freshly in mind, his phi-
losophy has been attacked with renewed vigor because of its political 
implications, and the close connection in Plato's thought between edu-
cation and the state has not been overlooked. 
In many ways the degree of animosity directed at Plato himself, 
the ends and motivations imputed to him as a person treated in many 
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cases as a Machiavellian contemporary, is a tribute to Plato the educator, 
his sustained ability to stimulate thought and his insight into vital problems. 
In general, Plato is stigmatized as antidemocratic or, if the defamation 
is more positive, as· totalitarian or communistic. Because there are some 
grounds for all these "tags," and because they are "loaded" words in 
countries that are held to be run by democratic principles this "labeling" 
process is often as deep as criticism needs to go. 
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Plato's communism, limited as it is to the rulers, would have 
horrified Marx, for Plato holds that only the educationally prepared elite 
would have a sufficient range of values to allow them to live communal 
lives, to give up the provincial perspective of the "owner." His absolute 
rule is authoritarian and not totalitarian, a distinction which he often 
draws himself when he criticizes tyranny. The authoritarian Philosopher-
King rules by right of reason and knowledge--the totalitarian tyrant by 
right of force. Plato is antidemocratic, but his definition of democracy 
and the present-day definitions ar-e poles apart. Most ardent democrats .. 
who flay Plato would be scandalized if his definition were applied to them, 
yet they criticize him without noting the development in democratic ideals. 
i. Plato's definition of democracy. 
The constitution of Cleisthenes, adopted in 507 B. C., had been 
' 
in effect for over a hundred years when the democracy condemned Socrates 
to death. 1 Political power under this constitution rested with the Assembly, 
composed of all male citizens over twenty, the Council of Five Hundred 
and the courts. The Council exercised control in many different di-
rections, but "the great powers of the Council. ... were always dependent 
upon the .good will of the Assembly, " 2 
The Athenian courts occupied a position in the government 'Which 
has no modern parallel and "were undoubtedly the keystone of the whole · 
1. The oligarchy of The Thirty gained power briefly near the end of the 
Peloponnesian war. 
2. Sabine, HPT, 9. Italics mine. 
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democratic system." 1 The members of the courts were chosen by lot 
from a panel of six thousand which was elected each year by the demes; 
these courts were very large, hardly ever less than 201 and often a 
great deal more, and they served both as judge and jury without the 
"machinery that goes with a technically developed form of law. " 2 The 
persons involved in the litigation had to present their own cases; each 
court was autonomous and therefore free from the dictates of precedence 
established by the decisions of other courts; the verdict of the court was 
final--there was no appeal, even though the decisions of various courts 
might contradict one another. 
Election according to Greek ideas was an aristocratic method 
of selecting officials;3 "to the Greek understanding ... filling offices by 
lot was the distinctively democratic form of rule, since it equalized 
everyone's chances to hold office. "4 The magistrate's and officials, as 
well as citizens, were accountable to the courts, composed of large 
numbers of citizens chosen by lot; the verdict depended on the defense 
and prosecution of the individuals involved and there was no recourse 
to judicial review. These are the reasons that rhetoric became the 
chief means to political power and also the reasons that Callicles could 
seriously warn Socrates that by ignoring the art of rhetoric he was 
1. Sabine, HPT, 9. 
2. Sabine, HPT, 10. 
3 . . Sabine, HPT, 82. 
4. Sabine, HPT, 7. 
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placing his life in danger, since he would not be able to defend himself 
in court. An appeal to truth or ethical principles was not the best way 
to secure Athenian "justice," but rather the ability to persuade the court. 
The officials, since they were always subject to the whims of the court, 
had to keep the pleasures of the people in mind at all times. 
Plato's definition and criticism of democracy grew out of the 
abuses to which this system was heir, as did his attacks on sophistry 
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and the teachers of rhetoric. If the modern writers who criticize Plato 
for being antidemocratic are willing to accept that which he criticizes as 
democracy, then Plato stands convicted. Because there was no necessary 
consistency in decisions, because the verdicts depended on the fancies 
of large numbers of people who had no special qualifications and because 
justice was reduced to a forensic tug-of-war, Plato associated democracy 
at its worst with anarchy, similar to the orgies of "freedom" indulged in 
by the mob during the early days of the French Revolution; at its best 
he thought of democracy as a contest between "flatterers" of the people 
for political power. With the constitution of Athens in mind, it is easy 
to see how he arrived at these conclusions--conclusions for which he 
needed no more evidence than the death of Socrates. 
ii. K. R. Popper's criticism of Plato. 
K. R. Popper, in his far from objective attack on Plato in The 
Open Society and its Enemies classifies Plato, Hegel and Marx as the 
chief proponents of the various forms of "historicism. '' The historicists 
"believe that they have discovered laws oi history which enable them to 
prophesy the course of events.... The prophets who announce that 
certain events are bound to happen make propaganda for them, and help 
to bring them about. " 1 
The text does not support Popper's contention that the ideal 
state is thought of by Plato as an historical fact, or that the degeneration 
of the state described in Book Vill happens because of necessary histori-
cal laws. 2 Plato's historicism, Popper asserts, is rooted in his frantic 
efforts to avoid the Heraclitean flux; 3 he sought stability by appealing 
to a Cretan and Spartan aristocratic tribalism in which the workers 
"are only human cattle. " 4 "The origin of society is a convention, a 
social contract" based on the social nature of man .• 5 But the nature of 
man, Plato's "biological naturalism," emphasizes both the subjection of 
the individual to the total organism of the state and "the natural ine-
quality of man. " 6 The analogy of the soul and the state in the Republic 
1. Popper, OSE, 3-4. 
2. Cornford, ROP, 53. In reference to logical construction of the ideal 
state in Book ll, Cornford says: "Plato . is not here describing the 
historical development of any actual state." Field, POP, 87. "The 
account of the stages of degeneration begins from the ideal city which 
had never in fact existed ... so there is no ground for taking this 
account as an attempt to arrive at a law of historical development." 
3. Popper, OSE, 19, 29 ff. 
4. Popper, OSE, 39-40. See pp. 284-285 on Plato's historical sense. 
5. Popper, OSE, 64. Cf. Cornford, ROP, 53. · Plato denies that 
society is "the artificial outcome of an arbitrary compact. " 
6. Popper, OSE, 66. 
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shows that Plato thought of "the individual citizen ... as an imperfect copy 
of the state"; 1 his reference to the state as the soul "writ large" means, 
in Popper; s translation, that ,;the city ... is greater than the individual. " 2 
. Plato's identification of justice with an aristocratic ruling class, 
his "racism," his belief in slavery and finally his program for indoctri-
nation-completes the totalitarian pattern which Plato subtly and dia-
bolically introduced into the Republic because he "did not dare to face 
the. enemy openly. " 3 It will .be obvious, it is hoped, that this thesis is 
diametrically opposed to the interpretation Popper places on most of 
the above points .... -and the significance that he draws from all of them. 
A detailed study of Popper's frequent misuse of quotations or the argu-
ments that he presents, especially in contrast to his own theory of 
"piecemeal engineering," is beyond the scope of this work, but a very 
brief analysis of his criticism of Plato's theory of education is perhaps 
justified . 
. Popper's entire criticism of Plato's theory of education, and a 
r 
great deal of his criticism of Plato in general, depends on the distinction 
which he makes between the Socratic influence in Plato's dialogues and 
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Plato's own philosophy. Equalitarian justice, the "protectionist" theory · . 
of the state, and the criticism of the irresponsible rule of the "superior" . 
1. Popper, OSE, 67. 
2. Popper, OSE, 68. 
3. Popper, OSE, 80, 74-75. 
in the. Gorgias are noble ideas but they belong to Socrates;1 the same . 
concepts in the Republic take on a subtle totalitarian cast in Popper's 
eyes. Popper does not bother with the Symposium, which has a very 
embarrassing combination of humanism which according to Popper is 
distinctly Socratic and the Forms, which are equally Platonic. 
All that is noble, equalitarian and inspiring, then, and Popper 
admits that there is much in the dialogues that is, belongs to Socrates, · 
whereas all that is inimical to democracy, respect for the individual and 
true education belongs to Plato. 2 "Socratic intellectualism is decidedly 
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equalitarian. . . . But this moral intellectualism of Socrates is a two-edged 
sword. "3 His stress on the need for enlightenm.ent can easily be "misin-
terpreted as a demand for authoritarianism. " 4 ·This is true, but it is 
hardly a "misinterpretation" on Plato's part--he announced this aim in 
the "Socratic" Gorgias, where he showed that .Socrates could not ac-
complish his mission of establishing '~equalitarian" justice unless 
political power rested in the hands of a just man. 
Socrates and the Philosopher-King contrast two entirely different 
worlds--"the worlds of the modest, rational individualist and of the 
totalitarian demi-god. "5 Plato realizes the totalitarian nature of his 
education, Popper asserts, because "he demands that only those who are 
1. Popper, OSE, 102-103, 112. 3. Popper, OSE, 113. 
2. Popper, OSE, 113-120. 4. Popper, OSE, 113. 
5. Popper, OSE, 116. 
past their prime should be admitted'' to higher education--"he is afraid 
of the power of thought. "l Popper cites the following passage as apply-
ing to the "highest form of education, " i. e. , the dialectical training 
necessary to the Philosopher-King. 
When their bodily strength . begins to fail, and when 
they are past the age of public and military duties, 
then, and only then, should. th~y be permitted to · 
enter at will the sacred field. 
The context from which this passage was taken states that Athenian edu-
cation was in need of reform because it exposed the youth to philosophy 
before they were mature, and that, as a result, later in life they con-
sidered listening to a discussion on philosophy at best as a pleasant 
pastime, for "in all but a few the light is quenched more effectually than 
the sun ct.. Heraclitus. "3 
. Socrates goes on to explain .how education should take place so 
that in the waning years of life a man can enjoy intellectual pleasures. 
Boys and youths should be given a liberal education 
suitable to their age; and, while growing up to 
manhood, they should take care to make their 
bodies into good instruments for the service of 
philosophy. As the years go on in which the mind 
begins to reach maturity, intellectual training 
should be intensified. Finally, when strength 
fails and they are past civil and military duties, let 
tJiem range at will, free from all serious business 
but philosophy; for theirs is to be a life of happiness, 
1. Popper, OSE, 117. 
2. Popper, OSE, 117. 
3. Plato, Rep., 498b, (Cornford, 206 .. ) 
-· -. 
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crownep after death with a fitting destiny in the other 
world. 
This, then, according to Popper, is totalitarian education which is 
afraid of the power of thought I 
While there is some merit in Popper's criticism, his dogmatism, 
in contrast to Plato's gentle guidance, in stating his case for democracy 
and his colored use of material as propaganda causes his every statement 
to be suspect. 
iii. Dewey and Plato. 
A much more enlightened criticism in th~ cause of democracy has 
come from John Dewey. Dewey's criticism of "the classic tradition, " 
which was entrenched in education at the turn of the century, is for the 
most part justified. He felt, however, that the classic tradition had 
its roots in Greek philosophy, especially that of Plato and Aristotle. 
As long as educators found their inspiration in the thoughts of these men, 
"progressive" education would not prosper. The emphasis on reason and 
the intellectual apprehension of true knowledge, he felt, detached ''doing" 
from "knowing"; the scientific method as developed in modern times had 
demonstrated that all useful knowledge was realized from doing, experi-
menting, and verifying the facts of experience. Intelligence and the 
realization of values cannot be separatec.I from "work, " which .had been 
cast into disrepute as menial and degrading by Plato and Aristotle, who 
1. Plato, Rep. , 498b-c, (Cornford, 206-207. ) 
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in their "quest for certainty" posited an unchanging realm of being that 
could be known to pure reason. 
Because practical action involves change and insecurity and 
because of man's distrust in himself and his inability to explain good and 
evil, the certainty of absolute knowledge has appealed to man. This 
preoccupation with the "antecedently real" has been purs~ed at the 
expense of an understanding of social problems that arise and must be 
solved every day in actual life. Dewey's contention is that all the 
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problems of philosophy "flow from the separation between theory and 
practice; knowledge and action." 1 His criticism, then, is that in the 
classic tradition; metaphysical presuppositions precede the facts of life, 
and that those facts are then distorted to fit the system; consequently man 
never does face ''reality," because he is always trying to escape to a better 
and more permanent world which exists in his mind. Man's salvation 
lies in facing facts, in the scientific method, in participating in work and 
society; by learning through doing. 
This thesis has tried to show that Plato's metaphysics grew out 
of a very keen awareness of the -"facts" of life, a deep awareness of the 
educational problem, and that in trying to solve these problems Plato 
always sought to· draw the individual and society, theory and practice 
into a harmonious unit. The above summary of Dewey's criticism of 
1. Dewey, TQC, 24. 
the classic tradition does not pretend to do justice to his thought, but it 
would seem that his criticism is more applicable to an interpretation 
that tradition has called Platonic than it is to Plato himself. 
On the positive side, Dewey proposes that education and philoso-
phy are practically one; that education is the chief means to social im-
provement; that the ends of education and the values of society should be 
consistent and that education should develop the potentialities of the indi-
vidual. He also holds that participation and student interest are funda-
mental to education and therefore that play and natural expression should 
be utilized rather than discouraged. The chief ends of education are 
social, Dewey feels, for education should prepare the student to partici-
pate meaningfully in society by instilling initiative and responsibility, by 
preparing the student to reorganize experience intelligently and purpos-
ively. Education is of fundamental importance because it is the chief 
means of assuring the continuity of social values. 
The only tenet which might be questioned as also applying to 
Plato' .S theory would be that of instilling initiative, but if we remember 
that real education for Plato consists of the active search on the part of 
the individual for true insight, it becomes evident that initiative is es-
sential to Plato's educational theories, too. 
The following quotations from various works by Dewey, collected 
in Intelligence in the Modern ·World, may help to indicate some of the 
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points upon which Dewey and Plato would seem to be in agreement . 
. Philosophy and education: "If we are ·willing to conceive edu-
cation as the process Of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual 
and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be 
defined as the general theory of education. nl . 
The importance of environment: "In the hands of one who is not 
intelligently aware of individual capacities and of the influence un-
consciously exerted upon them by the entire environment, even the best 
of technical methods are likely to get an immediate result at the expense 
of forming deep-seated and persistent bad habits. n2 
Education and the formation of habits: "The problem and the 
opportunity with the young are selection of orderly and continuous modes 
of occupation, which, whUe they lead up to and prepare for the indis-
pensable activities of adUlt life, have their own sufficient justification in 
their present reflex influence upon the formation of habits of thought. u 3 
Education and growth: "Acquisition of skill, possession of 
knowledge, attainment of culture are not · ends: they are marks of growth 
and means to its continuing.... Getting from the present the degree and 
kind of growth there_is in it is education. n4 
"Growth, or growing as developing, not only physically but intel-
lectually and morally, is one exemplification of the principle of 
continuity. "5 
Education and morality: "The educative process is all one with 
the moral process !16 
Theory and practice: "It is the business of educators to see that 
the conditions of expression of the practical interests are such as to 
encourage the developing of these intell:ectual phases of an activity, and 
thereby evoke a gradual transition to the theoretical type .... 
"When any one be.c.omes interested in a problem as a problem 
and in inquiry and learning for the sake of solving the problem, interest 
is distinctively intellectual. ,,7 
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The teacher as a .Socratic "midwife": "Since learning is something 
that the pupil has to do himself and for himself, the initiative lies with 
the learner. The teacher is a guide and director. "8 
1. Dewey, IMW, 259. 4 . Dewey, IMW, 628. 7. Dewey, IMW, 614. 
2. Dewey, IMW, 619. 5. Dewey, IMW, 664-665. 8. Dewey, IMW, 615. 
3. Dewey, IMW, 617. 6. Dewey, IMW, 627. 
Freedom and individuality: "F.reedom or individuality, in short, 
is not an original possession or gift. It is something to be achieved, to 
be wrought out. "1 
Society and education: "One factor inherent in the situation is 
that schools do follow and reflect the social 'order' that exists:'2 
Education and social institutions: "Government, business, art, 
religion, . aU social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That ~urpose 
is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals." 
Other points on which Dewey and Plato are in essential agreement 
are: that society is. at its best when individuals are doing that for which 
they are best fitted; that one of the essential tasks of education is to find 
and develop the leaders of society and that an individual's place in soCiety 
should be determined by natural aptitude and not by wealth or birth. Both 
believe that society and education are necessarily associated and inter-
dependent, and that education should reveal the values of life and give 
the student the basis for an organized life in harmony with moral insight. 
These many points of similarity between Dewey and Plato in their 
educational theories, however, may obscure the fact that there are funda-
mental differences in their thought--the differences are primarily episte-
mological and metaphysical. We have seen how important epistemology 
and metaphysics are to Plato's fully developed ideas on education, and 
it might seem strange that Dewey and Plato could be so close in t:lJ.eir 
thinking on education and so far apart on the more technical aspects of 
philosophy. In this difference lies the criticism that Plato would 
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1. Dewey, IMW, 627. 2. Dewey, IMW, 692. 3. Dewey, ~' 629. 
probably direct at Dewey. Dewey asserts ends and purposes both indi-
vidual and social for education and also maintains that in the broadest 
sense education and morality are essentially one, but he is also a 
relativist; Plato would be sure to ask for the "art of measure" by which 
Dewey assays the ends of education and thereby the ends of society and 
morality. 
Plato is related to Dewey in much the same manner that Socrates 
is to Protagoras, as Plato describes that relationship in the Protagoras. 
Plato can accept most of the positive statements that Dewey makes in 
regard to education, but he would then ask Dewey, as Socrates asked 
Protagoras, for the basis of those assertions; as Socrates rejected 
Protagoras' sociological arguments,- so he would reject Dewey's scien-
tific method, not because it is not valuable but because it is insufficient 
as an explanation of the facts of experience. The chief merit of the 
experimental method is the degree of control that it gives man over his 
environment--but this can only mean our physical environment, since 
as Dewey himself states, the technological advance of modern physical 
and social sciences has not yet reached the point where it has become 
"artistic or human" and that the limits in this direction are "moral and 
intellectual, due to defects in our good ·will and knowle~e. " 1 These 
limitations, Dewey insists, are not metaphysically inherent in the very 
nature of experience; there is no need to appeal to a metaphysical realm, 
1. Dewey, RP, 88-89. 
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since all that is needed for the realization of values is the organization 
of past experience and present needs. 1 "For reason is experimental 
intelligence, conceived after the pattern of science, and used in the 
creation of social arts. " 2· 
Dewey has a great deal of factual material to draw upon which 
was not available to Plato; but Plato's scientific attitude is generally 
overlooked or underestimated. ''The common notion that Plato was 
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'unscientific' must be pronounced an error. n3 Even with the great amount 
of scientific knowledge that mankind has at his disposal and the tre-
mendous advance he has made in contrOlling his environment, there has 
been no such advance, as Dewey himself. notes, in man's control over 
himself. The ethical and educational problems · that Plato raised are as 
pertinent today as they ever were, and the basis of his · criticisms of 
Protagoras still apply in general to Dewey. If there are ends, and 
purposes and social goods implicit in education, they rest on an organized 
system of values which in the final analysis depends on some objective 
reasonableness, the evaluation of the facts of experience, and this the 
scientific method, work or doing will not furnish. The standard for evalu- · 
ation is what Plato sought in his analysis of man, society and education--
the scientific method, doing and practical experience are essential tools 
in the search for the common meeting-place of men's minds, and Plato 
1. Dewey, RP, 89. 2. Dewey, RP, 89. 
~· Brett, HP, I, 66. 
would be the first to admit their importance in this respect, but they are 
not in themselves criteria for the ends or purposes that man must have 
if there is to be any sense in his attempt to organize life in society 
meaningfully. 
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Dewey himself realizes the limitations of the scientific method, 
and proposes that it takes active intelligence to utilize the potential values-
of our technological advances;1 but "intelligence" is not the same as 
"reason" and knowledge cannot be reduced to the certainty of absolute 
knowledge apprehended by pure reason. 2 Whatever the relative merits 
of these different attitudes m:ay be, it clearly appears that "practically" _ 
the argument is, as it should be since Dewey is a contemporary, in 
Dewey's favor. The classic simplicity of the Republic, even under ideal 
conditions, C'Ould apply only to a small and comparatively simple social 
structure. To think, therefore, of the early dialogues and the Republic 
as old-fashioned and worthless to a complex modern society is to miss 
the point entirely. 
Their profound simplicity; their reduction of human experience 
to fundamental issues is what makes these dialogues timeless. _ That we 
cannot accept the notion of the Philosopher-King does not destroy the 
argument that underlies such an ideal~ for the Philosopher-King antici-
pates the idea of specialized and institutionalized government that 
governs in the interest of the people and the idea that justice stands 
1. Dewey, IMW, 339 ff. 2. Dewey, IMW, 313 ff. 
above the decisions of a group of. people even though in that group the 
majority may have decided. for an unjust act. In trying to arrive at a 
form of government that would protect such a person as Socrates, Plato 
was anticipating the idea that an individual or a minority group should 
not be subject to the irrational moti.vations of a mob under the name of 
law. That he could hardly anticipate the machinery of jurisprudence, 
judicial review, or the constituted rights of an individual does not destroy 
the worth of his analysis; in fact, because he was forced to think the 
whole problem through without the aid of such concepts, the basic re-
lationships between the individual and society, education and knowledge, 
law and justice and all the other problems discussed in this thesis are 
delineated with a clarity that would be hard to achieve at present. · It is 
primarily in the problems that he raises and the relationships that he 
notes that Plato's value lies for the present day. 
7. Plato and modern education. 
Popper and Dewey were introduced in order to try to show, in 
part, Plato's relation to the modern world. Popper's entirely negative 
attitude towards Plato is super-typical of much of the criticism that 
Plato's philosophy is receiving at present from men who have reputations 
as scholars. The approach in this thesis has been positive throughout, ·· 
but this is not meant, to imply that .there is no criticism which can be 
made of Plato's thought as it applies to the modern world; the worth of 
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thinkers from the past, however, lies in the contributions that they can 
make to the present--criticism is necessarily a part of evaluation; but 
it is hard to see how Popper's caustic repudiation of Plato adds to our 
understanding of problems that face us today. If such an attitude were 
to become universal, it is we and not Plato who would suffer. 
The . brief summary of some of John: Dewey's educational tenets 
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was added in an attempt to indicate that Plato's fundamental ideas on 
education are not necessarily opposed to the ideals of society in a repre-
sentative democracy and may in fact be very useful as a basis for criti-
cism of our educational and social values. Dewey's philosophy of edu-
cation is admittedly designed for democracy. But his . thought, as far as 
education and its function are concerned, is not irreconcilable with Plato's 
philosophy of education. It has been noted that democracy in Plato's day 
and democracy at present have certain fundamental differences--it 
cannot be doubted that Plato would have approved of many of the principles 
and institutions of representative democracy, for instance, the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In many ways the justices of the Supreme 
Court are analogous to Plato's concept of the Philosopher-King; the 
position is one of high honor and even with the political machinations 
involved in the appointment of justices, they must have a certain edu-
cational background and are chosen for proven ability and experience. 
The lifetime appointment and the freedom from overt political pressure 
has placed above reproach the motivations behind the decisions of these 
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men. Their opinions interpret the principles upon which our government 
is based; they are subject to no laws except their own consciences; they 
have no standard except the "spirit of the constitution" and justice as 
they see it. The analogy can be carried just so far, but it would seem 
that there is enough similarity to justify the thought that many of the 
principles which Plato tried to in.still in the ideal state by means of the 
Philosopher-King have been incorporated in representative democracy 
through other means. 
The principles that Plato sought to realize through the Philosopher-
King are not necessarily limited to the institution of judicial review. 
Ideally they should apply to all officials in a representative democracy. 
The constitution does not impose on the elected poli-
tician and his aids the duty to follow the dictates of 
public opinion. It is the essence of representative 
government that the politician is voted into office on 
the theory that he can defend the interests1 of the people better than the people themselves. 
This departure from the traditional idea of what a democracy should 
theoretically be reflects the pace and complexity of political events in 
the modern world. Once the idea gains favor that government, for the 
most part, is the responsibility of trained specialists, or at least men 
with the ability to "defend the interests of the people," Plato's educational 
argument and its close. alliance with the political structure becomes 
extremely valuable. 
1. Strausz and Possony, IR, 496. 
As regards education itself, Professor Blanshard and four com- . 
patriots made a survey in 1945 of philosophy in higher education, the 
results of which were published in Philosophy in American Education. 
The general consensus of educators throughout the country was that 
philosophy in education today was not (1) performing its function of inte-
grating knowledge (2) or giving students a "community of mind" (3) or a 
consistent definition of their society (democracy), its meaning and ends 
(4) and that it has failed to give the student the basis, opportunity or 
guidance necessary for forming a "philosophy of life." 
Our graduates have a fair stock of information; 
granted; but it lies about in their minds in fragments 
which need to be welded together to make a usable 
instrument. Secondly, they have been so busy 
boring educational holes, acquiring specialized 
knowledge and skills, that they now have little in 
common ih the way of ideas, standards, or princi-
ples. Thirdly, they should understand better the 
nature and demands of the democracy in which they 
are to play their part. Fourthly, there is a want 
of clarity about the great ends of living, attachment 
to which gives direction and unity to life. 1 
If these are the failures of philosophy in education today, it becomes 
obvious why the principles behind Plato•s theory of education are as im-
portant now as they were in his own day; for these are exactly the points 
that Plato tried to resolve into one harmonious whole in the educational 
state, where a way of life depends on knowledge which gives to the citi-
zen a "community of mind" because the values of the individual are 
consistent with the values of his society. 
1. Blanshard, PAE, 10. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis, Plato's Philosophy of Educationin the Early Dialogues, 
is, as the title would suggest, concerned with the ideas on education that 
Plato discusses in the early dialogues. Platois use of the dialogue and 
the Socratic method place him among the foremost teachers of all time, 
and some of his practical suggestions, and his educational precepts are 
extremely cogent, but- it is with education in the larger sense of paideia 
or culture that this thesis is concerned. It has tried to analyze the place 
of education in relation to the development of Plato's philosophy by means 
of what here has been called "the educational ar.gument. " 
The educational argument attempts to trace the course of Plato's 
thought from the investigation of virtue or arete' in relation to the indi-
vidual who asks what it means to be virtuC?us and what the advantages 
of being virtuous are, to the problem which emerges from that investi-
gation: Can virtue be taught? The examination of "powlar opinions" 
in the shorter dialogues introduces this problem by showing the con-
flicting and fuzzy thoughts that are all too prevalent and the need that 
exists for clear and organized thinking on the subject of whether man 
can improve himself and whether he can be aided in that improvement by 
being "taught. " The problem of virtue and whether it can be taught is 
essentially the same as the proble.m of "the good life." It is perhaps 
easier to see that if virtue is actively sought it will be sought because 
it contributes to the "good life," but it is not so clear that "the good 
life" implies virtue--this is the fact which Plato wished to establish. 
The problem of the good life and the problem of whether virtue 
can be taught are actually one, then; from a consideration of what the 
best possible life is, the social and practical problems of the individual 
and his relation to society are most easily seen, for the good life would 
necessarily include .not only the individual's choices and actions in society 
but also that society itself, for it follows that the best possible life can 
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be lived only in the best possible society. Once it is shown that the good 
life includes social problems, the question of teaching virtue becomes 
paramount, for if individuals cannot be influenced for their own good and 
the good of society by the education that they receive, there is little hope · 
for social organization propitious to the conscious realization of the good 
life. In other words, if the good life is to go beyond the egocentric regard 
for personal welfare, man must be able to contnol to some extent the 
environment in which he lives, and one of the most important aspects of 
that environment, Plato felt, was the moral and intellectual clime which 
could only be governed by education. 
The problem of teaching virtue, when fully investigated, contains 
all the technical aspects of philosophy. Beginning with the more system-
atic investigation of virtue itself in the Protagoras, the problem begins 
to snowball, for virtue is there defined as "knowledge," and happiness 
is said to depend on "the art of measure. " The questions of what knowledge 
is, what it means to teach virtue, what happiness consists of and what 
the "art of measure" is, eventually involve Plato's epistemology, psy-
chology, metaphysics, axiology, and the rudiments of his theology. 
None of these technical ·aspects of philosophy are considered in them-
selves; they are all part of one ethical whole in which education plays a 
fundamental role. 
By trying to integrate all the potentialities of man, all the various 
aspects of personality that are "natural," Plato demonstrates that no one 
personality potential or desire should be exclusively appealed to as the 
guide to "the. good life." A predisposition to any one of life's many possi-
bilities results in an "inversion" of values that is unnatural; the principle 
that should govern is the intrinsic goodness--the good--of any value seen 
in relation to all the values, purposes, and ends of life conceived as an 
organic whole. 
Once the way has been paved by the shorter "negative" dialogues, 
the "educational argument" becomes more positive in the Symposium, 
Meno; and Gorgias. The Symposium presents the thought that man's 
happiness depends on the fullest realization of his natural potential and 
that the motivating force behind self-realization is love, the desire for 
self-expression rooted in the desire for immortal perfection and happi-
ness. The highest expression of this desire is the desire for wisdom--
a desire which can be guided or educated to the point of fulfillment but 
which cannot be satisfied by the transfer of factual lmowledge from 
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teacher to student. 
Both the Meno and the Symposium state that the awareness of 
ignorance, the insight into the unrealized potentialities of man, is the 
beginning of real wisdom. The person who is stimulated by this awareness 
may struggle on to real knowledge--the knowledge of eternal values known 
to the immortal soul. Such a man would be truly virtuous, truly just and, 
since the just man wills ends that are good and since the highest function 
of the just man is that of the statesman, he will accept the responsibility 
and teach the people to be better. The truly powerful man is portrayed 
in the Gorgias as a just man, and he can protect himself and the values 
for which he stands only if he is a statesman-educator who will rule on 
the basis of eternal values and not by "true opinion." Because he 
"possesses" true knowledge he wills ends that are truly good for himself 
and because he is an intrinsic part of society those ends will be good for 
the state. 
The best life possible and the good state are necessarily associated, 
and their materialization depends on the soul's recall of supernal values. 
The possibility of the soul's recalling these eternal truths depends on 
the profound awareness of ignorance (Socrates the gadfly) and proper 
guidance (Socrates the midwife); thus it is that we come to realize the 
full importance of the need for Socrates' new paideia which will be 
primarily education for the "soul," the total personality including its 
irrational elements. 
Plato relates most of his ideas in the beautifully simple con-
struction of the Republic, where he gives each concept its proper place 
in a complete social structure; in many cases, the real importance of his 
thoughts in the shorter dialogues can only be appreciated through the 
Republic and, conversely, much of the Repub:Uc presupposes the earlier 
dialogues. The Gorgias does not place the statesman in society but is 
rather a critica introduction which clears the ground for the positive 
development in the Republic by analyzing the political ideals existing in 
Athens in Plato's time. To resolve the conflict between Athenian law 
and justice, symbolized by the unjust conviction of Socrates, Plato 
decla.res that a complete reorganization of Greek society is needed to 
accommodate a new kind of statesman, who will be primarily an educator. 
The structure of the Republic follows the development of the "edu-
cational argument. " It begins by asking what the value of justice is to the 
individual. Plato develops the idea that the values to which individuals 
aspire determine the form of the state; the ideal state would then reflect 
the nature of the perfectly just soul. The perfect state would come into 
being only if there could be a Philosopher-King whose justice would be 
grounded on the knowledge of eternal values and not "true opinion." 
These values, or Forms are revealed through the soul's intuitive 
knowledge of the Good. In the Republic, the analogy of the Sun indicates 
the metaphysical reality of the Good; the analogy of the Line presents 
the argument that the mode of perception, the way in which an object is 
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known, has a one-to-one correlation with its metaphysical status; · the 
Allegory of the Cave sums up the relation between education, episte-
mology, metaphysics and politics and shows the pivotal position that 
Socrates' new paideia has in those relationships. 
Education guides the soul from the lowest form of perception to 
the highest; these modes of "knowing" have objects that vary in their 
degrees of reality; when the soul "sees" the good, its reality and "light" 
reveal truly these various degrees of reality for the first time; thus edu-
cation, epistemology and metaphysics are integrally connected. The 
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Good is the criterion of "the good life'' and knowledge of it allows the 
just man to will ends that he knows are good; the knowledge of true 
reality, then, implies that the good life is the ethical life. The just man, 
to lead the ethical life, must have the power in the state, he must be the 
law, and this in turn means that he must be an educator--the Philosopher-
King--since ends consistently good imply the best society in which happi-
ness of the citizens as a whole must be given preference; and their happi-
ness depends on their being made better and freely willing that the 
Philosopher-King should govern. 
Much of Plato's philosophy, and especially the idea of the au-
thoritarian Philosopher-King is considered by some contemporary 
thinkers to be inimical to democracy; but Plato's definition of democracy 
and the modern ideal of representative democracy are vastly different, 
whereas the principles that are symbolized by Socrates and the 
• 
• 
Philosopher-King need only be translated into modern terms for many 
of them to be completely in harmony with the best traditions of repre-
sentative democracy. Plato's analysis of education and its relation to 
human happiness and society are especially valuable to an understanding 
of the fundamental problems of modern education . 
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